SOVIET-EAST EUROPE RELATIONS 1956-1958

by
Frederic W. Smith

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AN ABSTRACT

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Washington, D. C.

AN ABSTRACT

OF

<u>[illegible] ENERGY RELATIONS 1926-1939</u>

By

Theodore M. Smith

Submitted in Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
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in Political Science in the Graduate
School of the American University
Washington, D.C.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research study is to examine a specific and significant period of time in the development of the Soviet bloc--1956 to 1958. As considered in this dissertation, the Soviet bloc consists of the Soviet Union and its East European "satellites": Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. Yugoslavia and China are treated only to the extent that their policies affected Soviet-East European relations during this time period.

The writer has discussed how Stalin forgot the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the events leading up to the crisis of 1956, and the manner in which the Soviet leaders reacted to this crisis. How the bloc evolved under Khrushchev's leadership, especially the sweeping and perhaps irreversible effects of his so-called de-Stalinization policies has been shown. The manuscript shows how rapid military and industrial growth of the Soviet bloc relative to the United States and her allies altered significantly the power relationship that had obtained for a decade following World War II.

At this time, the campaign against imperialism and colonialism reached its peak. The Soviets, quick to take advantage of deteriorating Western influence, were able to

provide a political leadership apparently sympathetic to the desires of the new nations for independence and rapid growth.

An additional factor in the growth of the Soviet variety of socialism, at this time, was the obsession of the former colonies and other under-developed nations to rush headlong into industrialization. It was only natural for Premier Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders to encourage and exploit to their advantage the breakdown in the old colonial order and the new emphasis on industrialization through socialism.

Effective strengthening of the socialist camp and realistic planning to extend bloc influence required that the bloc members continued to submit to centralized leadership. The writer points out that force or the threat of force by the Soviets is not the only basis of the Soviet bloc. There has been considerable economic integration within the bloc since 1956.

Of critical importance in an analysis of Soviet-East European relations during this period, however, has been the inability of the communist bloc leadership to promote a style of economic growth, cooperation, and integration that could permit the Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries to press their highly-publicized economic competition with the West.

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An additional factor in the growth of the Soviet variety of socialism, at this time, was the observation of the former colonies and other Soviet leaders of Western European industrialization. It was only natural for Russian Marxists and other Soviet leaders to welcome and exploit to their advantage the breakdown in the old colonial order and the rise everywhere in nationalistic sentiment throughout Asia.

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The manuscript comes to an abrupt halt, as the candidate, a Commander in the United States Navy, was killed in the service of his country.

AWARDED POSTHUMOUSLY

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INTRODUCTION

Several years ago, the official organ of international communism published--perhaps with justifiable optimism--the following assessment of the world situation:

> Historic events of world-wide importance are taking place on our planet. The transition from capitalism to socialism is being realized on a world scale. The face of the world is changing, and it is changing precisely as Marx, Engels and Lenin foresaw.[1]

Most of us would agree that historical events are taking place and that the face of the world is changing, even that traditional political and economic systems are being subjected to challenge and transformation. But whatever visions Marx, Engels, and Lenin had of the future, it is extremely doubtful that they "precisely foresaw" the nature of political change in the mid-twentieth century.

This process of political change applies, of course, to the Soviet bloc[2] as well as to other political systems.

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[1] World Marxist Review (Problems of Peace and Socialism), I (September, 1958), 3.

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If not apparent a few years ago, the nature of this process of change has been spectacularly demonstrated by the bitter quarrel conducted openly, since 1960, by Communist China and the Soviet Union. The somewhat less dramatic, yet perhaps much more meaningful, struggle between Rumania and the Soviet Union in recent years also underscores the depth of this change.

Students of political science attempting to analyze contemporary developments in the Soviet bloc would find their understanding enhanced by a thorough knowledge of how the bloc evolved under Khrushchev's leadership, especially the sweeping and perhaps irreversible effects of his so-called de-Stalinization policies. The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine a specific and significant period of time in the development of the Soviet bloc: 1956 to 1958. In order for such an examination to be meaningful, it is necessary to consider not just the chronology of events but also the theoretical foundations, in Marxism and Leninism, for relations among communist governments. It is also necessary to review briefly the methods by which Stalin forged the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the events

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leading up to the crisis of 1956, and the manner in which the Soviet leaders reacted to this crisis. The nature of the economic organization of the Soviet bloc should also be considered in some detail. And, finally, the evolution of the bloc structure, in the years 1956 to 1958, should be related to that of the present.

The time span 1956-1958 has been selected as the focus of attention of Soviet-East European relations for several reasons. First and most obvious, the significance of this period lies in the momentous events of the fall of 1956, when upheaval in Poland and revolution in Hungary threatened the complete disintegration of the Soviet bloc. The success of the Soviets, in at least partially repairing the structure of the bloc during the ensuing months, was such that two years later the Soviets viewed the world situation with considerable optimism, as expressed in the opening quotation of this Introduction (supra, p. iii).

When considering Soviet-East European relations during the period in question, the world situation existing at that time must be taken into account in order to place the policies of the various members of the bloc in proper perspective. Several broad developments were operative during the later 1950's to alter significantly the power relationship that had obtained for a decade following World War II. Among these were the rapid military and industrial growth

of the Soviet bloc relative to the United States and her allies: these closely-related developments were spectacularly accented by the launching of Sputnik in October, 1957, and subsequent Soviet successes in space exploration. During the same years, the United States, as the leading industrial power of the free world, was plagued by relative economic stagnation; and the American space program, no matter how sophisticated, was second in terms of time and prestige.

At about this time, also, the campaign against imperialism and colonialism reached its peak. The dissolution of huge empires controlled from Western Europe and the proliferation of politically unstable and economically under-developed nations throughout Asia and Africa left a political void waiting to be filled by a dynamic world force capable of providing forceful political leadership and substantial economic aid. The Soviets, quick to take advantage of deteriorating Western influence, were able to provide a political leadership apparently sympathetic to the desires of the new nations for independence and rapid economic growth. Since the highly-industrialized capitalist countries of Western Europe and the Americas were discredited, at least partially, by the stigma of colonialism and imperialism, an optimistic Soviet leadership might visualize this era as a golden opportunity for the U.S.S.R.

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and its associated powers to extend their influence, however inadequate their economic resources might be, throughout major portions of Asia, Africa, and even Latin America.

An additional factor was the obsession of the former colonies and other under-developed nations to rush headlong into industrialization. This attitude was usually accompanied by the conviction that the best--if not the only--solution to the problems of a backward country was to be found in socialism. The attractiveness of the Soviet variety of socialism, as a means to achieve industrialization was rarely accompanied by a careful consideration of the economic and political costs involved. It was only natural for Premier Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders to encourage and exploit to their advantage this breakdown in the old colonial order and the new emphasis on industrialization through socialism.[3] Whether the Soviets, after the severe crisis within the bloc in 1956, could refurbish the economic vitality of the bloc in order to take advantage of these new developments is subject to question. Lasting economic ties between the bloc and the emerging nations, if they could be established, would hopefully serve as the

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[3]For a brief treatment of this subject, see Leon M. Herman, "The Political Goals of Soviet Foreign Aid," in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 433-435 and 478-482.

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basis for future political penetration and increased influence by the Soviet bloc countries.[4]

Effective strengthening of the socialist camp and realistic planning to extend bloc influence required that the bloc members continue to submit to centralized leadership, not only in matters of ideology but also in the political, economic, and military spheres. How could Khrushchev reconcile the contradiction between the policies of de-Stalinization and alleged equality of bloc members with the requirements for economic--and perhaps eventual political--integration under Soviet domination? There is no precise answer to this dilemma which still confronts Soviet leadership. The reduction of terror and relaxation of the brutal Soviet methods of control of Stalin's era might improve economic productivity and brighten relations between the Soviet Union and the satellites, but, at the same time, these policies inevitably increased the appetites of the East European countries for still greater measures of political and economic independence.

The degree of political freedom achieved by the satellites in the mid-1950's must not be exaggerated,

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basis for future political penetration and increased inflexibility by the Soviet side concerned.[4]

Effective strengthening of the socialist camp and realistic planning to extend bloc influence requires that the bloc members overcome to exhibit to centrifugal tendency, not only in matters of ideology but also in the political, economic, and military spheres. The coming liberalization reconcile the contradiction between the political destalinization and alleged equality of bloc members with the requirements for economic--and perhaps eventual political--integration under Soviet domination. There is no precise answer to this dilemma which still confronts Soviet leadership. The reduction of terror and relaxation of the brutal Soviet methods of control of Stalin's era might improve economic productivity and heighten relations between the Soviet Union and the satellites, but, at the same time, these policies inevitably increased the appetites of the East European countries for still greater measures of political and economic independence.

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however. The Soviet leaders may not dictate the policies of East European governments, as in the past; but, on the other hand, they would not likely sit idly by should the communist structure of any East European government or the integrity of the bloc be threatened.

Force or the threat of force by the Soviets is not the only basis of the Soviet bloc. There is still the presence of large numbers of Soviet troops in or near the various satellites. As shall be discussed in Chapter IV, there has been considerable economic integration of the Soviet bloc since 1956: the construction of oil pipelines from the Soviet Union to several of the satellites and the continued dependence of East European countries on Russian raw materials serve as two examples. East Europe remains more than merely a Soviet sphere of influence in the traditional sense, and the realistic political leaders of East Europe are well aware of this fact.

A study of the years 1956-1958 should not only illuminate, in the historical sense, a critical era in the development of the Soviet bloc. It should also aid in an understanding of the nature of relations among communist governments at the present time. We should be able to conclude whether there are any marked differences between the relations among communist governments and, say, relations among various capitalist states. On the theoretical level,

we should also be able to frame some relationships between economic and political power.

In the few short years of Khrushchev's leadership, the once monolithic Soviet empire has revealed all the strains and stresses that have afflicted traditional military and political alliances of the past. If we recognize that the Soviet empire has been substantively altered, it is only natural to ask "why?" Was Khrushchev, in the relative sense, more a political liberal than Stalin? Or have there been external forces operative that would have determined the course of bloc development regardless of the nature of Khrushchev's policies? Or did Khrushchev, in his de-Stalinization campaign, not anticipate the nature and extent of the changes he would call into being?

Looming just over the horizon during the years being examined was the impending Sino-Soviet squabble, of historic origin and over traditional problems, yet still camouflaged by the veneer of "socialist cooperation and fraternal relations." Detailed discussion of this subject is outside the parameters of this paper, but the Sino-Soviet struggle did have its affect on the course of developments in the Soviet bloc during the period in question.

Of critical importance in an analysis of Soviet-East European relations during this period, however, has been the inability of the communist bloc leadership to promote a

style of economic growth, cooperation, and integration that could permit the Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries to press their highly-publicized economic competition with the West. In another decade or two, this may be accepted as the decisive factor of the period 1956-1958.

CHAPTER I

MOTIVATING FORCES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Many volumes have been written on Soviet foreign policy. One recent study of international politics suggests that there are two basic interpretations of the motivations for Russian expansionism: traditional Tsarist imperialism and revolutionary communist ideology.[1] To say that Soviet policies are inspired ideologically or a manifestation of historic Russian drives is both begging the issue and ignoring the complexity of the framework of factors motivating the foreign policy of any large and powerful state. Many analyses of international politics, especially the political confrontation of East and West, are insufficient because of a failure to provide a proper balance between the heritage of Russian foreign policy and the rather unique features of Marxist philosophy, warped by decades of Soviet interpretation and revision.[2]

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[2]Ambassador Bowles' recent article "Is Communist Ideology Becoming Irrelevant?," Foreign Affairs, XL (July, 1962), 554-558, fails to distinguish between the effective ideology of the present time and Marxist doctrine of a century ago. The erosion of Marxism through the passage of time has produced basically a new doctrine; it does not follow from this that ideology is irrelevant, even though it bears little resemblance to original Marxist theory.

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It has also been suggested that Soviet foreign policy can be summed up neatly as either revisionist or status quo, which supposedly avoids the sticky question of Marxist theory. Yet, it soon becomes obvious that these two classifications, which tend by definition to be mutually exclusive, are inadequate. If it is assumed that the Soviet Union is fundamentally a revisionist power,[3] then it must be determined to what extent the revisionist motivations are the product of Marxist ideology or historic factors. In addition, the proponent of the revisionist theory must stipulate whether a revisionist foreign policy involves a willingness on the part of the political leadership to risk the security of the state in international adventures.

The second general category above holds that, instead of being revolutionary or revisionist, Soviet policy is devoted to the conservation and strengthening of its present world position. According to this view, the Soviet Union is concerned primarily with the status quo and is not really interested in revolution of any form.[4] This school

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of thought has gained increasing influence in recent years because of the "thaw" in Soviet foreign and domestic policy since Stalin's death, and the success of the Soviet leadership in building a gigantic industrial-political empire that the Soviets are naturally anxious to preserve. Most proponents of the conservative Soviet attitude in world affairs argue either that the Party leadership is extremely reluctant to risk its position, as well as the future of Soviet Russia (which they feel grows relatively stronger each year), to challenge the West in a possible military showdown or that the modernization of Soviet society has produced a "mellowing" of Soviet leadership[5] and a crude type of public opinion in the Soviet "middle class" which is strongly opposed to adventuristic policies. However, an unusual dissent to this view was expressed recently, claiming that the Soviet Union ". . . is today what she has been throughout her modern history: the paradox of a great power founded on a weak society." This critical economic imbalance, the author states, is not disguised by a rapid

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growth rate; Soviet foreign policy is conservative, even defensive, because of its weak economic structure.[6]

Two problems of definition require clarification. First, it is accurate to state that all governments are concerned with the status quo. They favor the status quo to the extent that the political leadership thinks primarily in terms of the perpetuation of its power, within the context of the existing political system and wishes to avoid any unsettling international development which might threaten this position. This leadership is, in addition, committed by necessity to the protection of the interests of the state it is sworn to serve.[7] Since security of the state is identified (even if subconsciously) by the political leadership with its own security in office, all states

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[7]It is interesting, but not crucial, to stress, as has one renowned student of Soviet affairs, that "World revolution and the traditional national interests of Russia frequently march together but when they diverge the former is temporarily sacrificed for the sake of the latter." From the introduction to Waldemar Gurian, "The Two Mainsprings of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), Principles and Problems of International Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 280. It is often indicated that the Soviet Union, in its early years, would hazard its national security for world revolution, yet Lenin made it abundantly clear during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations that the Bolshevik regime could not hope to promote international socialism by sacrificing its own existence. Thus, at a very early date, the cause of international Socialism was deferred to the interests of the Soviet state.

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The second definitional problem is the interrelationship between ideology and national interest.[8] Some students of Soviet politics separate these conceptions too severely. There is no necessary, inherent divergence between ideology and national interest,[9] even though there will be a degree

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[8]Ideology and interests are seen as not necessarily being in opposition, when Soviet policy is visualized as a broad spectrum, ". . . beginning with a minimum protection of the Soviet Union and its socialist character--up to a maximum--to win over the rest of the world to the same system." Klaus Tornudd, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Non-Military Regional Co-Operation," Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, XXVIII [Helsingfors, Finland, 1961], 255; Alfred G. Meyer in Leninism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 86, briefly describes Lenin's concept of minimum and maximum programs, noting that the minimum program easily becomes an end in itself: "The means thus turn into absolutes, and the end, at least for the time being, becomes a mere myth." Alexander Dallin (ed.), Soviet Conduct in World Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 313, presents this view when he says that, in Russian policy, "ends and means interacted and reinforced each other." In a discussion of Bolshevik nationality policy, Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), p. 96, observes that ". . . like all ultimates, the Soviet variety tends to recede into the distant future, while the transitory hardens into permanence."

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of conflict between ideology and national interest, just as there is conflict between various interests in all developed societies. Rather than divergence, there is often a natural affinity between ideology and interests, with one affecting or determining the other. Interests are, after all, what the statesmen determine them to be (within limits), and ". . . it is the very nature of ideology that it deceives not only others but also those who use it."[10] Where there is conflict in a political system, between ideals and requirements, ideology usually is not abandoned but stretched to include the political requirements of the time. To reject the ideological bases of Soviet foreign policy is just as misleading as it is to assume that the sole motivation of the Soviets can be found in "pure" Marxist doctrine. The foreign policy of each state is governed, to some extent, by its peculiar form of ideology. Before attempting to formulate the role of ideology as a factor in the analysis of Soviet policy, we should briefly consider the concept of ideology itself.

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among two or more socialist states. For example, communist ideology could be considered to prescribe certain broad forms of economic cooperation and specialization; but the implementation of such cooperative measures may contravene traditional national interests.

[10]Fromm, op. cit., p. 130.

of conflict between ideology and national interest, just as there is conflict between various ideologies in all developed societies. Rather than divergence, there is often a natural affinity between ideology and interest, with one affecting or determining the other. Interests are, after all, what the statesmen determine them to be [within limits], and "... it is the very essence of ideology that it deceives not only others but also those who use it."[10] Where there is conflict in a political system, between ideals and requirements, ideology usually is not abandoned but stretched to include the political requirements of the time. To reject the ideological basis of Soviet foreign policy is just as misleading as it is to assume that the sole motivation of the Soviets can be found in "pure" Marxist doctrine. The foreign policy of each state is governed, in some extent, by its peculiar form of ideology. Before attempting to formulate the role of ideology as a factor in the analysis of Soviet policy, we should briefly consider the concept of ideology itself.

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The original meaning of the term "ideology" is based on the notion that all ideas originate from sensation or human experience. Both the word and the thought were developed in the eighteenth century, and the view of ideology as being the summation of individual human experience soon found favor with the leaders of the French Revolution, who realized that this concept of reason based on experience could be employed in a political sense to combat the dogmas of such authoritarian institutions as the church and the aristocracy. In this manner, ideology became associated with the political forces in power, and their officially-adopted political doctrine became the only acceptable ideology. Because of this association of the term "ideology" with the forces of the French Revolution during the Napoleonic era, the concept of ideology was linked with any political belief that was in opposition to Napoleon. Although the notion of ideology has broadened in recent years because of its extensive use, it still retains an aura of deliberate deception from the Napoleonic era.

Marx and Engels conceived a similar function for ideology. Although, at times, they used ideology to signify broadly any form of consciousness reflecting the attitudes and beliefs of a social class, they usually distinguished between the "ideological" consciousness (or "false consciousness") of the bourgeoisie and the "real knowledge" of the

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revolutionary class, or proletariat. From this position, as one student of ideology has argued, it was logical for Marx and Engels to reason that

> ideological doctrines are social myths or "opiates" of the people, and that the "reasons" for their acceptance have, at bottom, nothing to do with considerations of evidence or fact. This suggestion clings to the concept of ideology to this day.[11]

In this view, ideology consists of a body of doctrine, theoretical in its basis but intended primarily as a guide for action. Ideology is rooted in philosophy; but in a sense that it is a "false consciousness" and is generally restricted to political relationships, ideology may lose the core of its philosophical orientation.[12] The extreme form of this interpretation visualizes it as a sort of intellectual fraud, a deliberate hoax manufactured and perpetuated by power-seeking politicians who have no genuine belief in, and little understanding of, the idealistic goals of the ideology that they wear as a mask.[13]

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[11]Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 18-19. Also see Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), pp. 63-67.

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Misunderstanding and misuse of the term "ideology" leads to confusion and an inability to communicate with mutual understanding. Mannheim[14] has separated helpfully the concept of ideology into two meanings, the particular and the total. Both meanings have a common element in that neither participant in a dialogue accepts at face value what the other has said but attempts to gain an understanding of the other's view by analyzing his statements within the context of his social milieu.

Ideology in Mannheim's "particular" connotation, however, implies a much more narrow meaning than that of the "total" conception. The particular conception refers to only a part of the sum of the individual's views, whereas the total conception encompasses the idea-system of a specific "historico-social group," or class, or of a certain age or period of time. Marx's notion of the ideology of the bourgeoisie, for example, would fall within the total conception devised by Mannheim. The particular conception, as the terminology implies, is concerned with the ideology of an individual, rather than an entire group or class; it refers to an analysis of only a segment of the individual's ideas, on a purely psychological level. This requires a sharing of "common criteria of validity" between two

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The question of deliberate deception as an element of ideology is responsible for most of the divergent views of the nature of ideology that presently exist. Mannheim, as this writer understands him, is not explicit on this point. Mannheim apparently considers deception to be an element of the conception of ideology, both particular and total, although to a lesser extent in the latter.

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[15]Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 17. "Ideology is not ordinarily a conscious fraud, but is taken seriously by its beneficiaries." In the historical study of East-West relations, Barbara Ward suggests ideology as one of three "levels" of contact to be studied. Her very broad concept of ideology includes the whole area of religion and philosophy. Barbara Ward, The Interplay of East and West (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1957), p. 17.

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Mannheim's study has special relevance to contemporary political science. The growth of totalitarian political systems in the last forty years has broadened the meaning of the term "ideology," so that, in its "popular" sense, ideology, although the concepts just discussed are still valid, now generally means the summary construct or system of ideas perceived by an individual or group and used to describe the past, present, and future course of the development of man, his nature and societal relations, and his notions of the origin of the cosmos and a supreme being. The element of deception is no longer a necessary factor, although ideologies may be--and undoubtedly are--manipulated and shaped by ruling groups. Totalitarian political leadership is affected by the "feedback" of the ideology they promulgate, so that it is difficult to determine the point at which conscious deception might have ceased and actual belief commenced.[16] For this reason, Niebuhr's conception of ideology as a process of self-deception, and Morgenthau's idea of the separation of

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ideology and action are illustrations of the incorrect use of the notion of ideology; or, if not incorrect, these views are incomplete.

The Soviets, in one interpretation, visualize ideology as both a statement of ultimate objectives and a detailed guide for action.[17] Within the reality of the Soviet state, according to this view, contemporary Marxists would claim that ideology has shed its false consciousness and has assumed instead the cloak of Marxist infallibility, as interpreted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It has become all encompassing, a detailed

> action program suitable for mass consumption, derived from certain doctrinal assumptions about the general nature of the dynamics of social reality, and combining some assertions about the inadequacies of the past and/or present with some explicit guides to action for improving the situation and some notions of the desired eventual state of affairs. Ideology thus combines action--and since its object is society, it must be political action--with a consciousness both of purpose and of the general thrust of history. It gives its adherents a sense of consistency and certainty that is too often absent among those who have been brought up in the tradition of short-range pragmatism and empiricism.[18]

It should be realized that, when Brzezinski speaks of the role of ideology in shaping Soviet policy, he is not discussing Marxism in its pristine form, but rather the

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[17] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 97-98.

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product of the evolution of Marxist theory within the total Soviet experience.[19]

Brzezinski points out that, in the formulation of ultimate purposes, the ideology of the Soviets ". . . has remained basically unchanged throughout Communist history."[20] Rather than attest to the strength of the ideology, however, this conclusion simply underlines the fact that the ultimate objectives of Communist ideology have not been challenged by practical realities. Wherever the content of Marxist theory has been applied to practical problems (the requirements of the exercise of political power, for example), a revised Soviet ideology has evolved.

The relationship between long-range objectives and short-range tactics is a difficult subject to analyze. It is both difficult and dangerous for the leadership of a messianic movement to scrap the fundamental ideals of the movement. The ultimate objectives and ideals are constantly projected before the faithful to inspire lagging spirits. Temporary expediency, occasional cynicism, and compromise do not necessarily alter the ultimate objectives. Policy need not immediately, or constantly, be directed towards the achievement of distant objectives.[21]

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Concentration on the immediate and more pressing problems may cause a diminution in the appeal or significance of the final goal. For this reason,

> . . . the very thought of longer-range goals might constitute a distraction that would interfere with the pursuance of the more pressing immediate tasks. The means thus turn into absolutes, and the end, at least for the time being, becomes a mere myth.[22]

There is a difference of opinion, among those who claim a role for ideology in the making of policy, regarding the extent to which ideology shapes either short-range tactics or long-range objectives. One of the more knowledgeable students of contemporary Soviet politics, discussing the relationship of ideology and politics, writes that:

> What has been generally overlooked . . . is the fact of substantial change in the meaning and role of the Marxist doctrine itself. Marxism is manifested in everything the Communists say and do, but it does not enter into policy <u>except</u> in the short run. Theory is utilized by the Communist leadership to justify their power and policies, and its meaning is periodically reinterpreted to this end. Theory, in

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[22]Meyer, <u>Leninism</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 86.

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As Professor Daniels has so vividly demonstrated elsewhere,[24] the manipulation, modification, or blatant revision of Marxist doctrine to serve specific political objectives has been a conspicuous feature of Communists since Lenin's time. In this sense, in the requirements of political activity, action does determine the substance of theory. It is also correct to note that all policy decisions are justified and expressed in theoretical terms, but policy decisions, in the opinion of this writer, are more demanding in short-run, tactical matters, than in terms of long-range, vaguely-defined objectives. After all, it is not too difficult--and perhaps even stimulating--to the "believer" in Marxism, to talk of the "new Soviet man," the construction of communism by 1980, or the new principles of international relations based upon the fraternal socialist commonwealth. These distant or vague objectives do not contradict Marxism, but instead can be supported easily in Marxist theory. Tension between theory and policy arises in the short-range decisions that are designed to reach

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these objectives.[25] In other words, this writer is suggesting that "Marxism is manifested in everything the Communists say and do," but seldom determines policy decisions except to shape the general outline. The idealistic characteristics of Marxist theory enable the Soviet Marxist to identify--or equate--the interests of international communism with the interests of the Soviet state. This, in itself, presents no insurmountable problem for the Soviet (or other communist) politician; as was suggested earlier (supra, pp. 5-6), the problems multiply when non-Soviet Communists identify the needs of the communist movement with their national interests and possess some capability to advance these interests. This is essentially the nature of the problem that neither Marxist theory nor Soviet imperialism can master, and now seriously threatens the so-called socialist commonwealth.

The crux of the argument, in the opinion of this writer, is not whether ideology is a factor in Soviet foreign policy. The foreign policy of each nation is shaped to some extent by its ideology. The subject for discussion

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[25]The everlasting debate over such questions of economic theory as value and price, for example, is the persistence of these and other similar issues caused by questions of ideology or national interest? This is not simply stimulating speculation, because the economic failure (relative to Western Europe) of the bloc to integrate is centered on these questions.

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should be (1) what is the nature of this so-called Soviet ideology; and (2) in what manner is it different, if at all, from that of any other great power.

Brzezinski has formulated a framework for an analysis of the relationship between Soviet ideology and foreign policy.[26] This framework consists, first, of three basic Marxist principles: dialectical determinism in history, largely in terms of the class struggle; the inevitable triumph of socialism; and the inherent evil of private ownership. Superimposed on these Marxist principles are some further Soviet concepts which have grown out of the experience of Bolshevism: the necessity of the leadership of the Communist Party for the successful establishment of socialism in any given state; the supremacy of "consciousness" over "spontaneity"; and an international dichotomy consisting of irreconcilable hostility of the remainder of the world to the socialist states. The extent that the individual factors in this framework presently bear upon Soviet external relations is a matter of individual interpretation, but the structure itself serves as an excellent vehicle for analysis.

The question of the differences between Soviet ideology and that of any other state is central to the topic of

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this paper. Do the Soviets have as an ultimate objective the "communization" of the world (whether "realistic" or not), or are their policies simply consonant with "traditional" Russian goals? Do the Soviets act as any other great power would act under similar circumstances, or is their basic motivation determined by its Marxist foundation?

Brzezinski has commented that the Soviets have a sense of "compulsive obligation" to spread communism.[27] In this writer's opinion, Soviet ideology is different--in the political sphere--from that of any other great power in its ambition, its scope, thoroughness, and--most important--in this matter of "compulsive obligation" to extend the power of the Soviet regime through the international communist movement (again, it is not material to question the viability of the movement for this purpose, the "sincerity" of the professions of the Soviet leaders, or whether the Soviet leadership would risk the safety of the Soviet Union to advance the cause of the international movement).

The uniqueness of the Soviet system is exemplified in two characteristics: its internationalism[28] and its

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attitude toward the legitimacy of the existing international order. These attitudes are mutually reinforcing. Because Communist theory does not recognize the legitimacy of the present world order, especially that of the capitalist powers, the Soviet Union does not feel the same inhibitions against taking measures to change the international political structure as do the Western powers (whose inhibitions should not be exaggerated). The motivating force for such a policy is supplied by the internationalism of the communist ideology, which projects the concepts of a classless society and the withering away of the state to the international sphere, where all states will have arrived at equality under socialism (communism), and national boundaries, armaments, and other artificial international obstacles will "eventually" disappear. These two concepts, the socialist internationalism of the future and the illegitimacy of the present international system, have not been challenged by the exigencies of the last forty-five years and found to be unworkable, as have so many communist

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World (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 75. Professor Carr goes on to warn Western civilization that if it ". . . fails to develop ideas which appear equally valid in these respects, the advantage will continue to be on the side of the Soviet propagandists." Perhaps Professor Carr has misinterpreted both the need for Western civilization to "develop ideas" and the temporary advantages enjoyed by Soviet propagandists.

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tions against taking measures to change the international
political structure as do the Western powers (whose institu-
tions should not be endangered). The motivating force for
even a policy is supplied by the internationalism of the
communist ideology, which projects the concepts of a classless society and the withering away of the state to the international sphere, where all states will have arrived at equality under socialism (communism), and national boundaries, armaments, and other artificial international obstacles will "eventually" disappear. These two concepts, the socialist internationalism of the future and the illegitimacy of the present international system, have not been challenged by the experience of the last forty-five years and found to be unworkable, as have so many communist

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World (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 75.
Professor Carr goes on to warn Western civilization that if it ". . . fails to develop ideas which appear equally valid in these respects, the advantage will continue to be on the side of the Soviet propagandists." Perhaps Professor Carr has misinterpreted both the need for Western civilization to "develop ideas" and the tendency advantage enjoyed by Soviet propagandists.

principles that have been applied and soon jettisoned.[29] On the contrary, the idealistic communist goals of internationalism coincide with the aspirations of most men for brotherhood, mutual respect, the elimination of coercion in human relationships, etc.[30] In addition, the success of the capitalist system has not removed the distrust felt by large numbers of those people who still consider capitalism a form of economic slavery. The very nature of the arms race provides a natural, strong impetus toward some form of international system that, many hope, will preclude one state from making war on another. The internationalist image of communism, a sort of authoritarian "one world" system, could provide this type of international harmony, its advocates claim. It is all too easy to emphasize the apparent cynicism of contemporary Soviet methods, to dwell

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[29]Bertram D. Wolfe, "Communist Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XLI (October, 1962), 152, speaks of the "enduring elements of Soviet ideology." Cyril E. Black, "Soviet Political Life Today," Foreign Affairs, XXXVI (July, 1958), 580, claims that if Marxism has any role in Soviet politics today it is in the realm of foreign policy objectives: "It is perhaps natural that the further a problem is removed from practical Soviet knowledge, the more a solution is sought in ideology." Adam Ulam expresses essentially the same idea in "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," World Politics, XI (January, 1959), 155.

[30]Daniels, The Nature of Communism, op. cit., p. 13, comments that "it is in its moral aspect that Marxism has made and still makes its great appeal . . . Marxism has gathered much more force as a moral rebellion than an economic one."

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on the radical evolution of Soviet ideology from its original Marxist content, and to ignore the motivating drive, impetus, and consistency supplied to the communist hierarchy by the principles contained in internationalism.[31]

The Soviet view of the international structure is one of the keys in assessing the Soviet Union either as a traditional, conservative power, or as a revisionist power that does not accept the present system and feels unrestricted in its efforts to transform that system to the greatest extent possible, maximizing its national power in the process.

The uniqueness of Soviet motivations is not to be found solely in Marxist doctrine, or in historic Russian nationalism, pan-slavism, etc., but in the resultant ideology that has been fused from and strengthened by these and other factors.[32] The class struggle was mentioned by Brzezinski as one of the Marxist bases upon which Soviet experience has developed "Soviet" ideology. Through the policies of Lenin and subsequent development, the concept

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[31]The theoretical bases of socialist internationalism are discussed in the succeeding chapter.

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of the class struggle has been all but abandoned in favor of the international struggle between socialism (the "forces of peace") and imperialism--capitalism (the "forces of reaction and war"). The clamor over peaceful coexistence has not altered this view significantly. Peaceful coexistence does not negate the traditional communist notion that hostility is the normal feature of international affairs, and that the socialist states can have no lasting community of interest with the West. Some authors, including scholars in the field of international law, have argued at great lengths to support the view that it is difficult, if not impossible, to conduct a "meaningful comparative study"[33] of the records of the Soviet Union and the United States in the observance and violation of treaties. This writer would suggest that Professor Lissitzyn could make a valuable comparative study if he would select just one area of international law that is well established by both custom and treaty: the respect, on the part of each member of the international community, for the lawful existence of the other members of the community. Soviet ideology and policy openly vow to transform all states into socialist

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states. This policy has been implemented thoroughly whenever Soviet authorities have considered it to be within their interests, despite the norms of international law and specific treaties entered into by the Soviet Union (such as those with Great Britain in 1924, and the United States in 1933, providing for diplomatic recognition of the U.S.S.R.). Yet, Professor Lissitzyn equates an avowed, deliberate policy of disregard for the accepted norm of international law with the occasional violations of specific principles of international law committed by other world powers, including the United States and Great Britain.[34]

Professor Lissitzyn, it seems, then revises his previous attitude regarding Soviet views of the legitimacy of the international system.

> Since "peaceful coexistence" is regarded as temporary and implies no long-range accommodation with the West, Soviet decision-makers feel free to reinterpret and use international law norms to serve their own distinctive interests with seemingly less restraint

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[34] Ibid., pp. 23-24. Professor Lissitzyn then carries this distortion of logic even farther by noting, p. 25, that: "The sense of moral obligation can hardly be relied upon as a firm basis for the continued observance of treaties," but that the processes of diplomacy must seek mutual self-interests. The question might be raised, what is "mutual self-interest" if it does not include the notion of moral obligation. The absence of moral obligation implies that physical punishment is the ultimate sanction; this hardly is in accord with the notion of "mutual self-interest." Professor Lissitzyn is quite correct in observing that "we must beware of the naive assumption that [morality and the 'law habit'] can be normally expected to prevail over all other considerations."

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than is normal in the West, less regard for consistency or reciprocity, and less concern for stability.[35]

Whether or not a comparative study of the attitudes of the Soviet Union and any other power is conducted, the unique position of the Soviet leadership in regard to international order and stability is reflected in their attitude toward international law, one important segment of their general structure of ideas.

Many students of Soviet politics have missed the dynamism of Soviet ideology because they have failed to place the evolution of Marxist theory in the Soviet Union within the framework of an understanding of Russian history and the nature of the Russian people. Marxist theory, we are often told, is a product of Western culture, and, of course, this is at least geographically correct.[36] But, there is a great divergence between Marxist theory and Leninist political practice, not only because one was theory and the other practice, but because Marxism was primarily a product of--or reaction to--Western political thought, and Lenin was a "typical" Russian authoritarian: "Russian communism is a communism of the East."[37]

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[35] Ibid., p. 29.

[36] Aiken, op. cit., pp. 103-184, has described Marxism as ". . . radical and deliberate break with all the major social traditions of Western culture."

[37] Nicolas Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism

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It is wise to caution, as von Rauch does,[38] against an automatic conclusion that Russian character and Russian history have predetermined an authoritarian or totalitarian political system in Russia. Von Rauch correctly reminds us that democratic elements have always existed in Russia, but he fails either to note the comparative weakness of Russian democratic elements as a political force of consequence, or to point out where these forces failed to set the course of Russian political development.[39]

Berdyaev's study is one of the more scholarly attempts to relate Soviet ideological dynamism to Russian character and tradition; his thesis seems to contradict von Rauch's claim that a democratic strain has always been present in Russia. Berdyaev has described[40] the historical background of the messianic movement in early Russia, especially Moscow as the Third Rome or the "true church" of

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(Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 15.

[38]Georg von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. vi. Von Rauch emphasized his opposition to the belief ". . . that present conditions are a national consequence of a Russian predisposition for autocratic, despotic forms of government."

[39]For the antithesis to von Rauch's opinion, see Lev E. Dobriansky, "The Roots of Russia," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXIX (April, 1963), 45-51, in which Dobriansky outlines the disposition of the Russian people for authoritarian rule.

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Christianity, providing a motivating force for world evangelism. Peter the Great is described as the precursor of Lenin, a true bolshevik, a "revolutionary from above."[41] Peter's exhortations to the Russians to catch up to the West has been echoed many times by Soviet leaders, and is more akin to Soviet ideology than is Marxist theory. The history and characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia also indicate the form that Soviet Communism would assume. The Russian intelligentsia has been historically apart from the people, distinguished by its dogmas and intolerance.[42] Berdyaev pictures ". . . a most characteristic frame of mind of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia--the love of the man far off, not the love of one's neighbor."[43] This attitude might explain, in part, the excesses of collectivization, industrialization, and other harsh schemes imposed by Soviet bureaucratic despots upon their own people, all in the name of a greater good, messianic world socialism.

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[41] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[42] Ibid., pp. 19 and 20-21.

[43] Ibid., pp. 32-33. Compare this with Wolfe's comment that Soviet ideology ". . . nourishes not so much love of the future which is vague, as hatred of the present, which is clear and visible . . . hatred for 'the oppressor' predominates over hatred of oppression as such or love for the oppressed . . . ." Wolfe, op. cit., p. 168.

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We have mentioned the uniqueness of the internationalism, the "compulsive obligation" of Soviet Communism. This, also, is as much Russian as Marxist, although the two forces are mutually supporting. Berdyaev states that "the Russian spirit craves for wholeness," it seeks absolutes, it takes ideas totally, without that quality of "skeptical criticism" so prevalent in the West.[44] Berdyaev notes that:

> In Belinsky there was the characteristically Russian search for an integral outlook which will give an answer to all the questions of life, unite the theoretical and practical reason, and give a philosophical basis to the social ideal . . . . The same idea of wholeness will be found . . . in Marxist Leninism.[45]

Once having found the "integral outlook," the Russian intelligentsia accepts it wholly, as a complete doctrine, and is distrustful of those who have not been so "enlightened." It then becomes a matter of necessity, or compulsion, to force others to accept reality:

> In order to bring happiness to the greater part of mankind you may cut off the heads of hundreds of thousands. Belinsky was the forerunner of bolshevik morals. He says that people are so stupid that you must drag them into happiness by force.[46]

This sampling of Russian character emphasizes the affinity the Russians have felt for a totalitarian system of ideas[47] (such as that devised by Lenin) and their

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[44] Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 21.

[45] Ibid., p. 38. [46] Ibid., p. 41.

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[44] Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 71.

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There are indications that ideology, the messianic Marxist variety, no longer plays as significant a role in Soviet politics as it may have in the past. Revolutionary forces invariably lose some of their original dynamism and atmosphere of crusade. The successful revolutionary movement is involved with managing affairs of government, a task far more complicated than the process of seizing power. And once great power is achieved, as is the case with the Soviet leaders, there is less inclination to be concerned

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obsession with conspiracy can easily be exaggerated, as can the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet system. As an example, Dobriansky, op. cit.,pp. 45 and 50-51, writing of the continuum of Russian politics from early Tsarist days, warns that ". . . there can be no greater danger to civilization than the combination of modern technology and a barbaric scheme of institutions as found in the U.S.S.R." Fortunately, policy is not determined solely by mystical heritage!

[48]See Wolfe, op. cit., p. 157, for a brief comparison of Tsarist autocracy and Soviet totalitarianism.

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But the need for a unifying theory still remains. The loyalty and sacrifice of the rank and file is not purchased with visions of increased power for those holding the reins of government. And, of course, there is the great sense of material accomplishment, the pride of having converted an agricultural state into a mighty industrial power within two generations, despite the open hostility of the West.[49] The impetus provided by past success, the

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[49]As an example of the many factors impinging on foreign policy, this writer suggests an examination of the reasons underlying Soviet foreign aid expenditures. For a short discussion of this subject, see Leon M. Herman, "The Political Goals of Soviet Foreign Aid," United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 477-485; hereafter cited as Dimensions; Marxism-Leninism could be quoted extensively to support either massive foreign aid ("proletarian internationalism"), or none at all ("prevent the restoration of capitalism-imperialism"). Foreign aid could be inspired politically, as a means to influence the policy of the recipient country. Foreign aid could be an economic device of tactical importance. Also, foreign aid could be a prestige program designed to demonstrate the superiority both of socialism as an economic system and the capabilities of the Russian people. The final decision most likely reflects a mix of these and other attitudes; but, as Mr. Herman points out (p. 477), although there are logical reasons why the Soviet Union should not engage in foreign

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prestige of present power, and the future goals of socialism provide the heart of Soviet ideology today. This ideology may represent a radical transformation of Marxism, but it is, nevertheless, an internationalist ideology, one that cannot satisfy its believers with the status quo. The Soviet leaders

> . . . may even want to extend the communist system wherever possible for no better reason than that the acquisition of power breeds a desire for more power. We do know at least that few regimes in history have been more obsessed with power. As single-minded practitioners of the arts of power, they may not know how else to use their energies and express themselves. The conclusion that revolutionary Marxism no longer commands their passionate loyalty does not prove at all that they have abandoned expansionist aims.[50]

The combination of fear of the West and national ambitions fortified by an internationalist ideology make up the dominant motivating force in Soviet foreign policy. The uniqueness of Soviet ideology may whet a nationalist appetite, but it does not transform the methods of employing power. The present international system is much more analogous to the traditional pattern than an excessive concentration on "irrational" ideology would indicate. The

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intended emphasis of this chapter has been directed toward the motivating forces of Soviet foreign policy, not its form or structure. The uniqueness of Soviet ideology in itself serves to reinforce expansionist policies and provide some rather effective tools for implementing those policies, but the methods and objectives of power expansionism have not suddenly been transformed by ideology.

> . . . it does not follow that the Communist doctrines of the Russian revolution must be accounted to have ceased to have an influence on world affairs, for even if there is no Communist grand design there are Communist pre-conceptions which, whether obtrusively or unobtrusively, conditions the thoughts and policies of Russian . . . statesmen . . . . Communists have inherited from their forebears and indeed still learn for themselves a missionary zeal, a capacity for intrigue and for organization of revolution, and an attitude toward peace as a sort of refined war, a war without overt physical onslaughts.[51]

An attempt has been made to sketch the broad nature of ideology as it is conceived today, and the relationship between ideology and the foreign policy of a great power, such as the Soviet Union. The next task is to examine the theoretical foundations of the Soviet bloc.

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CHAPTER II

THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM

Marxist theory and Leninist practice, voluminous and pervasive as they are, left little in the nature of specific guidance for the construction of the new socialist world, following the establishment of the "peoples' democracies" in Eastern Europe after World War II. Marxist theory had concentrated on a detailed condemnation of the state of the world--the capitalist world, mostly--in the mid-nineteenth century. The future would take care of itself, once the existing economic structure had been overturned. When the proletariat gained control of the productive forces, man would be able to realize his full potential. Marx often alluded to the achievement of freedom, "the resolution of the conflict between man and nature," and the realization of a society in which man is no longer alienated from himself.[1] Marx also referred briefly to the possible, temporary requirement for a dictatorship of the proletariat:

> Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the

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[1]George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 50, citing Karl Marx, Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), pp. 102ff, 115ff, and 129ff.

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> one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.[2]

But beyond these rather vague pronouncements, there is little in Marxism to guide the contemporary communist in the problems of relations among socialist states.

Lenin was more concerned with the problems of seizing and holding power. One of the keys to the success of the proletarian revolution, in Lenin's view, was the national question. Lenin wrote rather extensively on nationality, nationalism, and the right to national self-determination. From these writings and from other rather isolated, yet specific references to these issues, the theoretical framework for Lenin's attitudes on relations among socialist countries may be deduced.

Despite the paucity of Marxist-Leninist theory on the world socialist structure as Marx and Lenin might have visualized it, contemporary Marxist scholars claim a vast heritage bequeathed by Marx and Lenin. Their claim is somewhat contradictory, however; while they extol the "huge ideological wealth" of Marxist-Leninist theory pertaining to the world socialist system, they also recognize the "important problems," the "many new problems" in relations

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[2] In a letter written by Marx in 1875, quoted in V. I. Lenin, Marx-Engels-Marxism (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1951), p. 761.

among socialist states that demand the "creative development" of Marxism-Leninism.[3]

To support their argument that Marxism-Leninism treats the question of the socialist system in some detail, the Soviet authors mention the obvious fact that:

> The founders of Marxism-Leninism . . . also had some practical experience in establishing relations between nations based on internationalist principles which had been accumulated prior to the formation of the world socialist system.[4]

It seems hardly likely, in view of Soviet claims that the socialist system is a new development in international politics, that this "practical experience" would have been of much value. But this question is of little practical concern, because the "creative development" of Marxism-Leninism is capable not only of filling in any gaps that exist in the theory, but also of altering the theory to satisfy the requirements of the moment. It is of greater value to us to attempt to describe, in brief form, Lenin's treatment of the problem of nationality and how this applies to the issue of relations among socialist states and the creation of a "world socialist system."

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[3] Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 764.

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Then it will be seen how Lenin's views have been "creatively developed" by latter-day Marxists.

As Lenin (who considered himself an orthodox Marxist) interpreted the evolution of history, he saw nationalism as a temporary phenomenon,[5] one of the evil characteristics of the capitalist system. Since capitalism was doomed to inevitable disappearance, so was nationalism. This, in part, explains the inherent contradiction within Lenin's theory of the right to national self-determination. Nationalism, prior to the completion of the socialist revolution, presented a threat to the success of the socialist movement. The attractiveness of nationalism to the bourgeoisie could serve not only to strengthen the bourgeois revolution but might also prevent the later assimilation of nationalities under socialism. For this reason, and others as tactics dictated, Lenin continually emphasized that the proletariat of all nations was absolutely opposed to nationalism,[6] and was unified in the alliance of the working class of all nations. The proletariat looks beyond national boundaries, and ". . . evaluates every national demand, every national separation, from the angle of the class struggle of the

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[5]V. I. Lenin, "Who Are the Friends of the People?," Sochineniia, I, 73.

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workers."[7] This evaluation, consistently demanded by Lenin, required that separation (secession) be interpreted in the interests of the class struggle. It partially explains Lenin's concept of "right to union."

Lenin's thesis on nationalism and the nationality question hinges on the Marxist futuristic concept of the eventual proletarian society.[8] The fact that the course of history, since the latter part of the nineteenth century, has not moved in this direction dilutes the basis of Lenin's argument, and partially explains his animosity toward the Social-Democratic movement in Western Europe in the era just prior to and during the First World War. It seems logical to assume that, if nationalism is a bourgeois manifestation and if the proletariat of all nations have more in common with other proletariat than with the bourgeoisie of their own nation, then the success of the proletarian revolution will usher in the stateless, nation-less era of proletarian internationalism. Since workers, by definition, are inherently incapable of exploiting fellow

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workers, there will be no need for state institutions, which are simply an expression of class domination. From this line of reasoning, Lenin developed his theories of the right to national self-determination and its less familiar corollary, the right to union. As these two concepts are discussed, it should be remembered that Lenin was interested primarily in the seizure and maintenance of power as a means of effecting the world-wide proletarian revolution. The slogan of the right to self-determination was one of the tactics to be employed in this struggle; it, therefore, receives much more of Lenin's attention than his notion of the "right to union." This latter idea was less significant to Lenin than self-determination not only because it was considered natural, in Marxist theory, that the proletariat would desire to be united, but also because it was a subject for the future, after the success of the revolution. It was expected that such an issue would be easily disposed of, if it should arise at all.

Lenin was a practical revolutionary. Despite his professed distaste for bourgeois nationalism, he recognized the facts of international life and felt that it would probably be necessary for the proletarian revolution to be accomplished primarily within national bounds.[9] He was,

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[9]Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, op. cit., p. 27.

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therefore, determined to employ the issue of nationalism to pursue the revolution both in Russia and throughout the world. This was not a simple task for Lenin, and it has not been easy for his successors who have faced, and still face, the very delicate issue of nationalism. Lenin pursued the "correct" center path, between the "leftists" such as Rosa Luxemburg and others who felt that nationalism was an obsolete bourgeois characteristic that had no place in the proletarian revolution, and the "rightists" who tended to compromise on the issue of nationalism to the extent that they ignored the revolution.[10] The leftists, or ideological purists, have nearly always been much fewer in number and significance, even in the early days of communist internationalism, for the simple reason that few people--even revolutionaries--are readily willing to sacrifice themselves and their carefully-developed organization for ideological principles. The path of least resistance is temporary expediency, or the compromise of principle for the sake of the movement.

The more insidious threat has been posed by the rightists who prefer a form of "national-cultural autonomy" which, in effect, negates the internationalist objectives

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and characteristics of the revolution. As the Resolution on the National Question, approved by the April 1917 Conference, stated:

> The Party of the proletariat decisively rejects what is known as "national-cultural autonomy" . . . [which] strengthens the ties between the workers and the bourgeois culture of the individual nations, whereas the aim of Social-Democracy is to strengthen the international culture of the proletariat of the world.[11]

The urge for "national-cultural autonomy" was strengthened, nevertheless, by Lenin's insistence on the right to national self-determination, which he defined, from the "historical-economic point of view," as ". . . political self-determination, political independence, the formation of a national state."[12] The most consistent characteristic of Lenin's nationality policy[13] is his persistent reiteration of the premise that national self-determination is neither absolute nor automatic. National

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[11] J. V. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1947), pp. 269-270.

[12] Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, op. cit., p. 14.

[13] For an excellent interpretive study of Lenin's treatment of the nationality problem, see Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationality (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958). A somewhat less orderly, but useful, study of the same subject is Samad Shaheen, The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of National Self-Determination (The Hague: W. Van Haeve, Ltd., 1956), especially Chapters III, V, and VI.

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self-determination is a "bourgeois-democratic demand," and is to be supported by the proletariat only when it suits their interests, not the interests of the bourgeoisie. Lenin makes it clear that the policy of the proletariat may temporarily parallel--but never coincide with--that of the bourgeoisie. "The working class supports the bourgeoisie . . . in order to secure equal rights and to create better conditions for the class struggle."[14]

Lenin's nationality policy was wholly opportunistic. Designed to support the working class movement, its objectives were international in scope. The right to national self-determination was a tactical weapon and was not to contradict or supersede the higher interests of proletarian internationalism. Even within Lenin's time, nearly four decades before the 1956 Soviet repression in Hungary in the name of "socialist" solidarity, these "higher interests" became so broadly defined as to become equivalent to the maintenance of socialist authority already established. Instead of the interests of world socialism being placed above the interests of any national unit in the socialist system, the national interests of the largest entity in the former Tsarist empire, the interests of Great Russia, became identified as the interests of all of the nationality

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groups.[15] After World War II, a similar process took place in Eastern Europe.

As a slogan, then, the "right" to national self-determination was designed, first, to weaken the authority of the Tsarist regime and thus aid the cause of the revolution in Russia and, secondly, to break down the traditional world order which had been established by, and was now controlled by, the capitalist-imperialist powers, thus enhancing the cause of world revolution. Once the revolution had been achieved in Russia, in late 1917, and a socialist "system" had been established, conditions became entirely different, of course. The right to self-determination then

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[15] Several scholars have commented on the "consistency" of Lenin's nationality policy. Low, op. cit., p. 126, describes Lenin's position as logical in the Marxist sense in that it furthers the interests of the proletarian revolution. Still, ". . . there are a large number of sharp contradictions and basic incongruities in Lenin's thought on nationality, to say nothing of wide gaps." Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), p. 78, comments that ". . . the Bolshevik position in the national question has been at once consistent and highly practical." This is correct but of little meaning when one considers Janowsky's accurate description of the purpose to be served in the nationality issue: "National policy was ancillary to the broader aims of social revolution . . . ." Janowsky is trapped by a self-defining definition: Lenin believes in national self-determination, so long as it does not contradict the interests of the working class; Lenin himself (or "the Party") determines when these interests are contradicted. This writer suggests that Lenin's opportunistic nationality policy was consistent in application, but inherently contradictory.

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was to be interpreted in terms of the interests of the established socialist state, and the corollary of the slogan of self-determination, or the "right to union," came into effect.[16]

From the socialist point of view, self-determination is inherently a destructive principle; the "right to union" is its constructive opposite. The right to self-determination is a proletarian tactic designed to spur the socialist revolution; the right to union is the theoretical basis for the construction of the socialist state or socialist system during and following the revolution.

To support his notion of the right to union, Lenin emphasized the economic advantages of the large state.[17] But beyond these advantages and the natural inclination of

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[16]As explained in Pravda, July 11, 1956, pp. 2-3 [translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume VIII, Number 28, p. 21; this publication is hereafter cited, for example, as CDSP-VIII-28, p. 21]: "V. I. Lenin set the task of uniting the Soviet republics into a single allied state and pointed out the major significance the accomplishment of this task had for the fate of socialist construction . . . ." The purpose of this Pravda article was to deemphasize the role of Stalin in early nationality policy, and to underline the "truly paternal concern Lenin always showed for the development of the national republics . . . [and] how he brought up the Communist Parties in these republics in the spirit of internationalism and how he struggled implacably against great-power chauvinism and local nationalism."

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the proletariat to unite, Lenin stressed that the proletariat of oppressed nationalities have a socialist duty, or obligation, to insist upon the right to union.[18] Lenin's rather obtuse definition of a Social-Democrat provides the theoretical concept: a Social-Democrat ". . . must fight against small-nation narrowmindedness . . . he must fight for the recognition of the whole . . . and the subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general."[19]

It is not difficult to determine the nature of "the interests of the general." The April 1917 Resolution on the National Question, written by Stalin at Lenin's request, stated emphatically that:

> The interests of the working class demand the amalgamation of the workers of all the nationalities of Russia into common proletarian organisation . . . . Only such amalgamation of the workers of the various nationalities . . . will permit the proletariat to wage a successful struggle against international capital and bourgeois nationalism.[20]

Lenin's theory of the form and organization of the state is not of direct interest to us here. Lenin, the practical revolutionary, was primarily concerned, prior to

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[18] "Discussion of Self-Determination Summed Up," Sochineniia, XIX, pp. 260-261.

[19] Ibid., p. 262.

[20] Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, op. cit., p. 270.

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

[20] Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

1917, with the problems of achieving power. After the success of the October Revolution, Lenin's interests naturally were directed toward maintaining and expanding the power of the new Soviet state. The emphasis on practical problems and the exercise of power is typical of Lenin; his idealistic work, The State and Revolution, is primarily a reflection of the revolutionary fervor that struck Lenin in 1917.[21] The practical problems of controlling huge territories and administering a large state, independent of the problems of survival generated by civil war and foreign intervention, soon overwhelmed and displaced the syndicalist, anarchist revolutionary slogans. The possibility that early failures to establish a truly socialist form of government consonant with Marxist theory might indicate a basic misconception in this theory apparently did not enter the minds of Lenin or his successors.

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[21] See Meyer, Leninism, op. cit., pp. 195-196; Professor Meyer notes that the idealism of State and Revolution is incongruous with the typical realism of Lenin. Similarly, Robert V. Daniels, in "The State and Revolution: A Case Study in the Genesis and Transformation of Communist Ideology," The American Slavic and East European Review, XII (1953), 24, calls State and Revolution, an "aberration" of Leninism. Even more significant, as Daniels points out, p. 22, is that this aberration has been ". . . made to serve as the reference point for rationalizing the subsequent evolution of the Soviet State in an entirely different direction." For a brief treatment of Lenin's theory of the state, see E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 233-249.

1917, with the problems of achieving power. After the success of the October Revolution, Lenin's interests naturally were directed toward maintaining and expanding the power of the new Soviet state. The emphasis on practical problems and the exercise of power is typical of Lenin; his intellectual work, The State and Revolution, is primarily a reflection of the revolutionary fervor that attack Lenin in 1917.[1] The theoretical problems of centralizing major resources and administering a large state, independent of the problems of survival dominated by civil war and foreign intervention, soon overwhelmed and displaced the original, anarchist revolutionary elegance. The possibility that early failures to establish a truly Socialist form of government consonant with Marxist theory might invalidate a basic misconception in this theory apparently did not enter the mind of Lenin or his successors.

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[1] See Meyer, Leninism, op. cit., pp. 195-196; Professor Meyer notes that the identification of State and Revolution is incompatible with the typical tactics of Lenin. Alfred Darty, Robert V. Daniels, in The State and Revolution: A Case Study in the Genesis and Transformation of Communist Ideology," The American Slavic and East European Review, XIX (1959), 25. Carla State and Revolution, an "Anarchian" of Leninism. Even more significant, as Daniels points out, p. 22, is that this observation has been ". . . made to serve as the reference point for rationalizing the subsequent evolution of the Soviet State in an entirely different direction." For a brief treatment of Lenin's theory of the state, see E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 23-28.

Parallel to the development of the massive Soviet state was the formulation of the concept of "socialism in one country." Whereas the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk demonstrate the value superiority of national interest over ideology (or the desirability of world revolution, in this instance) in Lenin's view, so the New Economic Policy and its related endeavors of the early 1920's represent the abandonment of basic ideological concepts to the demands of expediency. The failure of the anticipated world revolution to materialize made necessary the concept of "socialism in one country" even in Lenin's time, although Stalin is credited with its authorship.[22]

Although Lenin's theoretical characteristics of the state as described in State and Revolution were not realized, Lenin did provide some brief descriptions of what the future socialist system would be like. The subservience of the "interests of the particular" to that of the whole serves as a theoretical point of departure. This is the foundation of Lenin's views on socialist internationalism.[23]

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[22]Meyer, Leninism, op. cit., pp. 221-230, convincingly describes how Lenin is really the father of the idea of "socialism in one country," despite statements by Lenin that indicate otherwise. However, Gunther Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 282, claims that Stalin ". . . invented the 'Leninist' teaching 'Socialism in one country,'" and that (p. 93) ". . . this theory broke with the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin."

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The problem, of course, is to define the "interests of the whole" that are of superior value to the interests of the particular. By reference to ideology alone, it can easily be demonstrated that there is no contradiction. The interests of the whole are the interests of the proletariat, and these interests, in turn, are determined by the socialist government in power. The idealistic goals of international socialism are soon equated to the needs of the regime, and socialist internationalism becomes--in effect--the equivalent of the single Soviet state. It has been expedient (and one of the constants of Soviet policy) to recognize the prerogatives of sovereignty and the traditional state system as somewhat permanent characteristics of international politics.[24] As a derivative of this attitude, it might be anticipated that the formation of a "soviet union" would be based on the principles of federalism. Although the Soviet Union was to become federalist in structure, early

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cit., pp. 25-26, Lenin briefly records his allegiance to equality among states, but then remarks that the proletariat ". . . attaches supreme value to the alliance of the proletarians of all nations, and evaluates every national demand, every national separation, from the angle of the class struggle of the workers."

[24]The editors of The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, op. cit., p. 769, representing contemporary Marxist theory, claim that "Lenin pointed out that national and state distinctions between peoples and countries would continue to exist for a very long time even after the victory of the working class on a world scale."

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theoretical controversy and later practice centered on the concept of a unitary state, whether through governmental or party structure. During the revolutionary period, Lenin was consistently and adamantly in favor of a centralized, rather than a federalized, state.[25] The desire for a strong, centralized state and the concept of a future socialist world state[26] are both reflections of the theory of socialist internationalism, referred to by Marx and made doctrine by Lenin.

Socialist internationalism should be considered in its historical concept, because its meaning has been altered considerably in the last forty-five years, especially in the last decade. In addition, socialist internationalism, as the theoretical motivating and unifying force of the socialist system, is much more than a mere slogan. It is incorrect to consider the idea of socialist internationalism either a complete sham or the sole link between socialist countries; it is also incorrect to view socialist internationalism as a synonym for either a

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[25] Low, op. cit., p. 89.

[26] Discussed in Klaus Tornudd, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Non-Military Regional Co-Operation," Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, XXVIII (Helsingfors, Finland, 1961), 18. Tornudd references Stalin (Sochineniia, V:157-158) as suggesting the Soviet Union as a prototype for such a state.

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monolithic world socialist system or a loose socialist "commonwealth" of fraternally-associated states.

In Lenin's revolutionary sense, it was mandatory to maintain--in the face of occasionally overwhelming odds--absolute unity and cohesion:

> The interests of the working class and of its struggle against capitalism demand complete solidarity and the closest unity of the workers of all nations . . . .[27]

Working class solidarity could not be based, in practice, solely upon any cooperative venture such as federalism, or upon an ideological conception such as the workers' consciousness. Just as the proletariat required the leadership of the Party to achieve their revolution, the socialist countries needed to be amalgamated, or assimilated, in order to achieve "socialist internationalism":

> Just as mankind can realize the abolition of classes only through the transitional period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, so mankind can realize the inevitable fusion of nations only through the period of complete emancipation of all the oppressed nations . . . .[28]

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[27]Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, op. cit., p. 40.

[28]Lenin, quoted in T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), pp. 80-81. [Italics added]. Also, see Sochineniia, XIX:72.

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[28] Lenin, quoted in T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), pp. 80-81. [Italics added]. Also, see Sochinenia, XIX:12.

Obviously, such fusion cannot be the product of the exercise of the right to national self-determination. For this reason, once the proletarian revolution has succeeded, self-determination, or secession, becomes reactionary and a threat to the existing socialist regime. If events are unfolding in accordance with the precepts of Marxism-Leninism, however, the initial success of the workers' revolution should spur the movement forward; the proletariat of other bourgeois states will revolt and exercise their "right to union" and join the existing socialist system. This is the theory of the "spark" that Lenin hoped would apply successfully to the Russian revolution and its effect on the proletariat of Western Europe.[29] To insure that the "spark" theory did not function in reverse, the "right to union" could be exercised only once, whereas a seceding nationality could later reverse its choice and opt to join the socialist system[30]--hardly a demonstration of confidence in the theory of the "spark."

The spark theory was essentially a justification for Lenin's combination of Marxist theory and his revolutionary ambitions in Russia. Amalgamation, in a rather similar

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[29]For a discussion of the theory of "the spark," see Meyer, Leninism, op. cit., pp. 156-160 and 177-179.

[30]Low, op. cit., pp. 123 and 125.

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fashion, is justified on the basis of socialist internationalism. As one student of the nationality problem has indicated, Lenin's concept of assimilation is at variance with Marxist internationalism:

> Marx saw the root of national hate, of national tensions, and of imperialism in economics and in the class struggle, but not in nationality as such.[31]

Nationality had been uprooted from its legitimate, critical role in Marxist theory to become a weapon in Lenin's revolutionary organization. Socialist internationalism, the dialectical opposite of bourgeois nationalism, envisioned the eradication of national culture through the process of the fusion of nationalities. Amalgamation and assimilation are terms not often employed by Soviet theorists today. Instead, much is heard of the integration of socialist economies,[32] the international division of labor, and the fraternal socialist commonwealth. Occasionally, Soviet writers mention such factors as the desirability for more extensive consolidation of the socialist countries,[33] but these are usually ideological exhortations directed more towards cooperation than consolidation.

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[31] Ibid., p. 127.

[32] See infra, Chapter V.

[33] A. Sobolev, "Some Forms of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism," International Life [Mezhdynarodnaya Zhizn (Moscow)], V (May, 1956), 10.

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[31] Ibid., p. 127.

[32] See Lutze, Chapter 7.

[33] A. Sobolev, "Some Forms of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism," International Life [Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (Moscow)], V (May, 1956), 16.

The theory of socialist internationalism has been subjected to several major modifications by Lenin's successors. It would not be entirely accurate to attribute these "revisions" of doctrine entirely to the will of the Soviet leadership. Many factors are involved, as usual, in the making of policy and of the fitting of theory to policy when such is required. Often the adjustment is mostly dictated by circumstances; this writer's review in subsequent chapters of the nature of "socialist internationalism" in the Soviet bloc during the period 1956-1958 should demonstrate this.

One of the better known ideological formulations in Soviet doctrine since Lenin is Stalin's enunciation of the concept of "socialism in one country," a theory that can rightfully be attributed to the policies, if not the words, of Lenin. Stalin's subjection of the functioning of international communism to the dictates of Soviet policy and security needs requires no amplification here. Soviet policy, at the risk of over-simplification, and with some interruptions and shifts, entered a conservative era in the mid-1920's that lasted for a quarter century. During the Second World War, Stalin initiated an extensive campaign of Russian national patriotism that almost completely neglected the hoary concept of proletarian internationalism. After the war, the patriotic emphasis, as Soviet policy entered a

"reactionary" stage, shifted to a violent campaign against cosmopolitanism,[34] once one of Lenin's prized concepts. The cultural, political, and economic isolation of the Soviet Union from the West continued, despite the creation of the socialist system in the years 1945-1948.

It has been suggested that the campaign against cosmopolitanism since World War II has been closely connected with the communist emphasis on protection of sovereignty.[35] Attacks on cosmopolitanism may have dwindled in recent years, but the support for the values and ideas represented by national sovereignty ever continues. Several parallels between the relationships of internationalism-nationalism and cosmopolitanism--isolationism can be traced. Of significance to this study is the nature and scope of the problems presented the socialist commonwealth by the extended emphasis on the notion of sovereignty and sovereign equality.

The Soviet claim to the prerogatives of sovereignty was a tactical requirement for political survival in the

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[34]For an example of the Soviet campaign, in the latter years of Stalin's rule, against cosmopolitanism, see Pravda, April 7, 1949. Cosmopolitanism, which was considered by the Soviets, at this time, to be an "ideological cover" for the policies of the bourgeoisie, is discussed in Merle Kling, The Soviet Theory of Internationalism (St. Louis: Washington University Studies, 1952), pp. 30-31. In addition, see Tornudd, op. cit., p. 54.

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Despite the efforts of Stalin's successors, the nature of relations among socialist states has altered significantly in recent years. The years 1956-1958 are considered to be the critical period in this transformation. The new tensions, structure of power relationships, and conflicting interests that now operate more freely in and

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Despite the efforts of Stalin's successors, the nature of relations among socialist states has altered significantly in recent years. The years 1920-1939 are considered to be the critical period in this transformation. The new tensions, structure of power relationships, and conflicting interests that now operate more freely in and

among the socialist states have caused a significant shift in the pattern of authority within the socialist group. This shift (even excluding Sino-Soviet difficulties) has produced a hierarchical structure more suitable for the designation of "commonwealth" than "bloc."

Khrushchev was faced with essentially the same problem that Lenin wrestled with: the contradictory requirements of socialist consolidation and the devisive forces of nationalism. A reading of Khrushchev's speeches and writings will reveal hardly a hint of these developments. According to Khrushchev, the socialist camp remained united as never before, presenting a picture of monolithic unity and fraternal cooperation against the imperialistic hostility of the West. In the Premier's opinion:

> A new, socialist type of international relations arose with the formation of the commonwealth of socialist states. These are relations of fully equal rights, genuine friendship, fraternal cooperation in the sphere of politics, economics and culture, and mutual assistance in the construction of a new life.[36]

Three years later, Khrushchev was even more explicit in his conception of the nature of relations between the socialist states. Despite the facts of Hungary and other instances of fraternal socialist assistance, Khrushchev was able to claim that:

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> The socialist camp is a voluntary union of equal and sovereign states in which no one seeks or strives for any special rights, privileges or advantages for himself. It goes without saying that each socialist country independently decides the forms of its cooperation with the other socialist countries. There is not and cannot be any coercion in this matter.[37]

Whatever the relations among socialist states as interpreted by Khrushchev, there is no reason to doubt but that these relations have changed considerably since Stalin. Khrushchev did not possess what has been characterized as the "moral authority" of Stalin, moral authority in this context signifying an authority extending beyond physical control. Stalin commanded from the Kremlin an immense political machine, in which the Red Army, police systems, and economic domination were employed to compel abject cooperation by the satellites. The image of Stalin projected beyond these manifestations of political power, however. This image was the product of many factors, undoubtedly, but among these factors was a devotion to Stalin as the great vozhd who had successfully led the socialist movement for so many stormy years. In addition, Stalin was, to a limited extent, a theoretician who had been able to stretch Marxism without exceeding the limit of elasticity. The

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> . . . not on the basis of direct orders from Stalin but through the application of the principle of "anticipated reaction"--by attempting to do what Stalin might wish done.[38]

It is highly unlikely that such a condition can ever be recaptured. Stalin had been able to build up his control over the Communist Parties in Europe and elsewhere quite methodically, and, if necessary, painfully, during his many years in power. The advent of Yugoslavia's independent course, the rise of a powerful competitor in the form of Communist China, and the revelations by Khrushchev of the insidious "cult of the personality"; all of these started in motion a force of fragmentation that will be difficult, if not impossible, to contain.

This process of fragmentation cannot be recognized officially by communist theorists, nor should it be overemphasized by non-communist observers. In discussing relations among socialist countries, contemporary Soviet ideologists take basically the Leninist line that the growth of the socialist system inevitably produces a

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strengthening of socialist bonds. Having repeated and justified the Leninist reservation that national forms will remain for a "very long time," even after the complete socialist victory, Soviet Marxists claim that the strengthening of the sovereignty of socialist states does not contradict the objective of socialist internationalism. On the contrary, it is only through this process of strengthened sovereignty that the socialist states can become politically equal, and through political equality the socialist countries draw closer together:[39]

> Only when the nations are really free and equal, when no one nation encroaches on the independence of another, only in that case do they deeply trust each other, voluntarily enter into close relations dictated by the interests of developing the economy, defence, and foreign policy.[40]

As we shall see in a later chapter, the Soviets visualize this "growing-togetherness" primarily in economic terms, although the ideological aspects of socialist internationalism and fraternal cooperation should not be completely discounted.[41]

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[39] Fundamentals, op. cit., pp. 769-770.

[40] Ibid., p. 771. This reasoning is somewhat akin to Stalin's unusual theory that the state can wither away only by growing stronger! One might question how "independent" states must become before they can "deeply trust each other."

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There are other features of the socialist system that are propounded to support Khrushchev's claim for a "new type" of international relations. These features, stressed in recent communist literature, are the contributions by socialist countries to the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory (although to avoid "mistakes and shortcomings," socialist countries should rely on the experience of other socialist societies), the "voluntary pooling of effort" within the socialist commonwealth,[42] and the coincidence of the interests of the socialist countries:

> The national interests of the socialist countries are harmoniously combined with their common interests and aims . . . . Patriotism of the peoples of the socialist countries merges with internationalism. Love for one's own socialist country is organically combined with love for all fraternal socialist nations.[43]

Finally, the world socialist system is not hierarchically structured, an inevitable development in the capitalist world where the more industrialized, imperialist countries dominate the poorer countries which are forced to remain suppliers of raw materials. Instead of a hierarchy,

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development of the productive forces . . . the interaction of national economic systems." This process of international economic integration, the authors say, had commenced under capitalism--for exploitative purposes, of course--but will accelerate under socialism for the benefit of all.

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the socialist commonwealth is an association of free and equal states.[44]

These qualities are all cited by Soviet theorists as the peculiar characteristics of the socialist system. An additional advantage that has been repeatedly stressed in recent years is the opportunity for economic growth and protection of socialist gains offered to the new, underdeveloped nations by membership in the socialist camp. Neither the level of economic development nor the military potential of the underdeveloped countries need prevent these underdeveloped countries from associating with the socialist camp. The building of socialism is possible in the underdeveloped country ". . . irrespective of its level of development at the moment of the revolution . . . [and] irrespective of the size of its territory and population and military potential."[45]

Once the saccharine coating of "growing-tgetherness" and international love is disposed of, however, the Soviet Marxists turn to their real problems: nationalism and the leadership role of the Soviet Union.

Whereas love and all things good are the organic elements of the socialist system, ". . . imperialist

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reaction . . . [and] the most poisonous flowers of revisionism blossom in the nationalist morass."[46] Nationalism, "exclusiveness" and national communism are treated as threats to the unity and solidarity of socialist countries. During one of the "freezes" in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Soviet authors described this process in Yugoslavia, ". . . where narrow nationalistic tendencies came to the surface in the policy of the country's leaders."[47] Because the Soviets have not been able, or have not chosen, to activate a Leninist policy of amalgamation, nationalistic tendencies have flowered within the socialist commonwealth. In a somewhat fretful tone, the Soviets have admitted their failure, and that there can be no dominant or leadership role for the USSR. Soviet ideologists insist that "all the socialist countries are fully independent in solving their national problems and each one has an equal voice in solving the common problems of the socialist camp."[48] Not only are socialist countries equal, but "the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] does not in the least claim a special, leading

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role in the international Communist movement . . . . The Soviet Union is just an example of the struggle for socialism . . . ."[49]

We have seen that the problems of nationality and nationalism posed the same dilemma to Lenin as they have to his successors. We have indicated that these problems are derived from a basic Marxist fallacy, the notion that bourgeois nationalism, class exploitation, and inequality stem wholly from the nature of the economic system, or the method of control of the productive forces. The tactical advantages that have accrued to Lenin and Khrushchev from their nationality and sovereignty policies have not compensated for their damaging effects on socialist international cohesion. Soviet leaders have demonstrated remarkable political astuteness and tactical cleverness in pressing the issue of nationalist rights abroad, and attempting to suppress them at home. Yet, they cannot really seize the problem and solve it, for its solution would involve either rejecting the advantage of today's tactical maneuverability or a denial of tomorrow's socialist-internationalist goals. Either course might be fatal. The expedient solution is to ignore the dilemma, continue to pay obeisance to the development of world socialism, and concentrate on the problems

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CHAPTER III

FORMATION OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM

No discussion of the post-war years and the course of events in Eastern Europe is complete or meaningful without establishing a working definition of "Stalinism" and the relationship of Stalinism to these events. Much confusion regarding Soviet policies in recent years could have been avoided had there been less reference to Stalinism as if it were a clearly-defined historical phenomenon. This thought applies even more to the concept of anti-Stalinism (and de-Stalinization), which, in its simplicity, seems to imply to its users a sort of liberal-democratic attitude.

Stalinism embodies the essence of totalitarian politics; it is perhaps the "purest" example of total domination of a political system by one individual that has existed. Stalin's personality and totalitarianism were by nature complementary. There are many definitions of totalitarianism, of course, most of which try to describe it by its surface characteristics. For example, Brzezinski ascribes the following syndrome to Carl J. Friedrich:

> . . . an official ideology, a single mass party, a technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of all means of effective armed combat and of effective mass communication, and a system of terroristic police control.[1]

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> . . . political power . . . wielded without restraint . . . for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution . . . in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population.[2]

This comes somewhat closer to the mark of totalitarianism, especially in the last qualification concerning "coerced unanimity of the entire population." A simple distinction, in this writer's opinion, between the concepts of dictatorship and totalitarianism is that basically the former is passive, the latter active, in the exercise of control. In a dictatorship the essential elements of the exercise of control are held firmly in the grasp of the leaders; the remainder of the society is "observed," so to speak, to insure that no alternative power centers develop that could threaten control by the regime. No such "passive" nature exists in a totalitarian system; control in this type of society is active in that it seeks to identify with and dominate all social groups, classes, and strata to insure not only that no possible alternative power centers develop

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These remarks are especially applicable to Stalin's character and to his regime. Stalin was obsessed with total control, and he enjoyed for two decades the complete subservience of those immediately around him, the governmental structure, and Soviet society. When the Russian armies occupied Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, this attitude of total control was applied in the construction of the socialist system. It was as inevitable as any political process could be that the countries of East Central Europe would be mechanically and thoroughly transformed into miniature Soviet states, called "people's democracies," and that they would become little more than outlying provinces of the Soviet state.[3]

In domestic politics, Stalinism could be described as the process of seeking, by any means at hand, absolute

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[3]For a graphic description of the process of assimilation and sovietization of the satellites, see Hannah Arendt, "Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution," in Edward T. Hallowell (ed.), The Soviet Satellite Nations (Gainesville, Florida: Kallman Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 5-6. Miss Arendt points out that "all this and much more was predictable, not because there were any social or historical forces pressing in one direction, but because this was the automatic result of Russian hegemony." Also highly recommended as a short study of "economic Stalinism" is Alfred Zauberman, Economic Imperialism: The Lesson of Eastern Europe (London: Ampersand, Ltd., 1955).

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control. Such control is not attainable, but the combination of totalitarianism and a perverse mentality that seeks for the unattainable produces the type of permanent crisis that has characterized the Soviet Union.[4] In speaking of Stalinism, it may be stated that his domestic policies included the affairs of the satellites, which were controlled thoroughly from Moscow until 1953. They were hardly to be considered sovereign entities, except for the advantages to be gained in the relations of the socialist camp with the remainder of the world.[5]

Stalin's obsession with total power, his suspicion of those serving him, and his fear of those not under his control extended to relations with countries outside the socialist camp. The product of his mentality and a totalitarian political system was a conservative foreign policy: conservative not in its objectives but in its policies to achieve these objectives. Stalin's urge to dominate caused him not to press the "proletarian revolution" in areas

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Stalinism, then, can be seen as a political technique,[7] the methods involved in the exercise of power rather than the objectives of the power. To attempt to label any other communist party or government as Stalinist can cause serious misconception. Even more misleading, perhaps, is the use of anti-Stalinism as a political description. Tito has often been called anti-Stalinist,[8] yet he was one of Stalin's most loyal supporters and imitators prior to the 1948 Cominform expulsion of Yugoslavia.[9] It would be more accurate to label Tito as "anti-Stalin," in

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It is clear that the establishment of the socialist system in Eastern Europe after the war was entirely dependent upon the overwhelming superiority of the Red Army. What is unusual, considering this military superiority and apparent Western indifference, is the conservative approach to the control of East Europe that was adopted by Stalin. Stalin's tactics were not only totalitarian, but traditional. During the initial phases of construction of the socialist system in Eastern Europe, from 1944 through 1947, there were differences in the methods of acquiring and exercising power employed by the various communist parties because of national, ethnical, and political differences. Late 1947 marked an abrupt change in the pace of reconstructing Eastern Europe. This change was signaled by Zhdanov's uncompromising speech at the opening session of the Cominform in September, 1947, and was closely followed by strong communist pressure in Western Europe during that winter and the Prague coup and Berlin blockade of the following spring.[10]

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One study of the internationalist aspects of communist theory offers seven generalizations pertinent to the formation of a world socialist state.[12] Among these seven

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Although speculation such as this may now be only of academic interest, it is not irrelevant. The efforts of Soviet leadership since 1955 to integrate the economies of

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Why did Stalin not restructure the national divisions of East Europe after the sweep of the Red Army westward in 1944 and 1945? An immediate answer might be that he would encounter an unknown degree of resistance, despite the preponderance of Soviet power, from East European communists as well as nationalist forces in that area. In the consolidation of the bloc, Stalin and the communist leaders were required temporarily to work with political forces other than the communist parties. To have attempted, prior to about 1948 or 1949, to eliminate existing national

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boundaries would not only have alienated other political elements but would have precipitated the utmost hostility of the ethnic groups in East Europe. Such radical measures would also cause the immediate enmity, even if not the physical opposition, of the allies of the Second World War, with whom the Soviet Union was still cooperating, albeit to only a very limited extent.

More damaging to the future course of development of the socialist system would have been the elimination of the socialist countries as an attraction to the non-communist countries who might otherwise sympathize with their socialist endeavors and be tempted to establish closer ties with the bloc at a later date. As we noted earlier, Lenin understood the need to recognize the existence of nationalities and national units as the "facts of international life." Khrushchev was at least as pragmatic in his approach to the national question. Also, how else could the dictatorship of the proletariat be established, if not through communist parties which are organized on a national basis? Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the question of national boundaries and national sensitivities posed nearly the problem for Stalin as it has in recent years for his successors.

Another factor that could mitigate against the reorganization of Eastern Europe along a more integrated

course would be that such a development might reduce the overwhelming superiority enjoyed by the Soviet Union in its bilateral dealings with each satellite, and might in the long run produce a "bloc within the bloc" capable of developing an economic and political strength that could challenge that of the Soviet Union.[14] This consideration, undoubtedly, has influenced Soviet leaders in recent years as they ponder the most effective means to integrate the economies of the East European states with the Soviet Union without creating a power center potentially as strong as the USSR.

There are also the theoretical considerations to be dealt with in socialist construction after the war.[15] It was natural that the communists turned to the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or some suitable alternative such as the "People's Democracy," in the reconstruction of their national entities within the socialist

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[15]Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York: Frederick A. Praeger), 1960, pp. 25-32, briefly presents one view.

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[15] Edmund Wilson, The Soviet Bloc (New York: Frederick A. Praeger), 1950, pp. 23-12, briefly presents one view.

system.[16] This would not only satisfy their Marxist-Leninist preconceptions, but also provide a practical response to the problems of the exercise of political power. After all, there was a quarter century of Soviet experience to build on; and although the satellite communist leaders had not engineered their own revolutions, they faced similar difficulties of reconstruction and uncooperative populations.

But most important in the consideration that Stalin might have given to this problem is that such theoretical determinations were not necessary for the imposition and maintenance of Soviet control. Had Stalin thought along these lines, he would soon have concluded that the standard Bolshevik methods of political control through secret

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[16] Some authors (Arendt, op. cit., pp. 5-6, for example) have stressed the detailed imitation of Soviet experience in the construction of the Peoples' Democracies, indicating that, at this time, there was only one road, and this determined by the Soviets. On the other hand, Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op. cit., pp. 27-29, discusses several quotations of East European communist leaders in the early, formative years of the bloc, which emphasize that national conditions shape the path to socialism in their countries. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op. cit., p. 64, passim, claims that Stalinism as a political phenomenon developed after 1947 when Stalin attempted to impose a high degree of uniformity on all the satellites, and that this repressive policy was further magnified by the 1948 break with Tito. See also Fejto, op. cit., pp. 19-20: ". . . from 1948 on, the Soviet model was applied in all communist countries to the most insignificant detail, with a complete disregard for the specific conditions of every country . . . ."

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police, terror, and fear of physical punishment would suffice.[17] These techniques, that had stood successfully the test of time, were buttressed by the domination of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the satellites by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), as well as the presence of the Soviet armies in Eastern and Central Europe. The somewhat esoteric issues of proletarian internationalism, sovereignty and equality, and other aspects of the Soviet dualist policy simply provided a frame of reference for the justification of Soviet hegemony. The gap between theory and practice has never been wider than it was in the years 1944-1948, when the East Europeans supposedly accomplished their "socialist revolution."

When Stalin wrote in 1922 that the Soviet Union was ". . . the prototype of the future amalgamation of the working people of all countries in a single world economic system,"[18] he revealed the core of his policy that was to be implemented at the end of the Second World War. Beyond the obvious factors of the security of the Soviet state through friendly border states, and a controlling Soviet

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[17]For an exhaustive examination of the early phase of Stalinism and Stalin's technique of political control, see Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959).

[18]Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p. 202.

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[18]Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the Colonial Question (New York: International Publishers, 1943), p. 102.

voice in occupied Germany, Stalin was mostly concerned with the economic reconstruction of the USSR. For this purpose, the Soviets needed the utmost assistance from the recently conquered territories. With the exception of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, most of these countries were too poor to provide extensive material aid to the Soviet Union. The key area for Soviet interests lay in East Germany.[19] Complete Soviet control of this satellite was mandatory for rapid effective reconstruction of the crippled Soviet economy.[20] From the security point of view, the occupation of East Germany by the Soviet Union placed Russia in the heart of Europe with the claim for a voice in all European matters, straddled the other satellites, and provided the Soviets with a cogent argument for the presence of Russian troops in Poland.

There was little need for Soviet pretense to its control over East Germany, which was simply occupied territory conquered during war, and treated as such. In other

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[19] Zauberman, op. cit., p. 9. The degree to which this Soviet interest has been borne out is the vital role that East Germany now plays in the economic development of the bloc. See J. Emlyn Williams, "U.S.S.R. to Absorb East Germany?," The Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1962, p. 1; and a more recent comment by Paul Wohl, "East Germany: Soviet Kingpin," The Christian Science Monitor, June 28, 1963, p. 1.

[20] Arendt, op. cit., p. 6, observes that East Germany ". . . never became even a satellite country but remained occupied territory with a Quisling government . . . ."

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areas of Eastern Europe, however, the Soviet leaders felt constrained to provide their military control of the various countries with an aura of legitimacy through the administration of power by the local communist party.

For this reason, the seizure of complete political control by the native parties was not immediately effected, despite the presence of Soviet troops. Seton-Watson describes the process of the assimilation of power by the local communist parties as consisting of three phases of coalition government: (1) genuine coalition, (2) bogus coalition, and (3) the transformation of the bogus coalition into a "monolithic bloc."[21] During these three phases, whatever methods were required by the circumstances were employed by either the satellite communists or the occupying Soviet forces, or both. Obviously, the process was made easier by the authority obtaining to the Soviets in East Germany as an occupying power, with a prescription to ban any activity they determine to be Nazi or fascist. On the other hand, the seizure of power was somewhat more difficult in Czechoslovakia where there was more of a democratic tradition with well-organized political parties, and where there was closer observation and interest by the Western governments.

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[21]Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 248-249.

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The third reason, the salience of complete political control by the native parties was not immediately affected, despite the presence of Soviet troops. Gordon-Watson describes the process of the destabilization of power by the local communist parties as occurring at three phases of coalition government: (1) genuine coalition, (2) bogus coalition, and (3) the transformation of the bogus coalition into a "monolithic bloc."[21] During these three phases, whatever methods were required by the circumstances were employed by either the essential communists or the governing Soviet forces, or both. Obviously, the process was made easier by the authority obtaining to the Soviets in East Germany as an occupying power with a preconception to use any activity they determine to be real or feasible. On the other hand, the seizure of power was somewhat more difficult in Czechoslovakia where there was more of a democratic tradition with well-organized political parties, and where there was closer observation and interest by the Western countries.

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[21] Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 348-353.

Typical of the "three phase" process were the experiences of Bulgaria and Hungary. The former, which had been allied with Germany, severed relations with that country in early September, 1944, and prepared to declare war.[22] At the same time, the Soviet Army, without advising its allies, ignored a proferred armistice and invaded Bulgaria, even though there were no German troops in the country. Immediately after the "liberation," many thousands of patriotic, anti-Nazi Bulgarians were arrested and sent to prison. The first phase of the coalition government commenced with the formation of a "Fatherland Front," which included the opposition party led by Nikola Petkov. The genuine coalition phase soon degenerated into the bogus phase, as Petkov was not allowed to present any effective opposition. The bogus coalition phase ended abruptly in 1947, shortly after the United States ratified the peace treaty, when Petkov was arrested, tried, and executed for conspiracy against the state. The Communist Party in Bulgaria then had to endure an additional stage, an internal power struggle between the "natives" and those who had spent the war in Moscow, and thus owed their allegiance to the Soviets. In the contest

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[22]See L. A. D. Dellin, "Bulgaria," in Stephen Kertesz (ed.), East Central Europe and the World: Developments in the Post-Stalin Era (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), pp. 169-173. Hereafter cited as Kertesz, Developments.

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for power, Chervenkov, a loyal disciple of Stalin and son-in-law of the former Comintern leader, George Dimitrov, successfully ousted the leader of the "natives," Kostov, who was shortly tried and executed. In March, 1948, a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed by Bulgaria and the Soviet Union and, by 1950, Bulgaria had slipped into a form of communist isolation from the non-communist world, the most Stalinist of the satellites in domestic politics.

A rather similar process took place in Hungary[23] as well as other satellites. More time and effort was required during the "first phase" in Hungary, during which the Communist Party fared poorly in two elections. After the Fall, 1945, elections, in which the communists received only 17 per cent of the votes (less than a third of the vote accorded the major party, the Smallholders), the Communists harassed their opposition and arrested the Secretary-General of the Smallholders, Bela Kovacs. Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, also a Smallholder, was implicated by Kovacs' confession and compelled to resign in May of 1947. The communists pushed through a new electoral law and continued to persecute those who did not comply with their demands,

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[23] See Stephen Kertesz, "Hungary," in Developments, op. cit., pp. 121-122; also see Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 250-256.

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A similar process took place in Hungary[13] as well as other countries. More than any others was the Communist Party faced poorly in two elections. After the fall, 1945, elections, in which the communists received only 17 per cent of the votes three times as many as the vote accorded the major party, the Smallholders, the Communists retained their opposition and arrested the Secretary-General of the Smallholders, Bela Kovacs. Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, also a Smallholder, was implicated by Kovacs' confession and compelled to resign in May of 1947. The Communists pushed through a new electoral law and continued to persecute those who did not comply with their demands.

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[13] See Stephen Borsody, "Hungary," in Government, op. cit., pp. 343-373; also see Zeman-Nagy, op. cit., pp. 259-316.

but they still managed to capture only 22 per cent of the votes in the August, 1947, election. The immediate result was a major effort by the communists to force all non-communists out of the "coalition," which by now was in its second phase, or that of "bogus coalition." President Tildey, a Smallholder, was pressed into resigning in August, 1948, when his son-in-law was implicated in "espionage." The third phase in the take-over of Hungary was completed in late August, and in the spring of 1949, a single-list election completed the formalities of constructing a "people's democracy."

In like manner, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, was forced out of Poland in December, 1947, and in the same month, King Michael of Rumania was pressured into abdicating by the special Soviet envoy, A. J. Vyshinski. Two months later, the communists sent a special emissary, Valerian Zorin, to Prague, and shortly thereafter a successful coup d'état was effected giving the communists, under the leadership of Klement Gottwald, control, and resulting in the death of the Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, and the resignation four months later of President Edward Benes.

These events have been well described elsewhere, and are mentioned here only to emphasize the nature of the assumption of power by the Soviets and their puppets.

Undoubtedly, there were national and ethnic peculiarities to be taken into consideration both during and after the consolidation of power by the communists, but the similarities of the seizure and maintenance of political control far outweigh the minor differences.[24] There was now a socialist system in existence, but there was to be no redefinition of the concept of socialist internationalism. Since Stalin's earliest days, proletarian internationalism had been interpreted in terms of the support required for the policies of the Soviet Union, and Stalin saw no need to re-examine this view. The ideological emphasis in Stalin's last years were not "positive," in that they were directed solely towards the unity of the bloc (this was insured by Stalin's own methods of control), but rather "negative" and aimed more at the exclusion of all possible Western influence in the satellites (as in the intense campaign against "cosmopolitanism").

It is of interest to examine Stalin's method of control after 1947-1948 to provide a later comparison with the structure of the Soviet bloc, and its effective degree of cohesion, in the critical years 1956-1958. The function of

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[24]For this reason, it seems only of academic interest to record the many and twisted theoretical explanations offered by the Soviets and other bloc communists concerning the establishment of the "people's democracies," as in Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op. cit., pp. 25-31.

the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe has been well documented, and was graphically illustrated during the German uprising of June, 1953, the Poznan riots of June, 1956, and the Hungarian revolt of October-November, 1956. It is obvious that the Soviet leaders feel impelled to use whatever force is required to maintain their security and protect their vital interests, and they obviously interpret their vital interests to include preventing the disintegration of communist control over the bloc. Other methods of control employed by Stalin are not quite so easy to describe.[25] For example, there always has been a certain amount of coercion maintained over most of the communist parties by the CPSU,[26] but, in the long run, this is effective only to the extent that the Russians have the capability--and the will--to exercise physical control through the police or army, or their own clandestine organizations. Considering the number of "rigged" trials of high-ranking communists in the

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[25]For background to this question, see Gunther Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 209, 211-212; and Wolfgang Leonhard, "International Communism: The Present Phase," in David Footman (ed.), International Communism (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960), pp. 128-129.

[26]Nollau, op. cit., p. 209, says that one method employed to control the national parties was to send back to work in their party organization various "functionaries" of the Comintern staff who were presumably loyal to Moscow. This means is no longer available, of course.

the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe has been well documented, and was graphically illustrated during the Kronsen uprising of June, 1953; the Polish crisis of June, 1956; and the Hungarian revolt of October-November, 1956. It is obvious that the Soviet leaders feel impelled to use whatever force is required to maintain whole communist governments in power, and they obviously interpret their interests to include controlling the internal economic and political policies of these states. Other nations do employ military force to achieve political objectives.[13] For example, Nasser's Egypt has used a portion of its military establishment over much of the twentieth century in the Congo,[14] Iran, in the Iraqi war, built an extensive army to exceed that of its neighbors in capability--and then willingness--to execute unilateral control through the policies of Iraqi or Shiite Moslem fundamentalist organizations. Considering the number of "failed" states of sub-Saharan countries in the

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[13] For discussions of this problem, see Walter Millis, Harvey Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and the State (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), and Morton Kaplan, "International Cooperation: The Present Phase," in Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Nomos V: International Cooperation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 111-129.

[14] Keesing, op. cit., p. 18965, says that one motive employed to control the national parties was to lead each to work in their party organization to "neutralize" all the loyalists itself who might potentially object to service. This means, of course, additional, of course.

satellites from 1947-1952, the issue of Soviet dominance of the other communist parties as an effective method of control is of extreme interest to the non-communist observer of the bloc. One might reasonably speculate on the nature of events in 1956-1958 had the Soviets disposed more effectively of Gomulka and Imre Nagy in earlier days.

In addition to control of the parties, the political, economic, and military organizations of the people's republics in the years immediately following their establishment were staffed thoroughly with Soviet "advisers," who were competent not only to proffer advice on the construction of a socialist government but were also competent to warn both the satellite leaders and Moscow when certain measures being considered by a satellite government were not felt to be appropriate to the interests of socialism.[27]

Wolfgang Leonhard suggests four politico-ideological principles which provided the theoretical justification for Stalin's control over other communist parties.[28] Despite the validity of these principles as ideological concepts, and their acceptance by the more "internationally-minded"

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[27]On occasion, the role of the Soviets extended far beyond that of providing "advisors," as in the notorious case of the Russian Marshal Konstantin Rokossovski, who served as Poland's Minister of Defense for several years, and was also a member of the Politburo.

[28]Leonhard, op. cit., pp. 128-129.

activities from 1917-1952, the issue of Soviet dominance of the other Communist parties as an effective method of control is of decisive interest to the non-Communist observer of the bloc. One might speculate on the matter of events in 1956-1956 had the Soviet dictatorship been effectively at issue and the Soviet Union Party in decline days.

In addition to control of the parties, the political, economic, and military organizations of the peoples democracies are the areas immediately following their establishment were staffed exclusively with Soviet nationals, who were competent not only to predict events on the assumption of a socialist government but were also competent to warn both the politburo leaders and Moscow when certain policies being considered by a socialist government were not likely to be appropriate to the interests of socialism.[37]

Molinsky launched attacks four politico-ideological portfolios with doctrinal or theoretical justification for Stalin's control over other Communist parties.[38] Despite the validity of these principles as theological concepts, and their acceptance by the more "internationally-minded"

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[38] Buchanan, op. cit., pp. 129-139.

communists, they are meaningful for purposes of control only so long as the Soviet leadership is willing and able to punish those parties or individuals who do not comply with Soviet demands. As we have observed, in the development of international communism since 1955, all of these principles have been either abandoned or revised. The result has been not only the elimination of a true "center" of international communism, but also the practical realization that the Soviet Union interprets the principles of socialist internationalism in accordance with its own national interests, and will administer discipline only when it feels that its interests--not international communism--are threatened. What is important to note in this context is that the interests of the Soviet Union go beyond the traditional interests of statehood to embrace the communist movement.

From the maintenance of control and cohesion, there have been essentially only two methods of coercion available since the formation of the socialist system (unless intimidation through the threat of personal physical violence is included). These two methods consist of military and economic sanctions. Depending upon circumstances, military means of enforcing bloc unity are always available, but of value only in extreme cases. Much more subtle means of developing and preserving a unified bloc are afforded by

economic integration and control. These means have been relied upon by Stalin and his successors, although with far different emphasis and sophistication. But when the problems that faced Stalin are viewed in perspective, it can be shown that there was no fundamental difference between his technique and that of his successors.

Considering his long-range objectives and innate suspicious character, Stalin most likely realized that the war-time collaboration with his allies would not last long in the post-war era. One of the primary concerns of the Soviet Union after the war was the rapid reconstruction of the Soviet economy. To this end, the economies of the satellites were completely harnessed. During the process of the socialist revolution of the peoples of East Europe, i.e., while the coalition governments of the 1945-1948 period were being strangled, the satellite economies were burdened with the costs of reparations, dismantling of equipment and factories seized by the Soviets, and the support of Soviet occupation troops.[29]

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[29]The aggregate of these costs has been estimated as one third of the total national income for Hungary at the time, for example; see Zauberman, op. cit., p. 14. Also see Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951), pp. 234-236; in his preface to the second edition, Seton-Watson claims that "a good deal of space in this book is given to economic problems," but he gives Soviet economic exploitation limited treatment. For a concise treatment of this subject, see

economic integration and control." These means have been realized even by Stalin and his successors, although with different economic and political effects. But when the consolidation that Brzezinski viewed in perspective, it can be shown that there was no fundamental difference between his technique and that of his successors.

Consolidating his Jim-Crow objectives and inducing acquiescence, Wilson never literally threatened the Negroes with extermination--as the Nazis would not have long in the post-war era. Nor is the primary purpose of the Soviet Union today the use of the death concentration of the Soviet economy. It is but one of the elements of the satellite more comprehensive. During the process of the economic dominion of the Republic of East Germany, i.e., during the decisive confinement of the 1945-1948 period many people disappeared, the victims economic war, burdened with the costs of reparations, dismantling of equipment and industries seized by the Soviets, and the huge [illegible] of Soviet troops.[39]

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[39] One aspect of these costs has been estimated as one third of the total national income for Germany at the time, for example, see Ellis, The [illegible] Zone, p. 18. Also see Boris Sapronov, The East European Revolution (New York: Praeger Co. [illegible], 1951), pp. 214-217; in this reference in his normal edition, Sapronov claims that "a good deal is done in this zone in regard to economic problems," but in every serious economic evaluation [illegible] treatment of this subject, such

During this period of reparations and dismantling, the Soviets imposed various types of grossly unfair trade and industrial arrangements. These commercial projects differed depending upon the satellite and the branch of industry involved, but the most important arrangements from the consideration of the satellites were the Soviet-owned companies of East Germany (and a few in Hungary), which were ". . . in effect Soviet economic enclaves,"[30] and the notorious joint companies located in Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The Soviets enjoyed a form of extraterritoriality in the operation of these companies. Their structure clearly favored the Soviets in the determination of prices and control of management;[31] and their operations not only covered many of the satellites' extractive industries but also ". . . road, river and air transportation, the processing of home raw materials, and some

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Jan Wszelaki, Communist Economic Strategy: The Role of East Central Europe (Washington: National Planning Association, 1959), Chapter 8. Wszelaki estimates that the total amount of assets removed from East Germany alone in the post-war period as in excess of $15 billion, and the total transfer of wealth from East Europe around $20 to $25 billion. Wszelaki notes (p. 67) that the degree of exploitation varied whether the satellite was a former foe or traditional ally; also, see Charles P. Kindleberger, Foreign Trade and the National Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 160-161.

[30] Zauberman, op. cit., p. 16.

[31] Wszelaki, op. cit., p. 67; Zauberman, op. cit., p. 18. For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Nicolas Spulber, The Economics of Communist East Europe (New York: John Wiley and the Technology Press, 1957), pp. 182-223.

During this period of reparations and dismantling, the Soviets imposed various types of grossly unfair trade and industrial arrangements. These commercial projects differed depending upon the satellite and the branch of industry involved, but the most important arrangements from the consolidation of the satellites were the Soviet-owned companies of East Germany (and a few in Hungary), which were ". . . in effect Soviet economic enclaves,"[30] and the motorized joint companies located in Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The Soviets enjoyed a form of extraterritoriality in the operation of these companies. Their structure clearly favored the Soviets in the determination of prices and control of management,[31] and their operations not only covered many of the satellites' extractive industries but also ". . . road, river and air transportation, the processing of home raw materials, and some

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Jan Wszelaki, Communist Economic Strategy: The Role of East Central Europe (Washington: National Planning Association, 1953), Chapter 6. Wszelaki estimates that the total amount of assets removed from East Germany alone in the post-war period as in excess of $15 billion, and the total transfer of wealth from East Europe around $20 to $25 billion. Wszelaki notes (p. 57) that the degree of exploitation varied whether the satellite was a former foe or traditional ally; also, see Charles P. Kindleberger, Foreign Trade and the National Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 161-181.

[30] Kaufman, op. cit., p. 15.

[31] Wszelaki, op. cit., p. 67; Kaufman, op. cit., p. 15. For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Nicolas Spulber, The Economics of Communist East Europe (New York: John Wiley and the Technology Press, 1957), pp. 182-225.

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During 1947-1948, Soviet policy towards the satellites was modified substantially. There was no startling reversal of the Soviet position, but rather a recognition that conditions in both Eastern and Western Europe had changed considerably since the war. Whatever hopes Stalin may have had for the civil war in Greece or possible seizure of power by the communist parties in Western Europe were dashed by 1948. Also, the domestic economic problems of the Soviet Union and the satellites called for greater attention and more radical solutions. There was a gradual "turning inward" of Soviet policy, despite the drama of the Berlin blockade (which could be viewed as a defensive measure to consolidate the Soviet grip on East Germany).

In the reappraisal of the strategy of the communist movement in 1947, the emphasis was on the economic and political strengthening of the Soviet bloc. A first step was the establishment of a new organization to provide a greater degree of institutional cohesion desired by the Soviets. In the construction of socialism in the people's

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[74] Landauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

democracies, many of the communist leaders, despite their Comintern background and personal loyalty to Stalin, in their preoccupation with their own national problems were developing tendencies and attitudes which one author refers to as "domesticism,"[33] or excessive concentration on domestic affairs. Nevertheless, it appears that not even the Soviet Union at this time wanted a strong, centralized organization comparable to the Comintern,[34] but urged instead a more loosely-knit association designed primarily to facilitate the exchange of information, opinions, and policy views.[35] At the opening session of the new

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[33]Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op. cit., pp. 52-58. "Domesticism" is a "certain implicit perspective" inevitable in the application of rather broad guidelines to specific situations and demands. Brzezinski too easily distinguishes between domesticism and national communism, as if the latter were the purposeful placing of local-national units above those of the international movement. The differentiation is not that clear, as the Yugoslav Communists realized in their struggle in the 1950's against "localism," a phenomenon produced by their own decentralization measures.

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[35]Nollau op. cit., pp. 216-218. Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 328, states that the Cominform publication "For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy," was designed to promulgate the official line for the bloc. There could be several reasons why the

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organization, the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform, in September, 1947, however, Andrei Zhdanov delivered a forceful, "hard" line policy speech, designed to rally all the socialist countries around the Soviet Union in order to present a unified front in the cold war. The other members of the camp immediately reflected the Soviet line in their foreign policy statements, but this stage in international tension had been in preparation for some time and was certainly not the product of the Cominform.

It is generally agreed that the Cominform performed no major service for international communism.[36] An assessment of its functions might show it to have been a failure, in that the location of the Cominform in Belgrade did not keep Yugoslavia within the bloc, and the Cominform operating

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Soviets did not strive for a more centralized organization: (1) Soviet control of the satellites would not thereby be enhanced; (2) Stalin actually desired only a mechanism for more effective coordination of the parties; and (3) Stalin wanted an organization capable of exerting pressure against a recalcitrant member, so that the Soviet Union would not have to bear the entire disciplinary burden. This was the case with the Yugoslav expulsion and subsequent Cominform attack.

[36] See Nollau, op. cit., pp. 245-251, and Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev, op. cit., pp. 328-330. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op. cit., p. 62, ascribes considerable authority to Cominform and its "control over the Communist power structures." Wolfgang Leonhard, in The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 100, notes that "the Cominform conflict and the existence of an independent socialist Yugoslavia constituted a heavy liability for Moscow."

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from Bucharest after the split with Yugoslavia in 1948 was unable to force Yugoslavia to capitulate to Soviet demands.[37] Conditions had changed and, after about 1950, the Cominform served very little purpose and was paid even less attention.

The clash between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was of much more significance to the interests and growth of the international communist movement than the life and death of the Cominform. There are, of course, differences between Titoism, national communism, nationalism (localism, domesticism, ad infinitum), but essentially they all represent the same human tendency (or failing, from a Marxian point of view): the inclination of a person--or group--to place his interests first in priority, and to interpret the interests of the larger group in terms of the requirements of his more immediate environment. Brzezinski has described the "problems of diversity" within the bloc during its formative stage, and how these problems tended to become institutionalized and be resolved in ways that were not always in accord with Soviet objectives.[38] Usually local

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communist leaders have interpreted their interests on a national basis; within the bloc, each national party constantly endeavors to obtain the best terms and conditions for itself. Prior to 1945, there was only one communist party exercising political power, that is, the CPSU. This placed it in a significant leadership position for the entire communist movement. During the formative stage of the socialist system, it was recognized that the primary source of communist power was still the Soviet Union. As the socialist camp developed, however, the individual units tended more and more to think and act in terms of their more immediate objectives, rather than with regard to the ultimate objectives of the movement as a whole. The Soviets could keep this trend in check with their preponderance of power in all the socialist states, except for Yugoslavia, where the Yugoslav Partisans had been the principal factor in the seizure of power in 1944-1945. The contest between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union after Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 is usually viewed as a conflict of interests, Soviet hegemony versus Yugoslav independence. This is a correct interpretation but perhaps not sufficient. Not enough attention is given to the "correctness" of the position of the Soviet Union during this dispute: an effective international communist movement requires unity; unity of theory and policy demands a single source of authority;

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the Soviet Union, being not only the senior but the most powerful socialist state, is the logical choice for the role of directing the movement. For the communist movement to remain a revolutionary force of significance, this was the only possible course of development, in the eyes of the Soviet leaders; the fact that this interpretation coincides with Soviet interests is incidental. A strong, centralized international organization, as the Comintern was intended to be, was no longer considered necessary. Stalin realized that there was always the possibility that such an organization could develop a voice of its own in formulating policy and "creatively" developing theory. The unique historical position of the USSR, Stalin felt, endowed it with the capacity and authority to interpret and act upon the needs of the communist movement; there was no need to burden the effectiveness of international communism with a cumbersome institutional structure.

Yet, there remained a need for some sort of semi-formal arrangement tying together the socialist states, so that the more independent-minded members of the system could be properly constrained. This is the reasoning behind the modest role assigned to the Cominform, as well as its very limited effectiveness in subduing Tito.

The quality of man that tends to project and identify the interests of the individual or the group (or

nation) with the next larger societal unit is the centrifugal force that has continually plagued the international communist movement. There are inherent conflicts of interest between groups, whether the groups consist of capitalists, socialists, workers, or intellectuals. These conflicting interests must be resolved eventually by some superior agency possessing the authority and capacity to do so. When Stalin failed to bring Tito back into the fold in the late 1940's, he tacitly recognized the right to divergent courses of development within the communist movement. Stalin's death, in 1953, was no more than the catalyst for an inevitable process of the decentralization of authority already in progress.

After Stalin, there were essentially only two courses open to the Soviet leadership, either of which was designed to tie together again the socialist bloc under Soviet leadership. First, Malenkov and Khrushchev could recognize officially the Yugoslav position, and assume that a certain amount of national latitude in the building of communism would not preclude, but actually enhance, the strengthening of the movement. Or, secondly, they could attempt to "go it alone" in the socialist camp without Yugoslavia, castigate the renegade Tito as a fascist and force him into the undesirable position of a cast-off, and thus weld together the remainder of the bloc. Something

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similar to the latter course was advocated by Molotov and the Anti-Party group, who apparently conceived of a viable international movement only on the basis of a degree of control comparable to that required by Stalin. Such a course would not only be in accord with Soviet interest, the Anti-Party group must have felt, but would be the only way an effective revolutionary movement could be maintained. To them there was no conflict between ideology and power, because the power was to be devoted to the ideological objectives, and the ideological objectives could not be achieved except through firm, centralized leadership of the bloc.

Viewed in this manner, Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956 regarding the efficacy of separate roads, and his earlier recognition of this theoretical development at Belgrade in May, 1955, represent the first of the two opposing choices mentioned above. Khrushchev intended to make membership in the socialist camp more appealing, not only through the negative aspect of eschewing Stalinism, but positively by providing a more meaningful approach to mutual security (through the Warsaw Pact, reflecting the common fear in East Europe of West Germany in NATO), and by providing the basis for a reinvigorated bloc economy that would--it was hoped--be able to provide simultaneously for

a renewed industrialization drive and increased demand for consumer goods.

Before Khrushchev could act to reconstitute the bloc in a more progressive framework, he was forced to suffer through the "growing pains" of the bloc from 1953-1956. These developments provide the subjects of the next two chapters.

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CHAPTER IV

THE EVENTS OF 1956

The Soviet bloc and international communism have never recovered from the "events"[1] of 1956, and it is unlikely that the communist movement will ever again possess the unity (enforced or otherwise) of the early post-war period. It is generally accepted that Khrushchev's famous speech at the 20th Party Congress signaled, and even encouraged, the growing discontent that culminated in the Polish October and the abortive Hungarian revolution. This is partially true, in that the demi-god of Stalin was both publicly and privately destroyed at the 20th Party Congress, encouraging both moderate and liberal communists throughout the bloc to believe that all institutional vestiges of Stalin should also be removed. It is true that the thesis of separate roads to socialism was given renewed emphasis at the 20th Party Congress. But it is also true that this occurrence was more a form of recognition of processes already gathering momentum than the initiation of the processes themselves. De-Stalinization had been underway,

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although rather haltingly, since early 1953; and the separate roads thesis was formally recognized by Khrushchev and Bulganin on their first famous "junket," their trip to Belgrade in May, 1955.[2] In fact, it is even more accurate to push back the authorship of the separate roads theory, as has Walter Laqueur,[3] to Stalin and his failure in 1948-1952 to "break Tito" and bring the Yugoslavs back into the embrace of "socialist internationalism."

Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's crimes and recognition of individual paths to socialism at the 20th Party Congress was the culmination of a three-year growth of dissatisfaction and unrest in the satellites, a search by some of the satellite leaders for the degree of autonomy they would be permitted by Moscow, and an attempt by some segments of the native populations to determine the extent of personal freedom they could achieve within their political systems. Although the general accent was on increased autonomy for each satellite, the popular participation in political agitation and other features of this period varied considerably among the satellites.

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Czechoslovakia and the GDR (East Germany) followed somewhat similar patterns in that they experienced workers' rebellions very shortly after the death of Stalin. These revolts were forcibly restrained, the party leaders adopted more responsive policies, and the split between party and people did not again achieve the same proportions.

The first substantial physical outbreak against Soviet hegemony and communist misrule occurred at Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, on June 1, 1953. This was a spontaneous workers' revolt, brought on primarily by economic hardships (mostly because of a currency revaluation which destroyed many family savings), but it led neither to further uprisings in Czechoslovakia or the promise of assistance from the West. Control of the governmental institutions in Pilsen was quickly regained by the central communist government, and there was no need for extensive Soviet aid in quelling the revolt.[4] An uprising in East Germany, less than three weeks later, bore a remarkable similarity to the Pilsen affair. Again, it was the workers who revolted against communist oppression and, as in Pilsen, for economic reasons: an increase in work norms was, in effect, a

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[4]Duchachek, in Stephen Kertesz (ed.), East Central Europe and the World: Developments in the Post-Stalin Era (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. 107; see also Taborsky in Edward T. Hallowell (ed.), The Soviet Satellite Nations (Gainesville, Florida: Kallman Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 90-91.

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decrease in wages.[5] There was a major difference, however, between the Czechoslovak and German uprisings: the latter was successful in temporarily gaining control of a significant section of the agencies of public administration and control, and large-scale Soviet intervention with tanks was required to restore order and communist rule. The principal effect of these uprisings was the realization that the Soviets would use military force to support the socialist system, i.e.; the local communist leaders need not step down in the face of the open hostility of their own people. A secondary effect that must not have gone unnoticed was that the Western powers would not accept the risks involved in providing effective assistance to the rebellious workers. It was significant in both Czechoslovakia and East Germany that the uprisings were led by and composed of the workers; there was not the active participation and literary stimulus provided by the intellectuals, as in Poland and Hungary in 1956. After 1953, the Communist Party leaders in Czechoslovakia and East Germany were able to maintain effective control of both their parties and governments, without permitting further threats to the unity of the Soviet bloc.

Rumania and Bulgaria were apparently both too backward and too far removed from the influences of Western

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liberalism for the workers or intellectuals to develop any coherent opposition to communist rule. Purges and moderate reforms after 1953 successfully precluded serious opposition.[6] The slow process of de-Stalinization worked in reverse in Albania, where a Communist Party had been put into power in 1944 without the direct and primary assistance of the Soviet Union but with the aid of the Yugoslavs.[7] The domination of Albanian politics by Tito resulted in the welcoming by Albanian Communists of the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948. When the first rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow took place in 1955, the Albanians became quite apprehensive of renewed Yugoslav interference in their politics. Premier Hoxha's increased strengthening of power and the grip of the Party produced an aggravated form of Stalinism, rather than the de-Stalinization process called for by the CPSU.

Hungary and Poland provide yet another response to the death of Stalin and erratic de-Stalinization. There were no early abortive workers' revolts, and the growing dissatisfaction of the workers that was dramatically manifested in 1956 generally coincided with that of the

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[6] See Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania," in Kertesz, op. cit., pp. 157-159.

[7] Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 330.

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[6] See Peyton Lyon-Gelatt, "Yugoslavia," in Beckett, op. cit., pp. 127-150.

[7] Hugh Seton-Watson, From London to Bucharest (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 320.

intellectuals. Most likely, the receptivity of a few of the leading communists in these countries to a degree of de-Stalinization and moderate reforms, and the successful example of national communism in Yugoslavia, was of significance to the 1956 events in Poland and Hungary. Of great importance, also, was the availability in time of crisis of two communist leaders who seemed to be somewhat in tune with the aspirations and demands of their people: Imre Nagy and Wladislaw Gomulka. The differences between these two communists were crucial to the course of development of the "revisionist" forces and the course of the revolutionary activity in their countries in the fall of 1956. Gomulka and the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party symbolized revisionism expressing itself without breaking the bonds of the international communist movement, a rebellion by communists against the extent of the authority and domination of Moscow. Imre Nagy in Hungary, on the other hand, was not the guiding force of the spontaneous revolt of workers and students commencing October 22 with the 16-point resolution by Budapest students. Nagy was a symbol of the earlier "new course" in Hungary from 1953-1955 that had meant a reduction in Stalinist-type government. He had neither the political strength to keep the demonstrations within bounds nor the wisdom to realize

that his later withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact would not be tolerated by the Russians.

The 20th Party Congress, then, was not the entire story of de-Stalinization, nor was it the beginning. It was more like opening the floodgates which had previously passed only a trickle of revisionist water. Khrushchev must have had mixed motives in condemning Stalin at such length and with such vehemence and forcefulness, and in emphasizing other creative developments in Marxism as the theory of separate roads to socialism, the notion that war was no longer an inevitable occurrence, and the possibility of parliamentary transition to socialism. De-Stalinization may have been focused primarily on domestic policies, but Khrushchev, undoubtedly, realized that his revelations would have serious repercussions in the satellites and other communist parties. Leonhard offers three reasons which explain Khrushchev's deliberate dilution at the 20th Party Congress of Moscow's authority in the socialist camp:[8]

1. Political and ideological rapprochement with Yugoslavia;

2. Realistic interpretation of the course of political development in the bloc, and an

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[8]Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 125. See also Nathaniel Weyl, The Anatomy of Terror (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), pp. 5-8.

that his latest withdrawal of support from the Warsaw Pact would not be tolerated by the Russians.

The CDU Party Congress, then, was not the entire story of de-Stalinization, nor was it the beginning. It was more like opening the floodgates which had previously passed only a trickle of revisionist water. Khrushchev must have had mixed motives in condemning Stalin at such length and with such vehemence and forcefulness, and in emphasizing other creative developments in Marxism as the theory of peaceful coexistence to socialism, the Hungarian coup was no longer an inevitable occurrence, and the possibility of parliamentary transition to socialism. De-Stalinization may have been formed primarily on domestic policies, but Khrushchev undoubtedly realized that his revelations would have serious repercussions in the satellites and other communist parties. Leonard offers three reasons which explain Khrushchev's deliberate disruption at the 20th Party Congress of Moscow's authority in the socialist camp:[6]

1. Political and ideological requirements with Yugoslavia;

2. Escalating interpretation of the course of political development in the bloc, and so

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[6]Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 573. See also Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 3-6.

attempt to nip in the bud any further backsliding towards national communism: and

3. Hope of renewed ideological ties with the Social-Democratic forces in Western Europe, and an ideological appeal by the bloc to nationalistic forces in Asia and Africa.

In retrospect, we see that none of these hopes materialized fully. Yet, surely, Khrushchev would not have accepted such grave risks to socialist unity in early 1956 without anticipating commensurate rewards. It seems likely that the Soviet leaders were following their own Marxist preconception, that the natural affinity of the working classes of all the bloc members would weld the bloc together under effective leadership. This leadership would be provided, of course, by the most experienced and powerful member of the bloc. Stalinism had suffocated the economic and political growth of the bloc; the elimination of Stalinism, Khrushchev must have felt, would produce a new and much more viable socialist camp. Khrushchev probably did not anticipate the extent to which Stalinism had stifled initiative, national feeling, and other centrifugal forces which would disrupt socialist unity once the lid of Stalinism had been removed.[9]

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[9]Gunther Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 259-260, comments on the minor role played by proletarian internationalism, as a concept, at the 20th Party Congress. Although there was considerable discussion of the various

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sliding towards national communism, and

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ful member of the bloc. Conflicts had surfaced from
economic and political levels of the bloc, the elimination
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new and much more Vitalic socialist camp. Eventually
probably who may anticipate the extent to which nationalism
had stifled initiative, internal feuding, and other cen-
trifugal forces which would plague socialist unity con-
tinue its drive of socialism and over communism.[3]

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[3]Courtney Bolina, International Communism and World
Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp.
233-250; comments on the above role played by Khrushchev
international-ism, as a consequence, of the 20th Party Congress.
Although there was considerable discussion of the various

We have already briefly discussed the nature of Stalinism and its relationship to the formation of the bloc.[10] Khrushchev directed the contents of his secret speech, of course, to the assembled members of the CPSU, but it should have been obvious that the contents of the speech would become known to the non-Soviet communist parties. For this reason, the significance of the effect of the speech on relations among socialist countries could not be avoided. Stalinism had not been simply a Russian domestic phenomenon, but had permeated the entire bloc. It was not possible to destroy Stalin's image in the USSR without doing the same in the satellites.

Of great interest in assessing Khrushchev's speech[11]

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forms of transition to socialism and the problem of the cult of personality, according to Nollau "the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU seems to have been slow to appreciate the effect these factors would have on the relations between the Communist parties . . . ." The Soviets not only did not visualize the damage that might be incurred, it considered that the results of the 20th Party Congress would be a greatly strengthened bloc; Nollau quotes Pravda, July 16, 1956, on these Soviet expectations: "The decisions taken at the 20th Party Congress have opened up majestic prospects for the unifying of all the forces supporting peace and socialism."

[10]See Chapter III.

[11]Delivered February 24-25, 1956; released by the United States Department of State on June 4, 1956; found in the Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), hereafter cited as The Anti-Stalin Campaign. For additional analysis of Khrushchev's motives in attacking Stalin so vehemently in

We have already briefly discussed the nature of Stalin's relationship to the formation of the bloc.[10] Khrushchev directed the contents of his speech, of course, to the assembled members of the CPSU, but it should have been obvious that the contents of the speech would become known to the non-Soviet communist parties. For this reason, the significance of the silence on matters which socialist countries could not be avoided. Stalin's not been simply a burning question, but had normalized the entire bloc. It was not possible to destroy Stalin's image in the USSR without doing the same in the satellites.

On most [illegible] to advocate Khrushchev's speech[11]

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forms of opposition to socialism and the problem of the cult of personality, according to Dulles "the President of the Central Committee of the CPSU seems to have gone also to appreciate the effect these factors would have on the relations between the Communist parties . . .". The Soviets not only did not vindicate the charge that Stalin was innocent, it reinforced that the Communist Party Congress would be a publicly acknowledged step, Molotov Quotes Pravda, July 16, 1956, on these Soviet expectations: "The decisions taken at the 20th Party Congress have opened up majestic prospects for the unifying of all the forces supporting peace and socialism."

[10] See Chapter III.

[11] Delivered February 24-25, 1956; released by the United States Department of State on June 4, 1956; cited in the Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956). Hereafter cited as The Anti-Stalin Campaign. The editorial analysis of Khrushchev's motives in attacking Stalin is extremely an

is his fundamental purpose in attacking Stalinism: to detail the crimes Stalin committed against the CPSU. The fact that these crimes more than occasionally affected many millions of Russian people was not the most important reason for their revelation. Khrushchev mentions, on occasion, the injustices to the Soviet people and their great accomplishments under Stalin in building socialism, but his central thesis rests upon the damage Stalin did to the Party. This was implicit not only in the detailing of Stalin's crimes[12] but also in Stalin's positive contributions to the CPSU, such as his very important and necessary struggle against "the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinites,"[13] whose victory--Khrushchev claimed--over the CPSU would have returned capitalism to Russia.

Stalin ruled--or attempted to rule--the bloc as he did the Soviet Union. The purges of former members of coalitions in the satellites during the late 1940's, as

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his secret speech, see J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 305-307. Also see Wolfgang Leonhard, "International Communism: The Present Phase," in David Footman (ed.), International Communism (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960), p. 132.

[12]Such as the repression of "many honest Communists" and the party cadres who had borne the heavy Civil War load, The Anti-Stalin Campaign, op. cit., pp. 12-13; also see pp. 21-24, passim, for further listing of crimes against the CPSU.

[13]The Anti-Stalin Campaign, op. cit., p. 11.

is his fundamental premise in attacking Stalinism. He detail the crimes Stalin committed against the CPSU. The fact that these crimes were more than occasionally effected many millions of Russian people was not the most important reason for their revelation. Nevertheless, on occasion, the deliverance to the Soviet people and their communist accomplishments under Stalin in building socialism, not his central thesis, were the reasons Stalin had to go.

Party. This was implicit not only in the statistics of Stalin's crimes[12] but also in Trotsky's qualified sanctions to the CPSU, such as its very importance and necessary struggle against "the Termidorian-Bonapartist clique and of the bureaucracy,"[13] whose victory--although ultimately over the CPSU would have returned capitalism to Russia.

Stalin ruled--or attempted to rule--the Bloc as he did the Soviet Union. The grades of former Communists of conditions in the Republic during the late 1940's, as

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his secret speech, see J. M. Bochenski, Handbook, Marxism and Practice of Soviet Communism (Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 306-307. Also see Weigang Leonhard, "Khrushchev's Communism: The Present Phase," in Soviet Politics (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960), p. 113.

[12] Much of the exposition of Khrushchev's Communism and the party reform can be found in Khrushchev Khrushchev, The Anti-Stalin Campaign, op. cit., pp. 12-13; also see pp. 11-14, Leader: for further details on various aspects of the CPSU.

[13] The Anti-Stalin Campaign, op. cit., p. 11.

well as the trials of suspected Titoists (Rajk, Slansky, et al.) in the early 1950's, indicates the extent to which Stalin controlled the bloc, with the obvious exception of Yugoslavia. As revealed by Khrushchev, Stalin had grossly misjudged the extent of his control when he told Khrushchev that "I will shake my little finger--and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."[14] This could have been Stalin's most crucial error; had he forced the Yugoslavs to submit to the dictates of the Cominform, there may have been no need for Khrushchev five or six years later to explain the validity of separate roads or to destroy Stalinism.

Of additional significance to the communist movement is the relationship of Stalinism, a technique, to communism, which is both a technique and a form of government. It was vital that Khrushchev lay to rest any doubts or fears on the part of other communist parties that Stalinism was a reflection of the socialist system, a conclusion of the Western "bourgeois" press and political observers. It was inevitable that the communists had to treat Stalinism as a perversion that could not possibly reflect a degeneration of the Soviet system; this ideological "shoring up" by the CPSU did not take place until mid-1956, however, when some West European communists attacked the features of socialism

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[14] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

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[14] *Idem*, pp. 52-62.

which could permit the growth of a phenomenon such as Stalinism. This is another indication that perhaps the Soviet leaders did not expect nearly as strong a reaction to de-Stalinization as was displayed in the subsequent months.

Although no mention of the future dissolution of the Cominform was made during the 20th Party Congress, this possibility was most likely on Khrushchev's mind at that time.[15] By early 1956, it was obvious that the Cominform had outlived its usefulness as a constructive force in the building of socialist unity. This was especially true now that Khrushchev was attempting to bring Yugoslavia, which had been the object of violent Cominform propaganda attacks and Soviet threats in the past, back into the international socialist fold. The official resolution announcing the dissolution of the Cominform[16] recognized that "there have been changes in recent years in the international situation," but the changes offered as the reasons for the dissolution of the Cominform hardly correspond to reality,

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[15] Leonhard, International Communism, op. cit., p. 130, says that Khrushchev had mentioned, as late as December, 1955, the need of retaining the Cominform.

[16] "Announcement of the Dissolution of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties," Pravda, April 18, 1956, p. 3; translated in CDSP, VIII, 16, pp. 6-7. The resolution is also found in Carl E. Zinner (ed.), National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 9-11.

which could portray the growth of a phenomenon such as Stalinism. This is another indication that perhaps the Soviet leaders did not expect nearly as strong a reaction to de-Stalinization as the displayed in the subsequent months.

Although no mention of the future dissolution of the Comintern was made during the Party Congress, this possibility was most likely on everybody's mind at that time. By early 1956, it was obvious that the Comintern had lived its usefulness as a constructive force in the building of socialist unity. This was repeatedly true now that Khrushchev was attempting to bring Yugoslavia, which had been the source of violent Comintern propaganda attacks and Soviet enemies in the west, back into the international socialist fold. The official resolution announcing the dissolution of the Comintern[10] recognized that "many have been Communist parties have grown powerful and influential," but the congress stressed as the reasons for the dissolution of the Comintern rightly unchanged in reality,

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[10] Pravda, Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik, op. cit., p. 1.

[11] Khrushchev's acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Yugoslavian brand of Communist and workers' parties, Pravda, April 18, 1956, p. 1, originated in Cmd., 1122, 19, Cmd. 9-7. The resolution is also found in Carl E. Linden, Khrushchev Communism and Soviet Foreign Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, pp. 9-11.

except as noted that there were "particularly urgent tasks . . . of overcoming the division within the working class movement . . . ." Other forms, the resclution continued, should be found to promote socialist unity, "each party or group of parties will . . . find new and useful forms of establishing links and contacts among themselves . . . ." No reasons for the dissolution of the Cominform were offered beyond the "changing international situation;" it was not noted why the Cominform, which was supposedly just a means for exchanging information, could not serve in the new situation.

An article in Pravda accompanying the announcement of the dissolution of the Cominform sheds some light on the purposes of this move:

> For the first time in world history there has arisen the possibility of preventing new wars and imperialist aggression through the united efforts of peace-loving states and peoples . . . . [Italics added.]

The article continues with a reiteration of the "new prospects . . . for the transition of various countries to socialism," including parliamentary accession to power, and concludes with a call for "unity of action" among the various socialist parties. This announcement could be considered to pre-date the more intensive campaign begun in June to reconstruct socialist unity.

The pace of events in the socialist camp gradually quickened until June, 1956, when the full revelation of the extent of Stalin's crimes and perversions was made completely public by the release by the State Department of a copy of Khrushchev's secret speech of four months previous. It became mandatory for non-Soviet communist leaders to explain to their party members why they had supported Stalin so slavishly for so many years. It is obvious that all "good communists" had to adopt the line that Stalinism and its abuses could not possibly be inherent in the socialist system, but were merely a personal aberration.

Beyond this basic assumption, however, there was considerable variation in the nature of the comment and explanation offered by Communist leaders. An editorial in The Daily Worker (CPUSA)[17] noted first that there were great changes taking place in the Soviet Union, and that rather than being inherent in socialism, "the evils of the Stalin era . . . created a peril for socialism . . . ." Khrushchev's revelations demonstrated the strength of the system, rather than any possible weakness, and indicated "a new era for communism and humanity."

In his now famous interview published in Nuovi Argomenti, June 16, 1956,[18] Palmiro Togliatti of the Italian

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[17]The Anti-Stalin Campaign, op. cit., p. 93; The Daily Worker (CPUSA), June 6, 1956.

[18]The Anti-Stalin Campaign, op. cit., p. 99.

[illegible]

[illegible] The pace of events in the anti-Nazi struggle quickened until June, 1934 when the full revelation of the extent of Hitler's crimes and perversions was made common property public in the rulings by the Nazis themselves of a copy of Hindenburg's secret record of four months previous. It became immediately the dominant consuming interest to explain to their party members the Nazi and Hindenburg basis of alliance, for it was vital. It is obvious that all "good Germans" had to bend for life, take training and life existed could not possibly be tolerated in the totalitarian system, one must accept a criminal conception.

Before this basic revelation, however, there was considerable variation in the nature of the opposition and explanation offered by Germans. An editorial in The Daily Mirror (London) under date of March 1934 made clear cheers Lenten plans on the Jewish column. All that remains then [illegible] to publish, the data of the Reichstag [illegible] Hindenburg's resignation commemorate the meeting of the system, which [illegible] Nazi and Hindenburg's basis of alliance.

[illegible] Of the non-Jewish journalists at Berlin Reichstag, none is [illegible] Fabricius of the Daily Mirror [illegible] June 27, 1934.

[illegible] The Anti-Semitic Campaign, op. cit., p. 99.

[illegible] The Anti-Semitic Campaign, op. cit., p. 99. The

Communist Party came closest to blaming the socialist system for Stalin's excesses when he criticized the tendency towards its bureaucratic degeneration under Stalin's leadership. In a subsequent report to the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, Togliatti described the basis of his proposed polycentric system:[19]

> . . . full autonomy of the individual Communist parties and of bilateral relations between them to establish complete, mutual understanding and complete, mutual trust, conditions necessary for collaboration and to give unity to the Communist movement itself . . . .

These principles had all been discussed before, but their relationship to events and Togliatti's call for bilateral relations among the communist parties (rather than each individual party tied to the CPSU) signaled a new form of socialist collaboration.

Togliatti also hailed the agreement reached that month between the CPSU and the LYC (League of Yugoslav Communists) during Tito's journey to Moscow.[20] This agreement was close to being a restatement of polycentrism:

> Believing that the path of socialist development differs in various countries and conditions, that the multiplicity of forms of socialist development tends to strengthen socialism, and proceeding from the fact that any tendency of imposing one's opinion on the ways and forms of socialist development is alien to both--the two parties have agreed that their cooperation shall be based on complete voluntariness

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[19] Ibid., p. 215. [20] Zinner, op. cit., p. 12.

> and equality, friendly criticism, and comradely exchange of opinions on controversial questions.

By late June, 1956, it appeared that the CPSU was having second thoughts about the advisability of continuing further a propaganda campaign that was only serving to break up the bloc.[21] Although most of the damage had been incurred by this time, the Soviets reacted by attempting to minimize the significance of the separate roads thesis, to emphasize the values and advantages of socialist unity, and to answer the critics both within and without the communist movement, who had wondered out loud how Stalin had thrived in a socialist system and why Stalinism had not been unmasked earlier by the other Soviet communists.

Accordingly, the CPSU responded with an important resolution[22] that mentioned first the recent positive

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[21] B. M. Johann, "Nationalism and Internationalism," The Review [Brussels], 3:30-31, and Leonhard, International Communism, op. cit., p. 128, observe that the Soviet campaign to counteract the disintegrative and polycentric forces began in June, 1956. This writer recognizes the importance of the June 30 document, but suggests that the remarks of the CPSU following the dissolution of the Cominform presage this event. The Soviet campaign to arrest the disintegration of the bloc was highlighted by an article in Pravda, July 24, 1956, pp. 3-4, translated in CDSP, VIII, 30, p. 25, which emphasized the ". . . world system of socialism as an inseparable association of different countries and peoples . . . advancing toward a single goal, toward building a socialist society . . . ." The article stressed that "different paths toward socialism are by no means paths which diverge."

[22] Resolution of the Central Committee of the

and cowardly, tribunal resistance, and completely
exchange of opinions on controversial questions.

By late June, 1970, it appeared that the CCDC was
having second thoughts about the advisability of continuing
further a confrontation mission that was only serving to
break up the bloc.[11] Although most of the damage had been
incurred by this time, the Council's decision to attempt to
minimize the antagonisms of the struggle inside itself, to
emphasize the values and structures of democratic unity, and
to answer the critics who claimed that the Council was moving
in a socialist direction had only diminished the successes
gained locally by the Black Power movements.

Accordingly, the CCDC resolved also an important
resolution[12] that modified the earlier position

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[11] D. W. Cohen, "Continuity and Discontinuity," in
The Negro Revolt (Unpublished), p. 20-21, and Carmichael,
Communism, op. cit., p. 21-2, believe that the Soviet Com-
mission to investigate the dissidents and pressure the
forces began to lose faith. This action necessitated the re-
appearance of the CCDC to intervene, but suggests that the
merits of the CCDC initially was strengthened by the inter-
passage this group. The Soviet decision to arrest the dis-
interjection of the bloc was highlighted by an article in
Pravda, July 4, 1970, p. 4, "Events in [illegible]," in CDSP, Vol.
20, p. 21, which declared that "[illegible] reactionary
socialism as to [illegible] cooperation of [illegible] coun-
tries and parties . . . [illegible] toward a single goal."
toward building . . . socialist society . . . ," the article
affected [illegible] "[illegible] [illegible] toward socialism are by no
means quite what they."

[12] Quotation of the central theme of the

achievements in the creative development of Marxism-Leninism, the "power and strength of our Party and the Soviet socialist system . . . " reflected in the "courageous and relentless self-criticism in the matter of the personality cult." The resolution then explained the causes of Stalinism, all of which, of course, were alien to and outside of the socialist system.

Starting with two gross distortions,[23] the CPSU resolution then, at great length, explained the unique position of the Soviet Union as the first socialist power, one that offered great experience for other Communist and Workers' Parties because it had fought alone for socialism for more than a quarter century, like a "besieged fortress encircled by capitalism." The Soviet Union claimed the resolution had struggled against the intervention of hostile foreign powers, spies and provacateurs, and alone the Soviet Union faced the onslaught of fascism and the Anti-Comintern Pact. The failure of the Western capitalist powers to respond, in the late 1930's, to Soviet overtures

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Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 30, 1956, Pravda, July 2, 1956; also found in The Anti-Stalin Campaign, op. cit., p. 275.

[23]That they, the CPSU, had "told the whole truth, no matter how bitter," and that "the line of the Central Committee of the CPSU has met with the complete approval and support of the Party and people."

achievements in the creative development of Marxism-
Leninism, the "power and strength of the Party and the
Soviet socialist system . . . " contrasted to the "power-
ground and relentless self-criticism in the testing of the
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and outside of the Socialist system.

Asserting with the usual illogic of the Com-
munist line, in great length, resolutions for unity,
position of the world Union of the First Socialist power,
one that adopted three resolutions to close themselves and
workers' Parties [illegible] to [illegible] Socialism
for more than a quarter century, [illegible] Marxism-Leninism
enriched by revolution," the Soviet Union clamped its
revolution [illegible] to [illegible] of Soviet
life [illegible] while all [illegible] and alone the
Soviet Union faced the universal [illegible] and the Marx-
Leninist [illegible]. The failure of the Western capitalist
powers to prevent, by all [illegible], [illegible]

Communist Party in the United States, June 30, 1956, [illegible]
July 7, 1956) also found in The Anti-Stalin Campaign [illegible]
[illegible], p. [illegible].

[illegible] time, the [illegible] was [illegible]
nature and [illegible]," and [illegible] the [illegible] Com-
munism of the [illegible] has not with the [illegible] opposed and
support to the Party and people."

for collective action against fascism also posed a grave threat to the existence of the USSR.

During these times, there were massive economic problems pressing upon the Soviet Union as well as an embittered internal struggle ("who will get the upper hand?" said the resolution) after Lenin's death. The tremendous achievements of building socialism under these conditions required the iron discipline characteristic of Stalin (no matter what the cost to the Russian people), but the power and adulation of his eminent position "went to his head," noted the resolution. The marvelous accomplishments of the Soviet people under the leadership of the CPSU were not lost despite the "criminal band led by the agent of international imperialism, Beria." Crude and unfortunate violations of socialist legality took place, and "many honest Communists and Soviet non-Party people were slandered and suffered innocently."

The resolution then explained that failure by other Communist leaders to attack Stalin during this period did not signify any "lack of personal courage" (an answer to several attacks on Khrushchev); any action at this time against Stalin "would not have received support from the people" because of the depths to which they have been deceived by the practice of the cult of personality by Stalin.

The altercation with Yugoslavia in 1948 was then blamed, in the resolution, on Stalin (although at Belgrade in 1955, Khrushchev had laid the blame on Beria and Abakhomov).

Despite this open admission that the worst forms of Stalinism could flourish for thirty years, the Soviet leaders could then claim that "Soviet society is strong through the awareness of the masses," although they had just admitted that any action against Stalin "would not have been understood by the people."

The finale of the resolution consisted of the usual exhortations to all Communist and Workers' Parties to "retain and strengthen their ideological unity and international fraternal solidarity . . . " against war and for peace, against the machinations of NATO and SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO's predecessor) and against United States subversion.

It is difficult to imagine one document containing more falsification, distortion, and nonsense, yet this resolution[24] has served as the basis of Soviet relations

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[24]Broadened in its scope by the Soviet declaration on the status of their troops in Eastern Europe, Pravda, October 31, 1956, p. 1, translated in CDSP, VIII, 40, pp. 10-11; and modified by the Declaration of the Ruling Communist Parties, Moscow, November, 1957. This writer considers it a basic document because it is a response not to "capitalist-imperialist warmongers" but to the criticisms of other Communists.

more calculated, [illegible], but nonetheless real [illegible]
reassurance[24] [illegible]

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[24]Quotations in the review by Jean Jerome Hathaway
on the stamps of Emil Nolde in the Weimar Republic
October 28, 1974, p. 7 [illegible] pp.
10-11; and Nolde's autobiography "The Emptiness of Life" Volume
Neutral Territory, Cologne, Germany, 1927. Nolde writes
widows in a Berlin concentration camp. It is printed
"Capitalist-Imperialist Aggressors" [illegible]
of other Communists.

with its fraternal socialist neighbors since that time. Perhaps its efficacy is measured by the quality of socialist internationalism that has prevailed in the Soviet bloc since 1956. Viewed in this light, the attack that really commenced in April, 1956, on the "errors" of fellow communists has in no sense been a complete failure. Yet neither has it been more than a temporary success. One reason the June 30, 1956, resolution has not contributed more to socialist unity is its basic contradiction: the notion that Stalin could deceive, manipulate, corrupt and decimate the CPSU for nearly thirty years without the awareness of the people or the active resistance of the Party. Although these features of Stalinism existed and thrived with the knowledge of the Party, the Party consciously was incapable of corrective measures. Yet, Stalinism was supposedly not a degeneration of Soviet socialism. This is perhaps too much for the most devoted Russophile in the satellites to accept.

The importance of the June 30, 1956, resolution was stressed in a lengthy editorial in Pravda, July 16, 1956,[25] which declared in part that: "It is impossible to move separately or haphazardly toward such a great goal [as Communism]. The working people of all socialist countries are

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[25] Zinner, op. cit., pp. 16ff.

[13] Ibid., July 28, 1914.

marching toward this aim in unison . . . ." The absence of comment on the various forms of transition to socialism was an especially noteworthy feature of this article.

However, events in some of the East European socialist countries were not moving in the direction called for by the CPSU. In March of 1956, a Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party attempted to confine the effects of the "separate roads" thesis:

> The Gomulka group propounded the theory of a "Polish road to socialism . . . [which meant] holding up the process of revolutionary transformation . . . . In its essence this was not a variation of the Soviet road but its contradiction, and objectively it signified an outright negation of the road to socialism.[26]

During this same month, the Stalinist Bierut died and was replaced as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party by Edward Ochab. In less than a month, Gomulka was released from prison and rehabilitated, and two months later there occurred the Poznan riots which touched off the momentous events of 1956.

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[26] Jerzy Morawski, "The Lessons of the 20th Congress of the CPSU," Trybuna Ludu, March 27, 1956; translated in Zinner, op. cit., p. 59. This editorial also cited criticism of Gomulka by Ochab, who considered Gomulka a nationalist and opportunist. See report by Edward Ochab on Results of 20th Soviet Party Congress, Pravda, April 8, 1956, p. 5, translated in CDSP, VIII, 14, p. 35. Morawski displayed political astuteness by proposing to eliminate excessive centralization in the economy and restore intra-party democracy; he also proposed a 25 per cent wage increase, showing an awareness of worker dissatisfaction. Finally, he emphasized the need for "the unity and cohesion of the entire socialist camp as the safest guarantee of Poland's security . . . ."

The details of the actual uprisings in Poland and Hungary in the latter half of 1956 do not call for repetition here, dramatic as they may be. Needless to say, the revolts were, and still are, blamed by the Soviet Union on "imperialist forces" and "hostile agents." This was not the line adopted by the Polish government and party. It was admitted that this was an internal matter and not the work of "foreign provocateurs."[27] The Poznan riots actually reflected not only economic dissatisfaction but enmity towards continued Soviet control of the country.

The key to the reaction to these events by the Soviet party is found in a statement by Premier Bulganin a month after the Poznan uprising, when he and Marshal Zhukov were visting Poland in an attempt to minimize the extent of the damage. This statement reminded the Poles of the nature of their western frontiers, which among the major powers guaranteed these frontiers, and that the retention

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[27]At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Ochab placed the blame for the Poznan riots upon lingering economic difficulties and ". . . the difficulties connected with the tense international situation and with the necessity for rapid industrialization . . . ," Pravda, July 20, 1956, p. 4; translated in CDSP, VIII, 29, p. 16. Ochab admitted party responsibility for failure to eliminate bureaucratic distortions and callousness toward the people. Gomulka later observed that ". . . the clumsy attempt to present the painful Poznan tragedy as the work of imperialist agents and provocateurs was very naive politically." For the Soviet conclusion that the Poznan revolt was caused by imperialist agents and a reactionary underground, see Pravda, June 30, 1956, and July 5, 1956, translated in CDSP, VIII, 26, pp. 10-11 and 27, p. 17.

of this border depended upon "the friendship of the peoples of our socialist camp, the friendship of the Polish and Soviet peoples."[28] Polish security forces, however, had been able to restore order without relying, in this instance, on the "friendship" of the Soviet people. There were no immediate and sweeping changes in the Polish political and economic situation as a result of Poznan but, undoubtedly, the riots were of great importance in the later developments that brought Gomulka back into the party and in power. A Yugoslav comment on the outcome of the Poznan riots was that "it is of particular importance that Poland remains loyal to democratization."[29] But not even the Yugoslavs fully appreciated the trend of the affairs then at work in East Central Europe; Poland was to remain a "people's republic," but with a much different emphasis from that of early 1956.[30]

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[28]Oscar Halecki, "Poland," in Kertesz, op. cit., p. 50. Also, see Zinner, op. cit., pp. 143-145.

[29]Borba, July 6, 1956; translated in Zinner, op. cit., p. 141.

[30]As has been noted, the transformation of Poland during the latter half of 1956 was not a shift to "national communism." Gomulka remained steadfast in his adherence to Polish-Soviet ties as a prerequisite to the existence of the Polish state. A resolution (see Zinner, op. cit., p. 239) adopted by the Central Committee of the PUWP at its Eighth Plenary Session, October 19-21, 1956, and based on a speech by Gomulka just previous, declared that (p. 256) it would take all steps necessary against reactionaries at

Whether their reasoning was based on pragmatism or ideology, the Polish political leaders repeatedly reaffirmed during the "Polish October" their loyalty to the socialist camp and their abiding friendship with the Soviet Union. To the dismay of the Soviets, however, many revisionist and downright un-Marxist views slipped into print in Polish publications during this period. The Soviets attacked[31] the liberal-intellectuals who proposed innovations that, as the Soviets claimed (justly, perhaps), would "shake the very foundations" of the socialist system. Reforms in Polish political life did not include permitting attacks on the socialist system or the "necessary" ties with the Soviet Union.

Undoubtedly, Gomulka has hewn a "new path" for Polish socialism, but surface differences should not be

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home and abroad who attempt to weaken the Soviet-Polish alliance or cause anti-Soviet feelings. An even more graphic description of the need for strong PUWP-CPSU ties was offered by Premier Cyrankiewicz: "It is impossible to build socialism in Poland without the U.S.S.R. or, as some idiot might think, against the U.S.S.R.," Pravda, October 25, 1956, p. 3, translated in CDSP, VIII, 41, 5.

[31] Pravda, October 20, 1956, p. 3, translated in CDSP, VIII, 40, 12-13. A certain Z. Florczak "suggested that the slogan 'Workers of the World, Unite,' be abandoned, and that the ultimate goal be shifted from Marxism to the 'final enrichment of man.'" Another writer by the name of Jerzy Putrament prepared an article which, the Soviets rather plaintively noted, did not even mention socialism, and was "essentially an attempt to provide some basis for the rejection of socialism."

Whether their reasoning was based on acceptance of ideology, the Polish political leaders repeatedly professed during the Polish October" their loyalty to the socialist camp and their solidarity primarily with the Soviet Union. To the dismay of the Soviets, however, many revisionist and Communist-Marxist views although late voiced in Polish publications during this period. The Soviets attacked[1] the liberal-intellectuals who proposed innovations that, as the Soviets claimed (partly, perhaps) could "shake the very foundations" of the socialist system. Forces in Polish political life did not welcome participation of the socialist system or the "necessary" ties with the Soviet Union.

Unnecessarily, Gomulka has been a "new path" for Polish socialism, but events differed should not be

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[1] Pravda, October 20, 1956, p. 3, translated in CDSP, VIII, 47, 19; Pravda, November 6, 1956, p. 4, translated in CDSP, VIII, 45, 3-4.

mistaken for substantive reformation of the Polish system or her relations with Moscow. On the contrary, Gomulka's first public speech after his return to power contained remarkable similarities in both content and tone to the official Soviet explanations of the importance of the 20th Party Congress.[32] Gomulka first admitted that a "great deal of evil, injustice, and many painful disappointments have accumulated in the life of Poland during the past years." The First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party declined to dwell on this subject. Just as the Soviets denied that Stalinism was, or could possibly have been, a product of their system, and could not happen again, Gomulka dismissed the miseries of previous years with the terse comment that "these years belong to the irrevocable past." Gomulka then claimed, as did the Soviets after the 20th Party Congress, that the Party leadership had told "the whole truth, the unvarnished truth, leaving nothing unsaid about our economic and political situation . . . ." As if not quite sure that this message had been absorbed, in the midst of discussing economic problems, Gomulka again claimed that "the Party is telling the unvarnished truth to the working class."

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[32] Zinner, op. cit., pp. 271ff; the speech was delivered to a "citizens rally" in Warsaw, October 24, 1956.

The new First Secretary then warned that no one would be permitted "to take advantage of the cause of regeneration and of the peoples' freedom for purposes alien to socialism," a firm reminder similar to many found in Pravda in the weeks after February, 1956.[33] Gomulka's most significant remarks were directed towards the relations between Poland and the USSR. Having recognized the obvious that the Soviet Union is the "oldest" and "most powerful" socialist state, Gomulka continued with a statement that could have been studied with satisfaction in both Washington and Moscow: "We see our place in the world camp of socialism, and we understand our fraternal, friendly relations with the Soviet Union in this light [this is Soviet power]."[34] In the days that followed, while the Hungarians were enjoying a brief respite between invasions of Soviet

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[33]Later in the speech Gomulka forcefully dispelled any possible revisionist illusions: "The state authority will not tolerate for a moment any action directed against the Polish state interests and against our state system." Brzezinski correctly notes that ". . . from the very beginning, the National Communism of Poland, as it was often called by observers, was restricted by Gomulka to domestic affairs . . . without translating it into an external ideological challenge or a fundamental revision of Poland's place in the world . . . . Gomulka was neither a Nagy nor a Tito." Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 261.

[34]Gomulka's position has been consistent; compare, for example, the above quotation with his statement after the 40th Anniversary celebration in Moscow in November, 1957. Gomulka has steadfastly opposed any but the most mild form of organizational structure for the bloc.

armor, the Polish people were being congratulated by editorials in Trybuna Ludu[35] for their combination of "romantic outbursts" tempered by "political realism."

Confirmation of Poland's right to determine its own road to socialism was contained--among other terms--in a communique issued after talks between party and government delegations of the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union in Moscow, November 18, 1956. Gomulka headed a rather large delegation to Moscow to take part in important discussions concerning relations among socialist states in view of the recent developments in Poland and Hungary. The visit was also a fruitful one for Poland, at least temporarily. The matters agreed upon included[36] the settlement of outstanding debts on coal deliveries of nearly a decade previous, the promise of large amounts of Soviet grain in 1957 on credit, additional Soviet credits to the extent of 700 million rubles, the clarification of the status of Soviet armed forces personnel in Poland, and the repatriation of Poles still in Russia.

The economic arrangements contained in this agreement were important not only as a means of placating Polish feelings and revitalizing her economy but also as an

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[35] Trybuna Ludu, November 1 and 2, 1956; also found in Zinner, op. cit., pp. 277 and 281.

[36] Zinner, op. cit., pp. 306ff.

expression of the new debtor-creditor relationship between the satellites and the USSR that was forming at this time.[37] From a Stalinist era of exploitation, the Soviet Union, as the leading economic as well as political power of the bloc, was now in the position of aiding the satellites in their economic development. The extent and nature of this aid over the next few years was variable, and the motives of socialist mutual help often seemed questionable. It is also true that East Germany and Czechoslovakia continued to supply the Soviet Union with many needed products, especially machinery and chemical goods.

Considering the fraternal nature of relations between socialist countries, the content and amount of detail of the agreement on the status of Soviet forces in Poland seems unusual. The Poles recognized that the presence of Soviet troops was a necessity caused by the international situation; the Soviets agreed, on the other hand, that their military forces were not to interfere in Polish internal affairs, that the disposition of these forces must be agreed to by both the governments involved, that Soviet military personnel and their dependents were to respect Polish law, and that "the movement of Soviet military units outside their stations requires the agreement of the

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[37] For this shift in economic relations in the bloc, see Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 376-377.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Government of the Polish People's Republic or other competent Polish authorities."[38]

At the end of 1956, the reputation of international socialism appeared to be severely damaged in the Soviet bloc, among the Communist Parties of Western Europe, and in the so-called uncommitted and neutral states throughout the world. Yet, the Soviet Union had effectively, even if somewhat reluctantly, established by positive action a new content and significance to the phrase socialist internationalism, as it applied to the USSR and the peoples' democracies of East Europe. The acceptable parameters of political maneuvering permitted the satellites had been fixed at the close of 1956. Once the satellites had been advised forcefully of the full meaning of the concept "separate paths to socialism," it then remained for the Soviet Union in the following two years to exert the utmost efforts in restoring both the attractiveness and effectiveness of socialist unity within the bloc. That the Soviets were not completely successful was not unusual. Rather, the extent to which Khrushchev was able to re-weave a measure of bloc cohesion attests to his perserverance and ingenuity in this period.

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[38] Zinner, op. cit., p. 312 [italics added]. "Competent authorities" other than governmental representatives are not defined; presumably this refers to Party officials.

The communist leaders of Hungary were not so successful in their attempts to confine the rising discontent of the people. After the Twentieth Party Congress, the conflict between the intellectuals and the party leadership, especially Rakosi, deepened. The conflict was aggravated rather than eased by the rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk, who had been condemned to death as a "Tito deviationist" in 1949. The Petofi Circle, society of intellectuals formed within the communist youth organization in Hungary, focused the frustration of the writers and served as a vehicle for publicizing their anti-party views. The Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party strongly attacked the writers and the Petofi Circle, warning that anti-party attacks would not be tolerated: ". . . in the language of socialism a new revolution of this kind is called a counter-revolution."[39]

After the Poznan revolt in Poland, increased pressure was brought against Rakosi, and he was replaced by a similar party functionary, Erno Gero, on July 18, 1956. Although Gero implemented some minor liberalization measures, the discontent that continued to mount was focused against Stalinism by speakers at the reburial of Rajk on October 6, attended by a huge crowd. Imre Nagy, who had been Premier briefly in 1953 and still retained his popularity, was

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[39] Szabad hep, July 3, 1956. Official organ of the Hungarian Communist Party (Hungarian Working People's Party).

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[illegible]ful in their attempts to conceal the rising discontent of
the people. After the Hungarian Party Congress, the conse-
[illegible]ilict between the intelligentsia and the party leadership,
especially Rakosi, deepened. The conflict was apparently
neither then eased by the rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk,
had been executed in 1949 as a Titoist conspirator. In
1955, the Hungarian Party, applying to unorthodox tactics
within the communist camp, accepted in theory, if not in
the practice of the writers and parties as a vehicle for
publicizing their revisionist views. The Hungarian Congress
(Communist) Party strongly endorsed the writers and the
Petofi Circle, stating that Marxism-Leninism would not be
tolerated. "[illegible] in the language of criticism is mere rhetoric
[illegible]m of this kind is called a dogmatic-sectarian."[1]

After the Russian revolt in October, Imre Nagy
was brought against Rakosi, and he was replaced by a little
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discontent that continued to exist was focused against
[illegible]ations by students at the technical colleges
[illegible]ded by a huge crowd. Imre Nagy, who had been ousted
[illegible]ly in 1953 and still retained the confidence [illegible]

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[1] Magyar Nap, July 1, 1956. Quoted [illegible] in the
Hungarian Communist Party (Hungarian Working People's)
Party).

readmitted to the Communist Party in the middle of October, and a week later the now famous sixteen-point resolution was adopted by the Budapest students. The succeeding events are well known: Gero's intemperate remarks to the students followed by rioting and police firing into the crowds. The students were quickly joined by the workers as the riot developed into a major revolution that was eventually controlled only by full-scale intervention by the Soviet Army. On November 4, Kadar replaced Nagy, who fled to the Yugoslav embassy, but was arrested and later executed upon leaving the embassy, having been granted safe passage by Kadar.

Janos Kadar quickly came to terms with the Soviets, and on a trip to Moscow in March, 1957, agreed that Soviet troops could remain in Hungary "as long as necessary," in return for economic assistance from the Soviet Union.

Kadar moved swiftly against the two bases of opposition to the communist regime in Hungary: the intellectuals (including the students) and the workers. The Writer's Union was banned in January, 1957, but action against the Workers' Councils proceeded somewhat more cautiously, and they were not finally dissolved until November, 1957.

The repression of the Workers' Councils forms one of the more interesting and significant subchapters within the Hungarian revolution and the events in Poland in the fall

of 1956.[40] The workers, of course, should have been the most receptive to communist indoctrination, and it must have been difficult for communist leaders throughout the bloc to explain why the workers were in the vanguard of the Hungarian revolution.[41] It is important to note that the workers did not call for an end to the communist government in Hungary, although to the party leaders it must have seemed so. On the contrary, the members of the Workers' Councils felt themselves to be genuine socialists, true Marxists. They believed that the workers should control their own destinies, should run their own factories (as they supposedly did in Yugoslavia); in their enthusiasm, they believed that workers had a special affection for each other that spanned national boundaries (the true socialist

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[40] Perhaps the best treatment of the role of the Workers' Councils during this period in Poland and Hungary is found in Karl Reyman and Herman Singer, "The Origins and Significance of East European Revisionism," in Leopold Labedz (ed.), Revisionism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 219-221.

[41] Speaking in Budapest many months after the event, Khrushchev admitted that: "Naturally, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that a certain segment of the working people, particularly from among the intelligentsia, were taken in by the fascist slogans . . . ," Pravda, April 4, 1958, pp. 2-3, translated in CDSP, X, 14, pp. 12-14. At the same time, however, Khrushchev claimed that "as is known, our aid to the Hungarian people in the suppression of the counterrevolution was unanimously approved by the working people of the socialist camp."

of 1853.[40] The workers, of course, would have been the most receptive to communist indoctrination, and it must have been difficult for communist leaders throughout the bloc to explain why the workers were in dire straits of the Communist revolution.[41] It is important to note that the workers did not call for an end to the communists participation in industry, although to this party leaders it must have seemed so. Of the Communist, the Socialist-Democrat Socialist Party themselves or the Socialist Democratic Party Marxists. They believed that a Socialist Republic could change one institution, namely the Communist Party, they themselves did in Czechoslovakia, but in other countries they believed that a Socialist Republic could be other than Communist dictatorship. I am sure Socialist

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[40] Perhaps the best treatment of the evils of the workers' council during this period is found in Victor Serge's significant if less European perspective. In Memoirs of a Revolutionary (ed.), Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 111-121.

[41] Speaking in Budapest many months after the events, Khrushchev admitted that "Obviously, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that a certain segment of the working people, particularly those doing the intelligentsia, took part in the fascist elements in [illegible], 1956, pp. 6-7, translated in [illegible], 1956, pp. 6-7, translated in [illegible], 1956, pp. 6-7, translated

internationalism). In eliminating the Workers' Councils, the Soviet Union was crushing the only true workers' organization, the closest in form to the revolutionary Soviets of forty years earlier.[42]

An additional development arising out of the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary was the important Soviet Declaration on Troops in Eastern Europe of October 30, 1956.[43] This declaration restated the nature of relations among socialist countries, in light of the revolts that had occurred in Poland and Hungary:

> United by the common ideals of building a socialist society and by the principles of proletarian internationalism, the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their mutual relations only on the principles of complete equality, of respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and of noninterference in one another's internal affairs.

These principles of relations among socialist countries had been stated in various forms before. What was new at the end of October, 1956, was that the Soviet Union found itself forced by another socialist country to emphasize these conditions of socialist relations. The Soviet Union admitted that there had been many difficulties and mistakes in relations among the socialist countries during

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[42] See Arendt in Hallowell, op. cit., p. 28.

[43] Pravda, October 31, 1956, p. 1; translated in CDSP, VIII, 40, pp. 10-11.

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the formative years of the new system. At the same time, however, the declaration claimed that such mistakes had been condemned by the 20th Party Congress, implying that these were Stalin's mistakes.

The declaration then singled out the economic and military spheres as areas in which further attention "has become necessary." The Soviet Union offered (1) to develop and strengthen economic ties, without any violation of sovereignty; (2) to discuss the question of Soviet advisers "requested" by the East European governments; and (3) to review the stationing of troops in the satellites on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty.

The entire tone of the declaration was defensive; and although the Soviets did not commit themselves to an ideological or political retreat, they were now in a difficult position in their relations with the East European socialist states. They would have to bargain with the satellites from now on, rather than simply state their intentions and requirements.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

> Only if the proletariat and the poorest peasantry can muster enough consciousness, idealism, selflessness, persistence--only then will the victory of the socialist revolution be guaranteed. By creating the new soviet type of state, by thus opening the possibility for the working and oppressed masses to take an active part in independent construction of the new society, we have solved only a small part of the difficult task. The main difficulty lies in the economic sphere: socializing strictest accounting and control over the production and distribution of products everywhere, raising the productivity of labor, socializing production in fact.[1]

Lenin was indeed a first-class prophet when he said that "the main difficulty lies in the economic sphere . . . "; for despite the success of the Soviet Union in developing its own economy at a prodigious rate, the attempt to create a dynamic world socialist economic system has met with much more limited success. Lenin also may have correctly analyzed the reasons that have precluded this success by making it dependent upon the "consciousness, idealism, selflessness, persistence" of the peasants and workers in their efforts to create a "new soviet type state."

The relations of the East European people's democracies and the Soviet Union are affected not only by the

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[1] V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia (Second edition; Moscow: [n.n.], 1926-1932), Vol. XXII, pp. 440-441.

traditional ties between a great power and its protectorates but also the singular Soviet ideology that has grown out of Marxist theory and what has been called the "Soviet experience." From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, there is no divergence between what the Soviets choose to call "socialist internationalism," and the interests of the Soviet Union. This is not new, but was initiated by Lenin nearly a half century ago. What is new, we have determined, is the concrete formation of the socialist commonwealth after the Second World War. Now the interests of socialist internationalism are no longer determined solely by the political leadership of one socialist state, although this was effectively the situation prior to Stalin's death. Now a group of somewhat disparate nations comprise the "socialist camp," each one concerned with its own national interests.[2]

Contrary to the expectations of most Marxists, bourgeois nationalist tendencies did not disappear with the first socialist victory, or even upon the establishment of the socialist system. Despite the claims to "new forms of international relations" with the advent of the socialist system, there are now several different views and attitudes

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[2]Kennan rather humorously noted that the Soviet government now has "friends" to complicate its policy. George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 395.

traditional ties between a queer family and its neighbors but also the dramatic social isolation that has grown out of fascist theory and that has been called the "siege experience." From the point of view of any Jewish leadership, there is no difference between what the Israelis choose to call "socialist intellectuals" and all the targets of the Soviet drive. This is not mere fear inflated by seeing mostly a full century's eye. What is new, we have discovered, is the complete forgetting of the socialist commonwealth ethic and Jewish self. Now the tolerance of socialist representation are no longer interested solely by the political leadership of one particular ability, although this was effectively the primary factor in Stalin's words. But a group of Russian Jewish intellectuals who "socialist camp," were then confronted with its own national interests.[1]

Contrary to the revelation of most accounts, Jewish people historically considered not just disloyal with the first socialist country, as even when the majority of the socialist system. Unlike the claims of "the enemy of international relations with the support of the socialist system, there are now several different ways that

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[1]Bernard Avishai incorrectly names the Soviet government as the "primary" to consistent its policy.
George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 357.

seeking to determine, or help to determine, those policies felt to be in the interests of international socialism. We have seen in a brief review of events in the socialist commonwealth (Chapters III and IV) that Khrushchev's attempt to mold what he has called a "fraternal association of socialist countries," based upon the ideals of socialist internationalism, has not been an unqualified success. His weakening of the "moral authority" of Stalin, at the historic 20th Party Congress, earned not only fraternal gratitude but increased the desire for some forms of independence for the Communist Parties of the East European socialist states.

The impact and reverberations of Khrushchev's speech are now well known. What Khrushchev's intentions were at this time cannot be firmly established. What the Soviet leadership did in the two or three year period after the hectic months of late 1956 to recapture both the "socialist" cohesion of the bloc, and a firm Soviet position of authority within the bloc, can be reasonably restructured. Our goal in this chapter is to examine the historical development, the institutional arrangements, and the most significant features of the economic integration of the Soviet bloc, with emphasis directed to the years 1956-1958.[3]

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[3]Foreign trade outside the bloc and foreign aid will not be discussed in this paper except as they pertain to the subject of relations among the socialist states.

In Chapter II, we discussed some of the theoretical aspects of relations among the members of the socialist camp. It is appropriate at this point to mention some of the theoretical bases of the so-called "world socialist economy," a concept that is also supposed to be a radical development in the historical process. Close examination of both theories, relations among socialist countries and the development of a world socialist economy, illustrates that even the claims of contemporary Marxists are not especially radical, except as they are compared to the existing situation in the socialist camp.

Some of the "new" characteristics attributed to the world socialist economy have also been applied by socialist authors to the description of relations among socialist states in general. This includes the process of the "drawing together" of socialist states as they develop, an intricate process ". . . requiring much time and effort."[4] In the economic sphere, this implies, of course, that the economies of the socialist countries will be very closely coordinated and integrated.

An important aspect of this close coordination of the socialist countries in their economic activities is

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[4]The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 777. Hereafter cited as Fundamentals.

In Chapter II, we discussed some of the theoretical aspects of relations among the sectors in the socialist economy. It is appropriate at this point to describe some of the theoretical bases of the so-called "basic socialist economy," a concept that is also supposed to be a unique development in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Since examination of both Lenin's writings during socialist construction and the development of a basic socialist economy, illustrated that even the plans of contemporary theorists are somewhat radical, except as they are confined by the existing situations in the socialist camp.

Some of the "new" characteristics associated with the world socialist economy have also been implied by socialist authors in the discussion of relations among socialist states in general. This includes the concept of the "developing cooperation" of socialist states as they develop, an increase [illegible] , requiring much time and effort. In the economic sphere, this implies, of course, that the economies of the socialist countries will be more closely coordinated and interwoven.

An important aspect of this close coordination of the socialist countries in their economic activities is

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[illegible] Leninism Today," [illegible], p. 27). [illegible] cited as [illegible].

another "new" characteristic of the socialist system, the international socialist division of labor. The international division of labor, Marxist theorists tell us, is not new;[5] but the international socialist division of labor is a radical departure because it is based upon fraternal socialist principles. It is not possible, within the world socialist economy, to undertake a "fierce competitive struggle," because all trade is conducted by official agencies of the socialist government,[6] which is inherently incapable of exploitative practices or wasteful competition for profit.

In addition, because of the nature of the planned economies of socialist countries, the development of the world socialist economy is not hindered by economic fluctuations, artificial trade barriers, or exclusive regional groupings.[7] Such activities, which are inherent in a capitalist economic system, are contrary to the socialist principle of "growing togetherness."

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[5]The concept of the international division of labor is implicit in the carrying on of foreign trade. As one author has explained it, foreign trade is ". . . the necessary consequence of an international division of labour." Roy F. Harrod, International Economics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 9.

[6]Fundamentals, op. cit., p. 782.

[7]Ibid., p. 783.

another "great contradiction of the socialist system," the international socialist division of labor. The Chinese national division of labor, Mao said, is not only [illegible] but the international socialist division of labor is a radical departure because it is based upon fundamental socialist principles. It is not competing, within the world socialist economy, to produce a "fierce competitive struggle." Decisions will instead be governed by political considerations of the socialist government,[5] which is incompatible with exploitative practices or material considerations for profit.

In addition, because of the nature of the economic exchanges of socialist countries, the development of the world socialist economy is not dictated by economic fluctuations, recessions, cyclic booms, or declining rates of profit.[6] Such activities, which are inherent in a capitalist economic system, are contrary to the socialist principle of "creating happiness."[7]

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[5] The concept of some international division of labor is implicit in its carrying on of foreign trade. It can rather be explained as Lenin treats it, i.e., the necessary consequence of an international division of labor." Ray F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 3.

[6] Documents, op. cit., p. 10.

[7] Ibid., p. 38.

The cooperative efforts of the socialist system include the free exchange of scientific and technical data,[8] one of the means by which the less-developed socialist countries can advance to the same level of economic development as the more experienced, industrialized socialist countries, so that all countries in the socialist system can commence to build communism at approximately the same time. This characteristic of fraternal socialist aid is of great importance, communist theorists claim, in the attraction of the less-developed countries and former colonies to the socialist system.

The Soviet authors also stress the fact--of great importance to the "emancipated peoples"--that the economic competition with non-socialist countries is strictly with the well-developed countries of the West. "As for states which are taking their first steps in industrial development, the socialist countries do not treat them as competitors."[9]

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[8] Ibid., p. 784. One observer of the Soviet bloc economy has commented that the bloc has a "large-scale free exchange of patents and technical information" and conducts extensive exchange of personnel in support of the program of mutual aid and coordination. In the exchange of personnel ". . . they may have gone further than the West. East Germany and the Soviet Union alone have exchanged more than 17,000 specialists in the past 10 years." Paul Wohl, "Soviets Loosen Trade Ties," The Christian Science Monitor, January 16, 1962, p. 7.

[9] Fundamentals, op. cit., pp. 785-786.

Socialist planners also emphasize certain laws which are applicable only to the world socialist economy. Among these is the socialist principle of the maximum development of new branches of the economy,[10] so that each socialist country will become fully developed. Not only domestic socialist economies, but the world socialist economy as well requires extensive planning and coordination; such planning, which is conducted with the economic needs of all the fraternal socialist countries equally in mind, is possible only within--and is integral to--the world socialist economy.[11]

Within the world socialist economy the Soviet Union plays a special role: at the time of the formation of the socialist system in the late 1940's, the U.S.S.R. had already formed ". . . a powerful and integrated economic system [which] was well adapted to becoming the core of the world socialist economy."[12] While the Soviet Union carried the burden of the struggle for socialism, it was forced to develop all facets of its economy to the maximum extent; Soviet theorists note that the new socialist countries ". . . are relieved of the need to strive for such autarchy."[13]

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[10] Ibid., p. 778. [11] Ibid., pp. 777-778 and 780.

[12] Ibid., p. 777. [13] Ibid., p. 778.

socialist planners also advocated central long-range
are applicable only to the whole socialist economy. Hence
clause is the socialist principle of the maximum development
of new resources of the economy,[10] so that every socialist
country will become fully developed. The only economic
socialist economies (but the world socialist economy in-
will reproduce secondary planning and noncommercial econ-
planning, which is connected with the economic needs of all
the treatment socialist economies should be dual; is pos-
sible only within--and be limited to--the world socialist
economy.[11]

Within the world socialist economy the socialist
plays a special role. As the time draws[illegible] the socialist
socialist system in the late 1960's, the Soviets had al-
ready reached "[illegible] a powerful and integrated economic sys-
tem [world] was well equipped to encompass the laws of the
world socialist economy."[12] While this basic notion remains
the burden of the struggle for socialism. It was futile to
destroy all vestiges of the economy in the various nations.
Soviet theorists were clear and the socialist countries
[illegible] are allowed of its need to realize its maximum ex-
pansion."[13]

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[10]Ibid., p. 222. [11]Ibid., pp. 117-118 and 180.

[12]Ibid., p. 221. [13]Ibid., p. 222.

The Soviet authors explain in some detail the application of the principle of the international socialist division of labor to the world socialist economy, the benefits of the cooperation and coordination of the socialist economies and their specialization of production, and the fact that these principles do not apply to the Soviet Union because of its diversity and great breadth of industries already developed.[14]

Again, the degree of planning, coordination, and specialization is a new feature in economic relations "possible only in the socialist system"; it is emphasized that the agency set up to conduct this planning and coordination (the CEMA[15]) is not a ". . . directing body, or supra-state agency with authority to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states."[16] This is one of the "dual policies" of the Soviet system that poses a distinct dilemma to the

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[14] Ibid., pp. 779-781.

[15] CEMA will be the abbreviation generally employed in this paper for the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. Many studies in English refer also to CMEA or to COMECON. Soviet writers often refer to the CEMA as SEV, or "Soviet Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi."

[16] Fundamentals, op. cit., p. 780. Compare this attitude toward national sensitivities with that of Lenin, op. cit., XVII, pp. 143-144: "The proletariat supports everything which contributes to the elimination of national differences, to tearing down the barriers between nations, everything which makes the relations of the nationalities to each other increasingly more intimate, everything which leads to the amalgamation of nations . . . . Economics will amalgamate the different nationalities."

The Soviet economy contains in some partial and specialization of the productive of the international socialist division of labor by the world socialist economy, the separate of the coordination and coordination of the socialist economies and their specialization of production, and the fact that these contradictions do not apply to the Soviet Union because of its singularity and great backwardness already developed.[14]

Again, the degree of planning, coordination, and specialization is a new feature in economic relations "possible only in the socialist system"; it is precisely that the attempt not to coordinate this planning and specialization (the CMEA[15]) is not a "... directing body, or supra-state agency which sufficiently be interwoven in the relations of sovereign states."[16] This is one of the "real policies" of the Soviet system that poses a distinct dilemma to the

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[14] Ibid., pp. 375-381.

[15] Even what be the observation somewhat neglected in this paper for the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. Many articles in English refer also to CMEA or to SEV. Soviet writers often refer to the CMEA as ITS, or "Soviet Economic-Territory Partnership."

[16] Documentary, op. cit., p. 30. Compare this statement [illegible] Socialist Unity with that of Leader, op. cit., pp. 113-114: "The proletariat suppress exploitation, to promoting down the barriers between nations [illegible] which contributes to the elimination of national differences, to [illegible] the relations of the nationalities to each other increasingly more intimate, analyzing which evaluating what makes the [illegible] leads to the analysis of nations . . . Economic will amalgamate the different nationalities."

Soviets, and to other communist leaders: the need and desire to achieve maximum economic efficiency (and Soviet control, incidentally) is continually blunted by the policy of theoretical respect for the sovereign integrity of the individual units within the system. We can now turn to the development of the process of economic integration of the socialist camp.

Since the dissolution of the Cominform in early 1956 shortly after the 20th Party Congress, there have been no formal institutional arrangements reflecting (or providing for) the political cohesion of the bloc. Nearly coincident with the demise of the Cominform, the bloc under Soviet leadership was strengthening the economic aspects of socialist unity and cooperation, institutionally expressed by the CEMA. Bloc unity was at least temporarily refurbished after the long winter of 1956-1957, or, at least, the disintegrating forces of 1956 were temporarily arrested. The absence of centralized political control--once provided by the Comintern, and to a lesser extent the Cominform--has been partially compensated for by the more frequent gatherings of party congresses, mutual visits, and other political meetings. Socialist cohesion and the position of the Soviet Union within the bloc have been enhanced by widely-expanded economic ties between the socialist countries of East Europe and the Soviet Union. Steps that provide

economic coordination are conducive to political control. Political and economic power are, of course, extremely difficult to distinguish. It is possible that Khrushchev may have forged greater bloc unity through economic coordination because it appeared to be an excellent vehicle for containing the disintegrating forces of 1956. It is more likely that he realized--well before mid-1956--the significance in political terms of a closely-knit, rapidly-expanding bloc economy.

As we have seen in previous chapters, the economic development of the East European satellites in the years immediately following World War II was closely modeled after that of the Soviet Union: the industrial sector of the economy was nationalized, central economic planning with strict direction of all sectors of the economy was introduced, and each socialist country set out in its own autarkic manner to construct the basis of socialism, i.e., heavy industry. During these early years, as the gulf between East and West widened, and as economic conditions in the bloc failed to demonstrate a marked recovery, some sort of attempted "rational" planning or further coordination of the socialist states seemed almost inevitable.

The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance was established in January, 1949, supposedly as an answer to the

Marshall Plan[17] for Western Europe, which was seen through Marxist eyes as another example of capitalist enslavement of the workers and continued United States domination of the area. The Council had two meetings in 1949. An April gathering in Moscow decided to form a permanent Secretariat, and in August the Council meeting in Sofia exchanged technical and scientific information.[18]

Following a November, 1950, meeting of the Council (occasionally referred to as the Plenum) at which general problems of foreign trade were discussed, there was an organizational lull until 1954. No formal rules had been published, and it was not until a decade later that a Charter for the CEMA was released.[19] During its early years, the CEMA's activities were most likely devoted

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[17] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 127. Also see Jan Wszelaki, Communist Economic Strategy: The Role of East-Central Europe (Washington: National Planning Association, 1959), p. 80. The original CEMA members were the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Albania joined (February, 1949) shortly after the founding of the CEMA and East Germany was accepted in September, 1950.

[18] Frederic L. Pryor, "Forms of Economic Cooperation in the European Communist Bloc: A Survey," Soviet Studies, 11:174, October, 1959. The studies by Pryor and Wszelaki provide an excellent historical and operational brief of the CEMA. For additional detailed treatment, see Alec Nove and Desmond Donnelly, Trade with Communist Countries (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1960), pp. 25ff.

[19] "Texts and Documents: The COMECON Charter," East Europe, 9:42-45, August, 1960.

primarily to the economic strengthening of the Soviet Union, which then completely dominated the organization. Because it was the only institution linking the U.S.S.R. and the East European satellites in these years, the CEMA undoubtedly served effectively as a channel of communications among these countries and as a means for the Soviet Union to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe.

The period 1949-1954 could be characterized as an era of limited intra-bloc planning, with trade concentrated in bilateral channels and based upon economic necessities.[20] Each satellite continued to follow Stalin's formula for "building socialism in one country, despite the extreme disparities among the bloc members in raw materials, power, transportation, and labor force capabilities."[21]

From the close of World War II to the end of this period, the Soviet Union continued to exact reparations from its zone of occupation in Germany. These reparations

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[20]An indication of the extent to which the bloc also "turned inward" in this period is that "in 1938, the comparable share of the West in the foreign trade of the bloc areas was between 80 and 90 percent," whereas in 1948 and 1953 it had declined to 59 and 20 per cent, respectively. Samuel Pisar, A New Look at Trade Policy Toward the Communist Bloc, United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 72.

[21]"The Work of COMECON," East Europe, 9:4, April, 1960.

have been estimated to be as high as "25 per cent of production in any given year . . . as severe as could be designed and tolerated."[22] As a result, the East German economy in effect did not recover from the damages of the war until the late 1950's.

After the formative period which terminated in early 1954, there came a renewed emphasis within the bloc not simply on increaed economic expansion in all areas but greatly enlarged activity for the CEMA as the agency through which socialist trade and technical cooperation would be channeled. In addition to scientific-technical mutual assistance, the period 1954-1959 marked the first steps in two related areas of economic planning: more extensive coordination of the national plans of each member country, and attempts to reduce the autarkic practices of members by means of increased specialization of production.[23] Another significant development during these years was the formation of permanent, functional committees, located in

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[22]Wolgang F. Stolper, The Structure of the East German Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 5. For additional information on the extraction of war booty and reparations from Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union, and the reorientation of trade patterns in this area after the war, see Penelope H. Thunberg, "The Soviet Union in the World Economy," in Dimensions, pp. 41-416, 424-425.

[23]Specialization of production within the bloc, on the basis of the principle of division of labor, has been labeled the CEMA's "main task' since 1955. See Jan Wszelaki, "Economic Developments in East-Central Europe, 1954-1959," Orbis, 4:424, Winter, 1961.

have been restricted to be no higher as 75% per cent of pro-
duction in any given year . . ., an average as could be
designed and enforced."[22] As a result, his fears regarding
economy in effort did not subside from the passage of the
war until the late 1850's.

After the financial panic which accompanied in early
1854, there came a renewed emphasis within the Labor Bu-
reau on improved economic organization in all areas that
directly pertained directly or indirectly to the economy
through which specialization and functional cooperation
would be channeled. In addition to facilitating mutual-
mutual assistance, the period 1854-1858 viewed the first
steps in the related areas of economic planning: more ex-
tensive coordination of the well-owned plans of each country, and attempts to reduce the economic fluctuations as
members by means of increased specialization of products.[23]
Another significant development during these years was the
formation of functional, functional committees, located in

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[22]Rodney C. Loehr, The Influence of Old Land
Western Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
p. 8. For additional information on the relationship of the
Duchy and exports from Eastern Europe in the Depression
Union, and the cancellation of trade patterns in this re-
after the war, see Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Revival Plan
in the World Economy," in Quarterly, IV, 43-47, 80-82.

[23]Specialization or production within the bloc, on
the basis of the potential of division of labor, had been
labeled the CCEA's "main task" since 1953. See Jan Kozlowski,
"Economic Development in Soviet-Central Europe, 1939-1970,"
Orbis, 4:338, Winter, 1971.

the various CEMA capitals. These committees (more correctly referred to as commissions) have been very important in the growth of the CEMA activities in recent years. Coordination of national plans, specialization of production, and the permanent commissions will be amplified later.

An examination of some of the comments in the mid-1950's by both politicians and economists in the Soviet bloc indicates an enthusiasm that goes beyond the usual artificial, stereotype exclamations of social zeal. One reason for this undoubtedly was the relaxed (relatively speaking) political atmosphere in bloc relations following Stalin's death, which permeated economic planning and co-operation. Also, there is reason to believe that each socialist member felt that it could materially benefit from more cooperative efforts. There was increased realization that self-sufficiency was not only economically impossible but its pursuit was mutually destructive. A basis for bargaining to achieve increased cooperation--a realistic price structure in each member--did not exist, however, as will be discussed later in this chapter. The new, invigorated policy, at least after 1956, reflects the much more radical and energetic international policies of N. S. Khrushchev.[24]

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[24]Brzezinski refers to the renewed emphasis on the CEMA as ". . . a compliment to Khrushchev's perceptiveness." Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 284. Evidence of Khrushchev's more flexible approach is his apparent confidence in economists: "Stalin had no patience with economists; Khrushchev evidently

and monopolistic international politics of W. Is "encirclement"
policy, at least after 1955, reflects the much more realist
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An examination of some of the comments by Soviet
"Realism had no patience with economists; Khrushchev evidently
CEMA as "... a highly complex economy." Nemchinov, more
Grossman, op. cit., p. 324. Evidence of Khrushchev's more
flexible approach to his economic critics is documented in:

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[1] Footnotes refers to the previous problem on the

Enthusiasm by itself, however, seldom surmounts barriers or fulfills plans, and the bloc members soon encountered enormous problems as they attempted to extend the scope and depth of their trade integration. Artificial prices in planned economies is one of the problems the socialist planners faced--or ignored as best they could.[25] The extensive efforts of the past few years to solve these problems have produced some diversified and sophisticated theorizing within bloc economic circles. Some of the issues of this "inner debate" will be touched on briefly in this chapter, after an outline of the institutional structure of the CEMA. This activity has been located mostly within the Secretariat, although the Permanent Commissions have been given some attention as a reflection of socialist cooperation. Certain organizational features of the CEMA are rather revealing. An analysis of the Charter, in addition to what else is known of the functioning of the several CEMA organs, and combined with a study of the typical functioning of communist organizations (to determine which

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listens to them and understands the basic principles of capital investment and foreign trade." This comparison is from "The Work of COMECON," op. cit., p. 3.

[25]It appears that the satellite economies were more severely restricted and damaged not only by unworkable plans but also unrealistic prices and exchange rates. As a result, agitation for thorough restudy of the socialist pricing structure as well as other financial arrangements in the CEMA financial arrangements in the CEMA originated in some of the satellites prior to their official notice by Soviet theoreticians. See Pryor, op. cit., p. 183.

organs make decisions and which merely approve, disregarding such designations as the "supreme organ," etc.)--all this might indicate the effective centers of power.

The stated purposes of the CEMA are to further "the welfare of the member-peoples of CEMA . . . through the unification and coordination of the efforts of the member countries . . . [by means of] planned development of national economics."[26] To date, there has been ample coordination but little unification of the individual national economies, except in their Marxist-oriented approach to economic problems. Effective unification tending to supplant present national boundaries may be an unexpressed goal in keeping with Marxist-Leninist theory of the "world socialist economy"; present reference to such a goal, should it exist, would probably produce sharp dissent among the East European members of the bloc.

Other methods of "furthering the welfare" of the socialist peoples have included the exchange of scientific-technical information,[27] bilateral cooperation in the

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[26] "CMEA CONTRACT," East Europe, 9:42, August, 1960.

[27] See supra, p. 135. For a recent Soviet description, see V. Skrypnik, "Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the USSR and other Socialist Countries," Vneshnaya Torgovlya, No. 2, 1960; translated in Problems of Economics, 3:47-48, August, 1960. Skrypnik says that ". . . no less than 332 Soviet institutes in the People's Democracies (presumably including China) are now jointly working on about 2,000 different problems," p. 50.

construction of large-scale industrial enterprises, the granting of loans and credits, and the specialization of production of the member countries (referred to in socialist terms as the "international socialist division of labor").

The Charter of the CEMA, as well as nearly all Soviet references to the work of this organization, stress the ". . . principle of complete equality of all its members, mutual respect of sovereignty and independence [and] fraternal cooperation and mutual assistance."[28] Inherent in the notion of complete equality is the arrangement in the CEMA providing one vote for each member, in "marked contrast to capitalist practice." In addition to equal votes, the CEMA members are protected by Article IV of the Charter which specifies that recommendations and decisions of the Council are ". . . adopted only with the consent of the member-countries concerned." Soviet commentators in this field also emphasize, disregarding recent trends in the CEMA and the ultimate objective of a "world socialist economy," that the CEMA is not a supra-national organization.[29]

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[28]Nikolai Faddeyev, "New Features in Socialist Economic Cooperation," New Times [Beirut], January 24, 1962, p. 4.

[29]Ibid.; Wszelaki, loc. cit., claims that ". . . the CMEA has evolved into a powerful regulatory organism, which is assuming a distinct supranational character."

Membership requirements are stated in the Charter, allowing in theory for other states to join, and for present members to withdraw. The charter also specifies (not insignificantly) that "the seat of the Secretariat of the Council is in Moscow" (Article IX/4), and that "the language used in the Council is Russian" (Article XIV/2).

The Charter provides for four primary organs, or types of organs, within the CEMA. The first of these is the "Session of the Council,"[30] referred to in the Charter as the "supreme organ" (Article VI/1). The Session of the Council is composed of the national delegations, usually headed by the Minister for Foreign Trade or the Planning Chairman of the respective delegation's government.[31] Sessions are scheduled twice a year; and since the CEMA's

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[30]This is occasionally referred to as the Plenum; Pryor, op. cit., p. 179.

[31]Ibid. Also, see United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union, Report by the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 86th Congress, 2d Session, January 20, 1960 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 49; hereafter cited as Soviet Policy Machinery. See also Wohl, op. cit., p. 7, who described the December, 1961, meeting of the Council as being composed of the chairmen of the national planning committees. It is reported that at the 16th Session of the Council, held in Moscow in June, 1962, an Executive Committee was established, to be composed of the chairmen of the State Planning Committees of the CEMA members; see Theodore Shabad, "New Soviet Body to Guide Economy," The New York Times, July 19, 1962, p. 8.

evolution from 1954, this obligation has been fulfilled with few exceptions. However, in a manner similar to the "supreme" status of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Council meets for short periods in rather large groups, and is probably more an approval body than a decision-making organ. As the highest organ, it is charged by the Charter to study proposals from member countries, the Conference of the Representatives, the Permanent Commissions, and the Secretariat, as well as define the course of action of the other organs (Article VI/5, a, b).

Similar in function to the Central Committee of most communist parties is the Conference of the Representatives with one representative from each member country and a deputy in the Secretariat. In theory, the Conference is designed to operate during the absence of the Council.[32] Specifically, its functions include studying proposals on the implementation of decisions of the Session, coordinating the programs of the Permanent Commissions, and approving salaries and budgets and controlling the Secretariat (Article VII/2, a, c, d).

On the surface, the functions of the Secretariat (Article IX) appear rather perfunctory, and this organ is

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[32]Other studies indicate that the Conference meets "at least twice per month, by statute," (Pryor, op. cit., p. 180); or is in continuous session and is composed of "permanent country delegates resident in Moscow" (Soviet Policy Machinery, op. cit., p. 50).

evaluation since 1954, this obligation has been fulfilled with few exceptions. However, in a manner similar to the "supreme" standby of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Council meets for short periods in rather large groups, and is probably more an approved body than a decision-making organ. As the highest organ, it is charged by the Charter to study propaganda from member countries, the observance of the Non-Aggression Pact, the Permanent Commissions, and the decrees[1], as well as define the course of action of the other organs (Article 47[2], ch. 5).

Subject to question be the Central Committee of each communist parties is the Conference of the Representatives with one representative from each member country and a deputy to act therefor. In theory, the Conference is designed to operate during the absence of the Council. Specifically, its functions include studying proposals on the implementation of decisions of the Session, considering the programs of the permanent Commissions, and approving abstracts and reports and corresponding the Scientific Institute (Article 51, ch. 6).

On the surface, the functions of the Secretariat (Article 52) appear rather routine, and this role, it

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[1]Other sources indicate that the Conference meets at least twice per month, by statute. (Stone, op. cit., p. 180); or is continuous session and is composed of "permanent country delegates resident in Moscow." Soviet Policy Machinery, op. cit., p. 50).

seldom mentioned in Soviet or other socialist publications. Nevertheless, it is a permanent, major organ (some or most of the Permanent Commissions have their own small secretariats); it is located in Moscow; and it is headed by the Secretary of the Council, usually a Soviet representative.[33] In view of the typical importance of the secretariat in other communist organizations, it is logical to suggest a similar function for the Secretariat of the CEMA.[34]

If the Secretariat is the locus of political power in the CEMA (this can be only a tentative conclusion), the center of technical competence lies in the Permanent Commissions.[35] The Permanent Commissions, which have come into existence in the last seven years, have expanded rapidly in number and size. Considering the mission of the CEMA to be the coordination of the national economies of the member countries ". . . on the basis of an international socialist division of labor,"[36] this mission of

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[33] Soviet Policy Machinery, op. cit., p. 49.

[34] Wohl, op. cit., p. 7, suggests a contrary interpretation of the importance of the Secretariat: "In contrast to Western Europe's international economic agencies, CMEA headquarters in Moscow employs no experts, can take no initiatives or conduct research, and publishes neither statistics nor a bulletin."

[35] This appears to be the accepted title, although there are references to "permanent committees," "standing committees," etc., in Western and Soviet materials.

[36] A. Alexandrov, "In the Permanent Commissions of

[illegible] mentioned in Soviet or other socialist publications, [illegible] it is a permanent, major organ (more or less of the Permanent Commissions have their own small secretariats) it is located in Moscow; and it is headed by the Secretary of the Council, usually a Soviet representative.[33] In view of the typical importance of the secretariat in other communist organizations, it is logical to suppose a similar function for the Secretariat of the CEMA.[34]

It thus appears that in the issue of political power in the CEMA [illegible] can be only a tenuous association), the vector of ideological compliance [illegible] in the Permanent Commissions.[35] The Permanent Secretariat, which have come into existence in the last seven years, have developed rapidly in power and size. Considering the mission of the CEMA to be the coordination of the national economies of the member countries "... on the basis of an international socialist division of labor,"[36] this mission is

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[33] Soviet Policy Machinery, op. cit., p. 49.

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[35] This appears to be the accepted view, although there are references to "permanent committees," "standing committees," etc., in Western and Soviet materials.

[36] A. Alexandrov, "On the Permanent Commissions of

specialization of production is fulfilled by the several Permanent Commissions. The extent of the increased importance of the Commissions within the CEMA in recent years is indicated by their responsibilities, which include

> . . . proposals for further development of economic ties . . . and for organizing comprehensive economic and scientific-technical cooperation in individual branches of these countries economies. The Commissions [may] set up their own auxiliary bodies.[37]

These auxiliary organs could be secretariats and temporary and permanent working groups.

There are approximately fifteen functional Permanent Commissions[38] seated in different capitals of the CEMA members. Usually they are located in a capital which is appropriate for the function involved; i.e., the Oil and Gas Commissions sits in Bucharest, the Chemicals Commission in East Berlin, etc. Twelve of the Commissions were created

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the Council on Mutual Economic Aid," Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, VII, July, 1961; translated in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), XIII, November 8, 1961.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Alexandrov, op. cit., lists fourteen; Pryor, op. cit., pp. 180-182, describes fifteen; various other sources have mentioned fifteen. Knud Erik Svendsen, "The Economic Relations between the East European Countries," Ostakonomi [Oslo], Special Issue, 1961, p. 38, says that there are eighteen permanent commissions, but does not give their titles. The confusion probably results from the several different titles applied to the Commissions, and the different times at which the surveys were conducted.

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the Council on Mutual Economic Aid," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, XII, July, 1961, translated in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), XIII, September 5, 1961.

at the Seventh Session of the Council in East Berlin in May, 1956;[39] the remaining Commissions are of more recent origin.

In addition to the Permanent Commissions, the Seventh Session of the Council approved ambitious economic objectives for the bloc to accomplish during the years 1956-1961. The coordination of the national economies and the other arrangements agreed upon to achieve these plans were shattered by the events in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956, and as a result had to be reduced in scope.[40] At the same time, the Permanent Commissions increased in size and extent of activities, indicating not only acceptance by the satellites, but perhaps even a degree of popularity. Some of the Commissions, located in the "field" as it were, might serve as a vehicle for effective regional "mutual assistance" beyond the detailed supervision of Moscow. In this sense, the decentralization character of the Commissions perhaps compensates for some of the measures of integration that may not be popular in the satellites.

The Permanent Commissions bear comparison in many respects with the functional state committees of the Soviet government.

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[39] Pryor, op. cit., p. 177.

[40] Ibid., pp.177-178.

at the Second Session of the Council in East Berlin in May, 1950.[1] The remaining Commissions are of more recent origin.

In addition to its Permanent Commissions, the Council has created at its Second Session of the Council approved ambitious economic objectives for the bloc to accomplish during the years 1956-1960. The concentration of the national economies and the other correspondents appear upon to achieve close plans were abandoned by the events in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956, and as a result had to be reduced to accommodate At the same time, the increased Commissions increased in size and amount of activities, indicating not only acceptance by the satellites, but coverage upon a degree of productivity. Some of the Commissions, located in the "field" as it were, might serve as a vehicle for effective regional "mutual assistance" beyond the detailed supervision of Moscow. In this sense, the decentralization characteric of the Commissions perhaps compensates for some of the handicaps of bilateralism that may not be popular in the satellites.

The permanent Commissions bear comparison in many respects with the functional plans committees of the Soviet government.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 117-119.

[2] Times, op. cit., p. 177.

> The state committees play an important role in determining production and research programs, but do not directly administer enterprises and have no formal right to issue orders . . . .[41]

Similarly, the Permanent Commissions do not directly control economic units. But, an examination of the "advisory" functions of a typical commission is revealing. The Oil and Gas Commission, for example, has coordinated the national plans of member countries through 1980; the Commission reports to the Council on consumption and shipments of petroleum; it studies problems of specialization of production and the automation of pumping and control of oil pipelines, as well as communications along pipelines.[42] In addition, the petroleum import requirements of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (the latter only partially) are being supplied by a pipeline from the Soviet Union, under a degree of supervision of the Oil and Gas Commission.[43]

Another Soviet author, discussing the activities of the Permanent Commissions, states that they have

> . . . analyzed the status of the corresponding branches of the national economy in all the member

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[41]Alec Nove, The Soviet Economy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 74.

[42]Alexandrov, loc. cit.

[43]See "The Work of COMECON," East Europe, 9:5, April, 1960; Mario Mura, "Eastrope Project: An Answer to Russia's Oil Threat," Petroleum Management, 34:222, April, 1962.

[illegible] . . . The state commissions play an important role in determining production and [illegible] practices, but are not directly administer enterprises and have no formal right to issue orders . . . .[41]

Similarly, the Petroleum Commissions do not directly control economic units. But, an examination of the "supervisory" functions of a typical commission is revealing. The oil and gas commission, for example, has coordinated the national plans of various countries through [illegible] the conservation regards of the output of companies and enforcement of penalties; it studies problems of specialization of production and the rationalization of pumping and collect of all pipelines, as well as communications along pipelines."[42] In addition, the executive branch originates at least decisions, values. Subordinates, and thereby [illegible] the latter only performing are being supplied by a pipeline type the soviet unions, under a degree of supervision of the oil and gas Commission."[43]

Another Soviet writer, discussing the activities of the petroleum industries, states that they have

> . . . analyzed the status of the operations, breakdowns of the petroleum economy in all the basic

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[illegible] Dow. The Soviet Economy (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 74.

[illegible]Petroleum. Loc. cit.

[illegible] "The Duty of Obedience," Pravda Ukrayny, 3rd, April, 1960) Maria Burn, "Enterprise (re)Wards: An Answer to Russia's Oil Ineer," Petroleum Management, 34:252, April, 1962.

> states of CEMA and have drawn up recommendations on the volume of production and mutual deliveries of the most important goods . . . .[44]

An additional parallel may be drawn in the comparison of the CEMA structure with that of the Soviet Union in the realm of long-term planning. This function in the Soviet Union is performed by the Economic-Science Council, which is responsible for several tasks originally assigned to Gosplan, including research.[45] Within the CEMA, similar responsibilities are discharged by a Permanent Committee on Economic Problems. This Committee, during its Moscow session in November, 1959,

> . . . discussed and approved the order, the time and the program for drawing up the main principles and indices of the international socialist division of labor.[46]

At its meeting in December of the following year, the Permanent Economic Committee continued its discussion of long-range coordination of national plans, approved suggestions regarding the basic principles of the international socialist division of labor, and "approved the work done by the countries' specialists in drafting a

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[44] O. Bogomolov, "The International Socialist Division of Labor," Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 1, 1960, translated in Problems of Economics, 3:45, June, 1960.

[45] Nove, op. cit., pp. 75-77.

[46] Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 45.

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[44] V. Novikov, "The Increasing Socialist Division of Labor," Foreign Relations, No. 1, 1960, translated in Problems of Economics, 1:15, June, 1960.

[45] Brown, op. cit., pp. 75-77.

[46] Novikov, op. cit., p. 43.

method of comparing economic effectiveness of capital investments in Council countries."[47]

In the words of another observer of the economics of the Soviet bloc, the purpose and scope of the Permanent Economic Commission is to devise

> . . . methods of comparing the efficiency of factors in similar sectors of production in different member countries, and inquiring into questions such as the amount of capital required per unit of output, output per man-hour, and over-all cost per output unit.[48]

Data obtained and the methods resulting from such studies presumably would serve as the basis for decisions regarding the specialization of production of each member country, on the principle of the international socialist division of labor.

This brief analysis of the structure of the CEMA essentially confirms the insistence of Soviet authorities that COMECON is primarily a coordinating agency that has no supra-national attributes. There is no clear demarcation, however, between a "loose confederation" and a supra-national entity in international organizations. It is clear that the satellites have delegated considerable planning authority to the several CEMA organs, especially the

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[47]Alexandrov, loc. cit.

[48]Alfred Zauberman, "The CMEA: A Progress Report," Problems of Communism, 9:58, July-August, 1960.

method of comparing economic effectiveness of capital investments in Comecon countries."[47]

In the words of another observer of the economics of the Soviet bloc, the purpose and scope of the Permanent Economic Commission is to devise

> . . . methods of computing the efficiency of factory in utilizing sections of production in different countries, and involving time questions, such as the number of capital required per unit of output, saving per man-hour, and over-all cost per unit."[48]

Data obtained and the methods resulting from such studies presumably would serve as the basis for decisions regarding the specialization of production of each member country, on the principle of the international socialist division of labor.

This brief analysis of the structure of the CMEA essentially confirms the impression of Soviet authority that COMECON is primarily a coordinating agency that has no super-national attributes. There is no clear impression, however, between a "loose confederation" and a supranational entity in international negotiations. It is clear that the satellites have declared commodity priority entirely to the several core organs, especially the

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[47] Alexandrov, loc. cit.

[48] Alfred Zauberman, "The COMECON: A Proposed Report," Problems of Communism, vol. 8, July-August, 1959.

Permanent Commissions and perhaps the Secretariat. Beyond planning, the features of supra-nationality are difficult to detect. Sovereignty in the CEMA is supposedly protected by the veto in the decision-making process. The principle of unanimity and respect for the sovereignty of individual members is highly publicized by the Soviets. Despite the tedious discussions of integration and international socialist division of labor that are intended to weld the bloc into a unified whole, a world socialist economy, the primary emphasis on bilateral negotiations remains.[49] The Soviet Union undoubtedly can exert its maximum influence within the CEMA through the bilateral process, in which its massive power is matched with that of a single satellite during negotiations. The zealous protection of the sovereign rights of all members of the CEMA could work to Soviet advantage.

Integration, on the other hand, could possibly lead to the formation of a bloc--or blocs--within the CEMA, in the East European countries which theoretically could pose an economic challenge to the Soviet Union.[50] From this

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[49]After nearly eight years of "increased emphasis," the CEMA is still affected by ". . . inability to take binding decisions or even to propose a draft convention . . . [which] brings out the looseness of the Soviet bloc's international economic setup." Wohl, op. cit., p. 7.

[50]Shabad, op. cit., p. 8, in discussing the 16th Session of the Council in Moscow in June, 1962, claims that

point of view, the lowering of artificial national barriers could be contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union, even though it might be closer in accord with Marxist-Leninist theory than the present conservative, sovereign-rights approach.

The scope of this paper does not permit a discussion of the division of labor within the CEMA area on the basis of economic principles. Instead, some of the stated purposes and objectives of bloc specialization of production will be mentioned, along with their apparent significance.

Specialization of production is a logical result of the efforts of several countries (or simply two countries) involved in a joint enterprise to increase their overall efficiency.[51] It is not in itself necessarily a measure of the economic domination of one country by another but

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the Soviet Union has been pressing for greater economic integration of the bloc as a counter to the Common Market; the formation of the Executive Committee at this session was to have been, according to Shabad, a "compromise between the previous loose economic alliance and the supra-national body sought by the Soviet Union, but resisted by Poland and Czechoslovakia."

[51] Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 44, states that the international socialist division of labor accomplishes ". . . the specialization of individual countries within the framework of the world economy, in the production of definite kinds of goods and presumes that they complement each other's economy." In this paper, the term international socialist division of labor and specialization of production are considered to be essentially the same; certain uses by socialist economists imply several shades of meaning.

instead a recognition of the advantages in rational expenditure of available resources. Between partners of relatively equal economic stature, division of labor should be beneficial to each, without unfair advantage accruing to either partner. If the participants are disparate in economic power and growth, it is likely that the smaller or less-developed partner will become an appendage of the stronger. The supplier of unfinished products will, theoretically, remain a source of raw materials, tied to the productive system of the more-developed partner. Communist propagandists have used this theory to attack Western colonialism and imperialism with a degree of accuracy and effectiveness, but thereby admitting that the concept of an international division of labor grew from the world capitalist system as a practice of colonialism:

> International division of labor developed spontaneously in the conditions of capitalism. Born of the need to develop productive forces, it turned into a brake on their further progress, maintaining and furthering the economic backwardness of most countries of the world.[52]

Such a development under the international socialist division of labor would be impossible, we are told, because of the inherent qualities of socialism which preclude the

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[52] Problemy Mira I Sotsializnia (Problems of Peace and Socialism), No. 4, 1961.

exploitation of man by man and instead strengthen the ". . . rational and harmonious development of the economy."[53]

In view of the autarkic practices of the satellites in the past, it is logical to assume that there has been extensive opposition among the East European countries to rigid lines of specialization in their national economic development that prevent the overall growth of their economy. There have been examples of criticism of the practices prevalent in the system[54] since the principle of the division of labor was brought forth in 1956.[55] The number of statements in Soviet journals justifying a division of labor for the CEMA area indicates, perhaps, the extent of satellite recalcitrance on this subject. It is difficult to overcome not only the habits of several years but also it is difficult to surmount the most perplexing and explosive issue of all in East Europe, nationalism. The inherent logic in economics of the division of labor finds a

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[53] Faddeyev, op. cit., p. 5.

[54] The December, 1961, issue of Nowe Drogi [Warsaw], commented to the effect that the more developed members of the CEMA have followed practices designed to enhance their economic superiority at the expense of the less-developed members of the bloc.

[55] It has been demonstrated that this principle was implied at the formation of the CEMA in 1949; see "The Work of COMECON," op. cit., pp. 3-4. Faddeyev, op. cit., p. 4, says that the coordination of the several economic plans was first decided upon at the Fourth Session of the Council in March, 1954.

exploitation of man by man and indeed strengthens the "[illegible] national and economic development of the economy."[53]

In view of the autarkic tendencies of the capitalistic countries in the past it is logical to assume that there has been extensive cooperation among the Eastern European countries to avoid lines of specialization in their national economic development that threaten the overall economy of their economy. There have been examples of criticism of the principles [illegible] in the event[54] since the principle of division of labor was brought forth in 1958.[55] The tendency of economists in Soviet journals justifying a division of labor for the CEMA area indicates, however, the extent of autarkic resistance to this principle. It is difficult to overcome not only the habits of several years but also it is difficult to overcome the more psychological and political issue as well in these [illegible] nationalities. The investment logic in connection of the division of labor plans a

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[53] Pinkevich, Op. Cit., p. 9.

[54] Von Rosenberg, [1951], Issue of Ring Droit Internat'l, commented to the effect that the more developed countries of the CEMA [illegible] practices hesitated to [illegible] their economic superiority at the expense of the less-developed members of the bloc.

[55] It has been demonstrated that this principle was implied at the formation of the CEMA in 1949. See "The Work of COMECON," Op. Cit., [illegible]. Pinkevich, Op. Cit., p. 9, says that the Conference of the several economic plans was first decided upon at the Twelfth Session of the COMECON in March, 1956.

formidable opponent in the local communist leader who desires an overall development of his economy rather than one tied to the policies of other governments.

The bitter pill of specialization is not made easier to swallow by the double standard devised by the Soviet Union.[56] In regard to the East European members of the CEMA, the Soviets say that it is not wise for each socialist country to try to develop all types of industry, and that such a policy would be impossible to fulfill.[57] The Soviets justify specialization for the satellites as required by sources of raw material, geography, labor development, and "historically evolved traditions."[58] The principle of the division of labor does not apply to the Soviet Union, Soviet specialists claim, because the same conditions do not apply within the Soviet Union. This is explained as follows:

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[56] One Soviet writer, after justifying the continued autarkic growth of the Soviet economy and condemning the same for the satellites, then claimed the participation of all members of the bloc in deciding upon this course of action; N. Siluyanov, "A New State in the Development of International Socialist Division of Labor," Voprosy Ekonomiki, January, 1959; translated in Problems of Economics, 1:10, May, 1959. Siluyanov says that this decision was taken at the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Worker's Parties of the Countries Participating in the CEMA, which took place in May, 1958.

[57] Faddeyev, op. cit., p. 5.

[58] Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 44.

[illegible] opponent in the local community leader who defines an overall [illegible] of his economy rather than one tied to the politics of other governments.

The Silone pill of specialization is not made easier to swallow by the modern examples devised by the Soviet Union.[36] In respect to the East European members of the CMEA, the Soviets may find it is not wise for weak socialist economy to try to develop all types of industry, and thus make a policy result be impossible in reality.[37] The Soviet [illegible] specialization for the [illegible] dictated by [illegible] of raw material, geography, labor differences, and "historically evolved traditions."[38] The reluctance of the dictation of labor does not apply to the Soviet Union, having specialists claim, moreover the same conditions do not apply within the Soviet Union. This is explained as follows:

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[36] [illegible] writer, after inverting the conditions suitable growth of this Soviet economy and condemning the same for the exploitation that claimed the participation of all members of the bloc in teaching upon this country of action: E. Zolyomsky, "A New Basis in the Development of International Socialist Division of Labor," Foreign Economic Unit, January, 1959; translated in Problems of Economic Life, July, 1959. Zolyomsky says that this doctrine was taken at the conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Countries Participating in the [illegible] Trade Pact, 1958.

[37] Zolyomsky, loc. cit., p. 34.

[38] Zolyomsky, loc. cit., p. 44.

> The different countries do not participate in the international division of labor to the same extent. Big countries with vast territory and a large population, plus a more or less full supply of natural wealth, develop primarily on the basis of an integral economic complex . . . . Countries with a comparatively small territory and insignificant natural resources depend greatly on the external market and the international division of labor.[59]

Despite the obvious advantages for the Soviet Union, Soviet writers in this field continue to stress that the principle of the division of labor does not preclude the overall development of the national economies, that the CEMA is not a supra-national authority, and that the principles of socialism preclude the possibility of uneven economic growth or international exploitation among socialist countries. Also, it is emphasized that there is not a single economic plan for the regulation of the economic organization of the socialist world, but that this regulation is based upon ". . . the voluntary coordination of the national economic plans of the socialist states."[60]

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[59] Ibid., pp. 44-45. Also, see K. Vinogradov, "Collaboration of Socialist Countries in the Development of Machine Building," Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 2, 1960; translated in Problems of Economics, 3:52-53, June, 1960.

[60] Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 45. Miroshnichenko, another Soviet writer on this subject, has added that the Communist ideology predetermines ". . . a single trend of economic policy and the character of economic development for all socialist countries." B. Miroshnichenko, "Coordination of the National Economic Plans of the Socialist Countries," Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 3, 1960; translated in Problems of Economics, 3:46, October, 1960.

The different countries do not participate in the international division of labor to the same extent. Any country with vast territory and a large population, plus a more or less full supply of natural wealth, naturally participates in the basis of an industrial economic complex . . . . Countries with a comparatively small territory and insufficient natural resources depend greatly on the external market and the international division of labor.[39]

Despite the obvious advantages for the soviet Union, Soviet writers in this field continue to stress that the principle of the division of labor must function the overall development of the national economies, that it must not be over-centralized authority, and that the relative degree of specialization depends on the possibility of ensuring economic growth of interrelated sectors among socialist countries. Also, it is emphasized that there is not a single economic plan for the exploitation of the economic cooperation of the socialist world, but that this requires the joint work . . . the voluntary coordination of the national economic plans of the socialist states.[40]

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[39] Idem., pp. 84-85. Also, see C. Stoyanovov, "Specialization of Socialist Countries in the Development of Machine Building," Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 7, 1960; translated in Problems of Economics, 3:32-34, June, 1960.

[40] "Cooperation," op. cit., p. 42. Interrelations, another Soviet writer on this subject, has added that Communist ultimate objectives " . . . a single branch of economic policy and the character of economic development for all socialist countries." S. Mstislavskov, "Socialist Nation of the National Economic Plans of the Socialist Countries," Voprosy Economiki, No. 3, 1959; translated in Problems of Economics, 1:6, October, 1958.

The extent of specialization and coordination of production has increased considerably in the last six years. Considered concurrently with the growth of the Permanent Commissions, this represents one of the most significant developments in the CEMA system in recent years. We can now turn to some of the details of the integration of the socialist countries, and then examine the problems that have inhibited a much more rapid development of the world socialist economy.

We have observed how Lenin visualized the achievement of the future socialist system, through "the amalgamation of all nationalities in a higher unity"; this process would be effected by economic amalgamation.[61] It seems logical to assume that, in the fifteen years a socialist system has existed in Eastern Europe, the Soviets and their associated states would have undertaken radical, comprehensive measures to create a new, unified socialist economy which would serve as the basis for the future stateless society. The artificial barriers to the free flow of goods and people are the inevitable fruits of a bourgeois society, the communists claim. Now that these impediments to the growth of a socialist economic system in East Europe have been removed, one might expect to see artificial barriers

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[61] See fn. 16, supra, p. 137.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

dismantled, and economic integration advanced without regard for the traditional forms of the national state.

To develop the broad principles of the international socialist division of labor poses no major problem for the Marxist theorist, but to implement these principles in the form of integrative policies does present formidable problems for the communist politicians. As in other spheres of human activity, there develops a hiatus between theory and practice. Inevitably, the pragmatic requirements of politics receive precedence over the theoretical goals and precepts of Marxism.

The concepts of division of labor and economic integration are closely related and are often employed interchangeably. But there is a difference: the concept of the division of labor is primarily a theoretical principle; economic integration is the practical application of this principle that has been devised piecemeal as demanded during the evolution of the socialist system. There is inherent conflict between division of labor and the requirements of economic integration. Writing in 1959, the Soviet economist Siluyanov noted that the policy of autarky--except for the Soviet Union--contravenes the needs of socialism and the socialist system.[62] Socialist internationalism, he claimed, is a feature of the completely new

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[62]Siluyanov, loc. cit.

[63] Ibid., loc. cit.

structure of relations among socialist countries. Attempting to interject new (supra-national) values into the concept of socialist internationalism, Siluyanov added that the new socialist system should be developed not only on the basis of the location of raw materials and the requirements of the national economy, but ". . . for the satisfaction of the needs of other countries in the socialist camp."

The attempt to place the interests of the bloc above those of any single member is not a recent innovation. After the crude Soviet exploitative practices in the immediate postwar years, the CEMA members agreed in the early 1950's that there should be a form of economic integration in order to utilize most efficiently the available bloc resources. Such a program required ". . . the formation of an integrated bloc economy in which production would be organized strictly on the basis of comparative advantage."[63]

Until 1956, the integration of the planning of all members was mentioned only occasionally in various bloc publications, and most of the trade was conducted on a bilateral basis.[64] In the later 1950's, the foreign trade of

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[63]Alfred Zauberman, "Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects," Problems of Communism, 8:23, July-August, 1959.

[64]Nove and Donnelly, op. cit., p. 26. Also see Robert S. Jaster, "CEMA's Influence on Soviet Policies in Eastern Europe," World Politics, 14:508-509, April, 1962.

structure of relations among socialist countries. Attempting to introduce new (supra-national) values into the concept of socialist internationalism, Ellyasov added that the new socialist system should be developed not only on the basis of the location of raw materials and the requirements of the national economy, but "[...] for the satisfaction of the needs of other countries in the socialist community. The advantage of any single country is not a short-term [illegible] Rather the needs [illegible] economically [illegible] in the long-[illegible] 1970's that there should be a form of economic integration in order to utilize most efficiently the available mineral resources. Such a process requires "[...] the formation of an integrated [illegible] economy in which production would be organized directly on the basis of comparative advantage."[63]

Once [illegible] the integration of the planning of all economies was envisioned only occasionally in various [illegible] publications, and most of them were conducted on a [illegible] level.[64] In the later 1970's, the Bucharest school of

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[63] Alfred Ellyasov, "Economic Integration: Socialism and Economics," Problems of Communism, 31:3, July-August, 1982.

[64] Note and Donnelly, op. cit., p. 28. Also see Robert J. Jarrett, "CEMA's Influence on Soviet Policies in Eastern Europe," World Politics, 34:504-509, April, 1982.

bloc members with each other increased rapidly, reflecting the steps taken to implement the principle of division of labor as well as the increased efficiency resulting from the efforts of the Permanent Commissions. Some of the results of the planned integration of the economies of the CEMA members should be briefly mentioned, although this dissertation does not attempt a detailed study of trade patterns and other related economic matters.[65]

As the second industrial power of the world, the Soviet Union might be expected to import primarily raw materials and export finished products. This is not the case, however; the economy of the USSR is still being developed as rapidly as possible in an attempt to overtake the United States in total production during the course of the next fifteen or twenty years. For this reason, development of heavy industry continues as the highest priority.

> Soviet imports from the area [of East Europe] consist mostly of machinery and finished industrial goods, while Soviet exports are mainly primary goods such as fuels, minerals, foodstuffs and other raw materials.[66]

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[65]The pioneer major work in the field of East European economies was that of Nicolas Spulber, The Economics of Communist East Europe (New York: John Wiley and The Technology Press, 1957). A more contemporary study, although not as detailed, is Nove and Donnelly, op. cit.; both works discuss the work of the CEMA only in general fashion.

[66]Stanislaw Skrzypek, "Notes on Soviet Bloc Trade," East Europe, 11:7-8, February, 1962.

labor mobility with open ended increased rapidly, reflecting the steps taken to implement the principle of division of labor as well as the increased efficiency resulting from the efforts of the Functional Specializations. Some of the results of this planned interchange of the economies of the CEMA members should be initially monitored, although this observation does not attempt a detailed study of trade patterns and other involved economic matters.[65]

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[66]Leonidas Kerrypes, "Notes on Soviet Bloc Trade," East Europe, 13:7-8, February, 1964.

This trade pattern reflects a trend in the Soviet Union not only of continued emphasis on industrial development *per se*, but also a more diversified economy which may devote more attention to the production of complex industrial and electrical equipment, including electronics and related "space age" products, requiring a lower input of raw materials.[67]

In its effort to become the world's leading industrial power in all vital sectors, the Soviet Union is concentrating on the development of industries, such as those just mentioned, which are best promoted by means of the most modern and automated machinery. At her present pace, the Soviet Union is unable to provide all of this equipment herself. The imbalance of industrial goods, an important target in the specialization of production, is supplied mostly by the two most highly-developed industrialized members of the bloc, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.[68]

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[67] Wszelaki, *op. cit.*, p. 439, explains the Soviet emphasis on this type of development as an effort ". . . to concentrate its investments and manpower upon the development of such branches of its national economy which it regards as most essential for the winning of its economic and power race against the West."

[68] "The most important items of Soviet imports are *machinery and equipment*. The Soviet Union is still one of the most important importers of machinery and equipment in the world . . . . The German Democratic Republic ships

In order to facilitate the growth of the machine tool industry in the satellites, the building of machines has been numerically restricted to a certain number of models; and the production of these models is allocated among the satellite countries possessing special competence.[69]

A more recent application of the principle of "specialization of production," an outgrowth of developments during the 1956-1958 period, is found in the integration of the shipbuilding industry of the East European members of the CEMA. The Shipbuilding Commission of the CEMA, at a meeting in Warsaw in December, 1961, decided on the standardization of sea-going ships for the bloc. Production of these ships is concentrated in the Baltic yards of East Germany and Poland, although other CEMA members will take part in the program. "In future the shipyards of each country will build in large numbers for all CMEA countries the types of vessels required by them."[70]

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large quantities of various machines and equipment to the Soviet Union . . . . From Czechoslovakia we import equipment for the power, chemical, and food industries . . . ." G. Rubinshtein, "The Development of Soviet Imports," Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, No. 5, 1960; translated in Problems of Economics, 3:4-5, August, 1960. For an earlier discussion and criticism of the insufficient integration of the machine building industry, see Siluyanov, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

[69]Rubinshtein, op. cit., p. 4.

[70]Eric Bourne, "Soviet Bloc Knits Industries," The

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Large quantities of various machines and equipment to the Soviet Union . . . From Czechoslovakia we import equipment for the power, chemical, and food industries . . . ," Pravda, 9. Torgovlya, No. 3, 1960; translated in Problems of Economics, 3:6-9, August, 1960. For an earlier discussion and criticism of the inefficiencies inherent in the machine building industry, see Silyanov, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

[69] Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 4.

[70] Pete Bourne, "Soviet Bloc Mulls Industries," The

The specialization of production of segments of industries in the satellites does not restrict the industrial development of the USSR in general, or in the specific industries involved.[71] On the contrary, it frees the Soviet Union for more profitable endeavors in other fields.

In similar fashion, the industrialization of the East European socialist states[72] has increased their dependence on the Soviet Union for sources of raw materials. Table I demonstrates that the increase of raw materials imported by the East European countries from the USSR within an eight-year period was certainly not insignificant.

The significance of this shift in trade patterns becomes even more apparent when the figures in Table I are compared with the trade of the East European countries, prior to World War II, with the countries of Western Europe and the USSR.

Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1962, p. 2; Wszelaki, Economic Developments," op. cit., p. 442, states that one Polish shipyard has been committed during the period 1959-1965 to supply the Soviet Union with a million tons of shipping.

[71]See Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 20, for table entitled "Share of the Dependent Countries in Soviet Trade." This table graphically illustrates the dominating role played by the USSR in the exports of each of the satellites, and how relatively small a share of the Soviet Union's exports are taken by the satellites.

[72]Faddeyev, op. cit., p. 6, presents a table describing the increased share of the industrial sectors of the total economies of the East European countries.

The specialization of production of segments of industries in the satellites does not constitute the industrial development of the USSR in general, or in the specific industries involved.[71] On the contrary, it forces the Soviet Union for more profitable endeavors in other fields.

In static terms, the industrialization of the East European satellite states[72] has increased their dependence on the Soviet Union for sources of raw materials. Table I demonstrates that the increase of raw materials imported by the East European countries from the USSR within an eight-year period was certainly not insignificant. The significance of this shift in trade patterns becomes even more apparent when the figures in Table I are compared with the trade of the East European countries, prior to World War II, with the countries of Western Europe and the USA.

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[71] See Jaroszek, op. cit., p. 10, for table entitled 'Share of the Separated Countries in Soviet Trade.' This table graphically illustrates the dominating role played by the USSR in the exports of each of the satellites, and how relatively small a share of the Soviet Union's exports are taken by the satellites.

[72] Hamburg, op. cit., p. 6, presents a table describing the increased share of the industrial sectors of the total economies of the East European countries.

TABLE I

EAST EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON USSR[73]

(per cent of imports supplied by USSR)

Import	1950	1958
Iron ore	65.0	74.7
Pig iron	68.1	84.0
Rolled steel and pipe	48.9	57.5
Non-ferrous metals	26.5	59.4
Oil	47.3	97.1
Oil products	52.6	58.6
Sawn lumber	12.8	63.1
Cotton	79.3	66.7
Grain	77.9	83.9

[73]"The Work of COMECON," op. cit., p. 4.

TABLE 2

EASE EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON USSR[73]

(per cent of imports supplied by USSR)

Import	1950	1958
Iron ore	65.0	74.7
Pig iron	56.1	84.0
Rolled steel and pipe	48.3	57.5
Non-ferrous metals	26.5	59.4
Oil	47.3	97.1
Oil products	56.6	98.8
Sawn timber	12.8	47.2
Cotton	79.3	56.7
Grain	77.9	81.9

[73] "The Role of COMECON," op. cit., p. 44.

Soviet trade with the East European socialist states represents the major portion of their foreign trade, and the satellites are becoming increasingly dependent upon the Soviet Union in their trade patterns. The extent of the intra-bloc foreign trade that is regulated by the CEMA has not been specifically determined. Most Western students discuss "east European trade" in general terms relative to the CEMA. Wszelaki mentions two methods of Soviet "tightening economic controls" in 1959-1960 (through the CEMA and through the process of trade control) as if some or most of the foreign trade of this area is not CEMA-regulated.[74] On the other hand, Stolte, discussing the increased coordination of the national economies of the CEMA members, quotes a 1961 Ulbricht statement to the effect that 90 per cent of the bloc industrial production was controlled through the CEMA. The control of intra-bloc trade should be at least comparable in degree to the control of industrial production. In addition, it should be remembered that the current Soviet Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965) anticipates an increase of "more than fifty per cent" in the trade of the Soviet Union with the other countries of the bloc.[75]

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[74]Wszelaki, "Economic Developments," op. cit., p. 424.

[75]Nove and Donnelly, op. cit., p. 124.

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[74]Wszelaki, "Economic Development," op. cit., p. 424.

[75]Nove and Donnelly, op. cit., p. 144.

Through the operation of the principle of socialist division of labor which, as we have seen, applies to the satellites and not to the Soviet Union, the USSR is able to increase the specialization of the production of each East European member of the bloc and direct this specialization to the advantage of the growth of its own economy. Whether coincidental or carefully planned, the development of the pattern of trade of the East European socialist countries with the USSR in recent years has subjected these countries to increasing dependence upon Soviet Russia.[76]

There have been various reports of increasing consolidation of Soviet control in some satellite countries. Some of the control measures, it is implied, are so all-inclusive that they are outside the institutional arrangements of the CEMA. There is little to substantiate such a possible trend, however.[77]

The extent to which the deliberate integration of national economies conflicts with the national interests of the participating states, be they socialist or otherwise, has been suggested. Economic integration implies the

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[76]This process has been described by Wszelaki, "Economic Developments," op. cit., pp. 432ff.

[77]See J. Emlyn Williams, "U.S.S.R. to Absorb East Germany?," The Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1962, p. 1.

Germany," The Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1962, p. 1.

rational process of selective judgment: priorities in the sectors of production and exchange must be determined. This, in turn, involves the question of "comparative advantage." No matter what the method of selection, whether "Marxist-scientific" or capitalist, it is assumed that the decisions relating to the selection of production and exchange matters are considered on the basis of comparative advantage.[78] The notion of comparative advantage involves many things beyond the scope of this research, but one of its most important features is the question of price and value, and their relationship to production and exchange criteria. The Marxist-ideological content of these factors has relevance to the economic construction of the socialist commonwealth as it presently exists, and particularly the period 1956-1958.

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[78]Nicolas Spulber and Franz Gehrels, "The Operation of Trade Within the Soviet Bloc," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 40:148, February, 1958, state that ". . . it appears that the authorities have so far shown only slight interest in planning economic development in consonance with comparative advantage." This claim does not seem entirely accurate. Soviet economists, in this writer's opinion, are continually striving (since the early 1950's) for a method of determining comparative advantage, without using the term, of course, within a Marxist framework. Lack of success, in accordance with Western standards, should not imply lack of interest. See also K. Ostrovityanov, "Commodity Production and the Law of Value under Socialism," Kommunist, 13:100-101, September, 1957, translated in CDSP, IX:44, pp. 3-8.

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tage." We mention also the method of abstraction, whereby
"market-mechanistic" or capitalist, it is assumed that the
decisions relating to the selection of production and ex-
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has relevance to the economic construction of the socialist
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[7] Nicolas Spulber and Frank Gerrits, "The Operation of Trade within the Soviet Bloc," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 40:144, February, 1958, state that "... it appears that the authorities have so far shown only slight interest in planning economic development in accordance with comparative advantage." This claim does not seem entirely accurate. Soviet economists, in their writings opinion, are continually striving (since the early 1930's) for a method of determining comparative advantage, without using the term, of course, within a Marxist framework. Lack of success, in accordance with Western standards, should not imply lack of interest. See also "Lektsiya o 'Sovremennyy Proizvodstvo i Zakon Stoimosti'," Kommunist, 13:100-101, September, 1957; translated in CCLI, IX:44, pp. 3-6.

Without attempting a detailed analysis of Marxian economics, it is relevant to mention some of the thoughts of Marx that pertain to price and value. It is necessary first of all to recall that Marx was not interested simply in the philosophy of economics, history, or politics in themselves, but offered an integrated system of thought that would both explain the nature of the existing human society, i.e., a critique of capitalism, and provide the rationale for the proletarian revolution. This is the so-called "unity of theory and practice," although forty-five years of Soviet experience have so altered the content that it could now be labeled the "disunity" of theory and practice.

Since Marxism is supposed to be an integrated whole, as a revolutionary philosophy, Marx's economic theory is of validity insofar as it explains the contradictions of capitalism and supports Marx's materialist conception of history. In other words, Marxian economics is a political economics. Marx's economic theories serve a clearly established political purpose, and are not offered as mere erudite scholasticism.

Lichtheim lucidly demonstrates[79] the relationship of

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[79]George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 180-181.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Marxian[80] economics--especially Marx's interpretation of the "law of value"--to his philosophy as a whole, and the use to which his economic theory is to be applied. Considering the apparent contradiction between Volumes I and III of Capital, as Marx developed his theory of value and the principle of commodity exchange, Lichtheim suggests that one's interpretation ". . . must ultimately depend on what one expects a theory of value to do." If the student's purpose is directed toward an understanding of the sociological explanation of the processes of capitalism, ". . . there is no particular reason why one should not employ the Marxian apparatus . . . ." On the other hand, if the student is primarily concerned with the theory of value and its relationship to prices, ". . . it is hard to see what useful purpose is served by trying to salvage a theoretical model which makes such an operation impossibly difficult." The conclusion is obvious, it seems, that Marxian economics are not (or should not) be considered per se as the theoretical basis of a viable political economy, but rather should be treated as the methodological approach to an analysis of sociological phenomena and process.

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[80] To this writer, "Marxian" implies the body of thought offered by Karl Marx; the term "Marxist" refers to the theories and concepts originated by Marx but revised, restructured, and recast by socialists since Marx.

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The reader might consider that this conflict is of only academic interest in the study of the economic structure of the bloc, but this is not entirely correct. Despite the extent of the revision[81] of the content of Marxian economics, Soviet-socialist economists have not abandoned their ideological view of the totally-planned economy, and the totally-planned economy cannot allow for the independent play of the market but is inextricably bound up with an artificially determined price structure. Many observers of the bloc economic organization consider the price structure to be the principal stumbling bloc to effective economic integration and more rapid development of the bloc economy. From this point of view, it is necessary to consider (without defining) both the Marxian and Marxist concepts of price and value and their present relation to the strength and cohesion of the bloc.

According to Lichtheim,[82] Marx's followers and critics have needlessly expended their efforts attempting to develop or explain an economic science based upon Marx's theoretical concept of commodity value, as being defined in

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[81]For a brief discussion of the evolution of Marxist economics, see Alfred Zauberman, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics," in Leopold Labedz (ed.), Revisionism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 268-280; Nove, op. cit., Chapters VIII and XI, also discusses this problem, although not only from the point of view of revisionism.

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[92]Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 180-191.

terms of labor content. This attention, misdirected to a "pseudo-problem," ignores the main purpose of Marx's economic analysis as a "sociological explanation of the genesis and operation of capitalism," rather than as the theoretical basis for a socialist economy. Because Marx's main purpose was politico-sociological analysis, he could accept the methodological limitations of his analysis to obtain historical perspective.[83] Nevertheless, Marx's disciples accepted his theory of the "law of value" as scientifically operative. This "law" became "the basis of the ideological platform of the Marxist movement."[84] Because the law of value has been ideologically wedded to the concept of surplus value and capitalist exploitation of labor, it has served as "the theoretical justification of the call for a revolutionary overthrow . . . " of capitalist society.[85]

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[83] Ibid., pp. 182-183.

[84] Zauberman, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics," op. cit., p. 270. On this subject, Nove, op. cit., p. 221, has said the following: "Marxian theory was concerned with identifying the elements which determined value and price in a capitalist market economy, and accounting for such phenomena as exploitation and surplus value. Whether Marx was, in fact, successful in doing these things is a question we need not pursue here. The problem before Soviet economists in a search for an objective basis for prices is to find a means of using the theory in a situation in which a free market does not exist." [Italics added.]

[85] Zauberman, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics," op. cit., pp. 270-271.

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[85] Anderson, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics," op. cit., pp. 272-273.

It has become untouchable doctrine in Marxist theory because of its ideological content and significance.

If these interpretations of the misapplication of Marxian theory by latter-day Marxists have any validity, they serve to illustrate the dilemma posed in the integration of the Soviet bloc. Just as the Soviet economists have not fully resolved the dilemma of sophisticated mathematical price-cost determination versus Marx's theory of value, the bloc economists collectively have not really faced up to the dilemmas presented by artificial pricing structures and their relation to comparative advantage.

Mendershausen considers this dilemma of pricing structure and bloc trade at three levels:[86]

1. Are bloc trading arrangements to be determined by market equals or <u>through</u> a supra-national organization?

2. In the conduct of trade, are goods to be exchanged by means of the operation of a market, or the simple "accounting-type" transfer of goods?

3. If the bloc members do not employ their own internal price structures for intra-bloc trading, but adapt "world prices" to their own system, what are the criteria selected?

The first problem is not accepted as such by Soviet theorists. First, the sovereign equality of all bloc members

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[86]Horst Mendershausen, "The Terms of Soviet-Satellite Trade: A Broadened Analysis," <u>The Review of Economics and Statistics</u>, 42:162, February, 1960.

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applies, of course, and there can be no "market interplay" as is known in the West. Supra-nationality is also discounted, but not rejected in practice as it has been in Soviet theory. The fact that the "fraternal cooperation" of the socialist commonwealth does not provide a sufficient yardstick for the solution of this problem is tacitly admitted by the lengthy theoretical discussions on pricing and trade in bloc journals since 1955. Although Hendershausen's second suggested problem area is related to the first, there is an additional factor introduced by the apparent abandoning of the theory of simple accounting-method transfer of goods.[87] Stalin was one of the last to approach such a concept in his work The Economic Problems of Socialism, published in 1952. Since the mid-1950's, it has been admitted that the law of value is fully operative even without the completely socialist (state) sector of the economy.

Soviet economists have supplied little information on the third problem area suggested above. They still admit that the price system for bloc trading is based upon world prices.[88] Although they claim that socialist prices

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[87]The account-transfer method is held valid for certain segments of the Soviet economy.

[88]I. Dudinskii, "Some Features of the Development of the World Socialist Market," Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 2 (1961), translated in Problems of Economics, 4:58-59, September, 1961. In 1958, two non-Soviet analysts noted that: "All trade agreements published before 1951 specified that world prices were the basis for the prices of the goods involved;

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[68] L. Gatovskii, "Some Features of the Development of the World Socialist Market," Voprosy Ekonomiki [Problems of Economics], 4:90-99, September, 1961. In 1960, two non-Soviet analysts noted that "all trade agreements published before 1957 specified that world prices were the basis for the prices of the goods involved;

are not subject to the cyclic nature as in the capitalist world, they do not offer the criteria employed in providing price stability in the socialist camp. One Soviet writer typically observes that: "Prices [in the Soviet bloc] are established for a long period, and they remain stable."[89] On this basis, it seems that the bloc would be able to shift to its own price structure, but this author continued that ". . . we believe that the socialist camp will gradually go over to its own price basis in its trade." Yet, he admits that this is no simple matter: "The formation of the socialist market's price basis confronts the economists of the socialist countries with major problems." These problems require the accumulation and study of data from socialist trade, but it is not acknowledged that this process supposedly has been underway for decades.

There is general agreement among Soviet economists that (1) the law of value operates in a socialist economy where commodity production exists,[90] and (2) that prices have a definite relationship to value, but there seems to

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from 1951 onward . . . no specific statements can be found concerning the pricing basis of these particular contracts." Spulber and Gehrels, op. cit., p. 144.

[89] Dudinskii, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

[90] M. Sakov, "Some Questions on the Theory and Practice of Price Formation in the USSR," Voprosy Ekonomiki, trans. in Problems of Economics, 1:49, June, 1958; also, L. Gatovsky, "On Utilizing the Law of Value in a Socialist Economy," Kommunist, No. 9, June, 1957, trans. in CDSP, IX, 34, p. 3.

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85 Mutanskii, op. cit., pp. 33-60.

86 M. Sobol', "Some Questions on the Theory and Practice of Price Formation in the USSR," Voprosy Ekonomiki, transl. in Problems of Economics, 1142, June, 1953, pp. 36-49. Obviously, "On Utilizing the Law of Value in a Socialist Economy," Kommunist, No. 3, June, 1951, known in short, cit., pp. 1-

be no clear consensus on the role of price and value as the socialist society approaches communism. The orthodox Marxists argue for the political determination of prices: "Deviation of price from value does not contradict the law of value, but follows from its operation and nature." Other more revisionist-minded Soviet economists stress the continued role of money and price structure well into the achievement of communism. Nemchinov advises that prices do not correspond directly to value because of the effect of supply and demand.

The claim that price formation is based solely on the states' price policy rather than on the objective process of the formation of socially necessary outlays of labor is just another ". . . incorrect notion."

Although the more sophisticated attempts to bring Marxian economics "up to date" have been undertaken primarily in recent years by the socialist mathematicians,[91] an early justification for this process of revision was provided by Ostrovityanov in 1957, whose model was Leninist, vice Marxist, economics. Ostrovityanov provides a key to the un-Marxian future:

> As is known, the fundamental differences in the nature of social labor will disappear in the highest stage, communism, but the incidental differences

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[91] See Zauberman, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics," op. cit., pp. 278-280.

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[91] Jan Tumbergen, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics,"
op. cit., pp. 278-289.

> between mental and physical labor will remain. If one is to deduce from the differences in the nature of social labor under socialism that commodity production is necessary, it must be admitted that certain incidental commodity production and an incidental law of value will also remain at the highest stage, communism.

What has been taking place has been called a "growing rapprochement between Soviet and post-Marx non-Marxist economics."[92] An appreciation by socialists of the problems involved in contemporary socialist economic practice, and an understanding of some of the methods of non-Marxist economics and their application to socialist practice, however, does not signify the evolution in the near future of a market-operative economic system in the Soviet Union or the bloc. It is much more likely that the political direction of a totally-planned economy will remain and that the obstacles presented--whether recognized or not--will be accepted as an inevitable part of the dialectical process.

Even if there were the most honest efforts by all the CEMA members to develop a highly-integrated, cooperative economy, the bloc would still be plagued by the problem posed by artificial prices in the individual national economies. Integration of the CEMA economies, as has been noted, was suggested as an objective at the formation of the CEMA; by the mid-fifties, integration had become the

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[92] Zauberman, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics," op. cit., p. 279.

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What has been called above was termed a "price-less capitalism" by Novick and Poskrebyshev, economics. [2] An appreciation by Trotskyists of the problems involved in contemporary Socialist economic operation, and an understanding of some of the methods of non-Marxist economics can lead application to socialist practice, however, does not signify the evolution in the near future of a market-operative economic system in the Soviet Union or the West. It is much more likely that the political direction of a fully-planned economy will remain and that the obstacles encountered--and that accompanied or opt--will be accepted as an inevitable part of the dialectical process.

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[2] Baumgarten, "The Revisionists in Soviet Economics," op. cit., pp. 275.

major objective, to be attained on the basis of the international socialist division of labor.

So far there has been little real progress toward effective integration of the plans of the national economies,[93] although bilateral--and, in some cases, multilateral--trade and industrial projects have been greatly increased. One difficulty encountered by the planners of integration was the method adopted, the ". . . primary reliance upon the intra-bloc trade network as the integrating mechanism . . . clearly the wrong instrument in an environment of planned economies."[94] Intra-bloc trade may have been the wrong vehicle for economic integration, but it is suggested that perhaps there have been no other reasonable alternatives, unless the CEMA were to be empowered with supra-national authority to allocate materials.

Paradoxically, it is the nature of the completely-planned economy, extolled for so long and faithfully by socialist economists, that presents the severest problems in international economic integration. Some of these problems include artificial pricing structure, lack of convertibility of the national currencies, and rigid allocation of planned production.

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[93] Jaster, op. cit., p. 510, does not agree.

[94] Zauberman, "Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects," op. cit., p. 24.

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[33] Mayer, op. cit., p. 510, does not agree.

[34] Kaser, "Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects," op. cit., p. 44.

Currency exchange is closely connected with the problem of artificial prices in a planned economy. The official currency of the CEMA is the ruble. Early attempts to increase the multilaterality of the CEMA resulted in the decision reached at the Eighth Council Session, June, 1957, to establish a currency clearing union through the Gosbank in Moscow. Despite the efforts involved, however, it was reported in early 1961 that:

> The Soviet bloc is no closer to convertibility and multilateralism than before. Communist experts are well aware that some objective price basis which reflects a real relationship between the value of goods produced in the various countries must be established within the bloc before much headway can be made toward integrating their economies.[95]

This lack of success in the establishment of multilateral trade and clearing systems is confirmed by Soviet and other bloc sources. Dudinskii noted, as late as September, 1961, that "bilateral clearing covers the bulk of goods in trade, largely because most of the trade on the world socialist market is handled under bilateral agreements."[96]

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[95] "Eastern Europe and the New Ruble," East Europe, 10:19, April, 1961. See also Raymond F. Mikesell and Jack N. Behrman, Financing Free World Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 59, who suggest that the claims of "multilaterality" arising from the June, 1957 meeting of the CEMA Council must be treated with skepticism.

[96] Dudinskii, op. cit., p. 60. In discussing the coordination of trade through the CEMA for the period 1959-1965, Dudinskii remarked that the anticipated increase (1.7

currency exchange is closely connected with the problem of artificial prices in a planned economy. The official currency of the CGMA is the ruble. Early attempts to increase the multilaterality of the CGMA resulted in the decision reached at the Eighth Council Session, June, 1957, to establish a currency clearing union through the Moscow Bank. Despite the efforts involved, however, it was reported in early 1961 that:

> The Soviet bloc is no closer to convertibility and multilateralism than before. Communist country trade will remain even more objectively price basis which reflects a real relationship between the value of goods produced in the various countries must be established within the bloc before such reality can be made toward integrating their economies.[93]

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He recognizes that multilateral clearing, although it is employed in the bloc economy, "offers additional possibilities . . . [and] will gradually rise in importance."

Despite the obvious disadvantages and obstacles, most of which are belatedly receiving increased recognition in socialist journals, there have been notable achievements in the economic sector of the Soviet bloc. For a balanced judgment, the purposes and successes of the socialist economies, as well as their deficiencies, must be kept in mind, and not compared only with an idealized Western economy.[97]

It should be recognized that there has been a significant shift in the political and economic orientation of the Soviet bloc in the last decade. Although the famous "secret speech" by Khrushchev before the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, in February, 1956, is generally credited as the moving force behind the new socialist structure, perhaps even of greater significance has been the Belgrade Declaration delivered by Premier Khrushchev in early May, 1955, to President Tito. It was recognition by the Soviet Union of the "different roads" thesis that has led to the establishment of a "commonwealth" of socialist countries.

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times) would be realized ". . . on the basis of bilaterally-conducted trade negotiations," p. 58.

[97]Taken in part from the methodology offered by Nove, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

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[97] Taken in part from the methodology offered by Neal, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

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This principle was publicized at Belgrade and reaffirmed at the 20th Party Congress.

But in case Khrushchev missed the significance of his own words in early 1956, there were the "events" in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 to remind him. Force, or the threat of force, on the part of the satellites, caused the Soviets to issue their momentous (in content, as well as title) Declaration of October 30, 1956, "On the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States."[98]

The importance of the period 1956-1958 in the development of bloc relations lies not only in the increased latitude, however limited this may be, of the satellites vis-à-vis Russia, but in the institutionalization of this revised situation and its clear recognition by both the USSR and the East European socialist states.

If the Soviet Declaration of October 30, 1956, marks the official recognition of the new relationship among the socialist states, the May, 1958, summit conference in Moscow attended by the leaders of the Soviet bloc, with

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[98] Pravda, October 31, 1956, p. 1. For a frank treatment of the importance of this Declaration, see P. Nikitin, "Economic Cooperation of Countries in the Socialist Camp," Pravda, July 14, 1957, pp. 4-5, translated in CDSP, IX, 28, pp. 10-11. See also the discussion of this Declaration in Chapter IV, supra.

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representatives from Asian socialist states, signifies a new era in socialist cooperation. Or at least, that was its intent. The conference dealt primarily with the economic integration of the restructured socialist camp. An examination of events in the socialist bloc since 1958 should support some conclusions concerning the effectiveness of the CEMA as a cohesive force within the Soviet bloc.

First, there has been substantial improvement in the development of the industrial sector of the Soviet bloc since 1956-1958; despite its limitations, the CEMA has undoubtedly been instrumental in this development. It has become increasingly active as the organizational means for developing and coordinating the trade of East Europe and the Soviet Union.

The scope of CEMA activities has broadened sharply from a modest beginning with a primitive economic organization embodying not only increased trade patterns, but also extensive coordination of the national economic plans of its member countries, specialization of production, limited currency convertibility, fairly extensive mutual scientific-technical assistance and exchange, and rather impressive achievements in the integration of electric power networks, and the machine building, oil transport, and shipbuilding industries. Successes in these areas, however, are partially offset by rather limited bloc integration in other

industrial sectors, the lack of a multilateral clearing system, and the handicap of artificial price structures which inhibit effective cost comparison and extensive, meaningful economic negotiation.[99]

Although the Soviet Union recognized, in the years 1956-1958, a more equitable position for the satellites within the bloc, there is evidence that the Soviet Union still maintains ample economic leverage vis-à-vis the satellites. Without considering at this point the purely political and military measures of control of the bloc available to the Soviet Union, a study of the present economic structure discloses somewhat more subtle methods of economic domination and control.

Most obvious, of course, is the economic strength of the Soviet Union relative to each one of the satellites.

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[99] For a recent, thorough analysis of the course of developments in the CEMA, see Michael Gamarnikow, "The Future of COMECON," East Europe, 11:4-6, June, 1962. This is an excellent treatment of the work of COMECON from 1958-1962. Gamarnikow concludes (p. 9) that "the internal contradictions which have become apparent since 1958 suggest that the prospects of COMECON are not very bright." The heart of the problem, according to Gamarnikow, is the artificial price structures within the bloc, or the lack of an effective method to gauge comparative costs of production. Less important, but still vital, problems are the lack of progress in the implementation of bloc integration, failure of the bloc's "richer" members to provide adequate financial assistance to the "poorer" ones, and the tendency for each member of the bloc to concentrate on the production of those goods in short supply, i.e., to place their own interests above those of the bloc as a whole.

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Bilateral negotiations and agreements may be clumsy alternatives to multilateral arrangements, but in a meeting of units of such disparate economic power as the Soviet Union and the satellites, individually, the definite advantage is with the major power. Through bilateral arrangements, the Soviet Union is able to maintain its predominant position, but this position of strength is buttressed by several other factors:

1. Financial arrangements, such as price setting[100] and the use of a bloc currency,[101] appear to be dominated by the Soviet Union.

2. Control of the direction and character of trade, by reserving to the Soviet Union the right to

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[100]The exploitation of the satellites by the Soviet Union through "rigged prices" is beyond the scope of this study. For a review of this question, the following analyses are suggested: (1) Mendershausen, op. cit., pp. 153-155, who attempts to show an overcharge in Soviet trade with the satellites, without claiming deliberate intent; (2) Franklyn D. Holzman, "Soviet Foreign Trade Pricing and the Question of Discrimination," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 44:134-147, May, 1962, who refutes Mendershausen's theoretical approach rather than his figures, claiming that an analysis of bloc trade and pricing as a sort of "customs union" would demonstrate the irrelevancy of Mendershausen's conclusions; (3) Jan Wszelaki, "Soviet Price Discrimination in Export to East-Central Europe," Assembly of Captive European Nations, ACEN Document 207, June 7, 1960.

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the principle of autarky, but denying this principle to the satellites. The specialization of production of the East European bloc members of the CEMA makes these countries dependent upon the Soviet Union in their trade patterns.

3. Integration of the power industries, through the tying together of electric power grids and a network of pipelines originating in the Soviet Union.

4. Institutional control through the various organs of the CEMA, several of which are permanently located in Moscow, and which are dominated by Soviet personnel.

On the other hand, there is evidence that shows that the Soviet leadership of the bloc is not completely unchallenged. There have been frequent instances of the expression of displeasure by the satellites over the pricing structure, the lack of more extensive financial assistance within the bloc, and failure to integrate those industries which some satellites consider to their advantage.

The bloc countries have achieved some notable successes in economic progress, but the efforts to forge an irresistible economic system--the basis of the world socialist system--do not reflect any radical, new principles of socialist international relations.

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CHAPTER VI

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST REVISIONISM

Having read some of the literature of the "marxist" school, Karl Marx is reported to have exclaimed: "All I know is that I am not a Marxist." Were he able to study the various remnants of Marxism still persisting as political movements both in and out of power in most regions of the world today, Marx's comments would probably verge on exasperation. Marx lived long enough to experience the perils of revionism and reformism,[1] the Scylla and Charybdis

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[1]Revisionism can be simply defined as the alteration of a substantive or essential portion of Marxism-Leninism, so that its interpretive, critical, or revolutionary content is dissipated. A more specific definition has been provided by a Soviet source, Izvestia, December 28, 1957, pp. 3-4; translated in Communist Digest of the Soviet Press [hereafter cited as CDSP], IX, 52, pp. 24, 35: "Revisionism is a trend hostile to Marxism within the workers movement which, under the pretext of developing Marxism, reviews and revises Marxism's basic and tested principles and tries to substitute antiscientific bourgeois-reformist views in their stead."

Reformism is the alteration of the revolutionary aspects of Marxist ideology so that the revolutionary movement accepts its position within bourgeois society. Reformism negates the revolution. Defined by Jerzy Morawski, Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, Trybuna Ludu, March 27, 1956 [cited in Carl E. Zinner (ed.), National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February-November, 1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 60]: "Reformism is a policy of concessions and reforms effected within the framework of the bourgeois system, intended to 'correct ' or 'mend' capitalism instead of radically liquidating the sources of class exploitation and oppression."

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of every revolutionary movement. Revisionism has always been considered a major threat to the viability of the international communist movement. As just suggested, it is not a phenomenon new to Marxism, but the extent to which revisionist tendencies since the death of Stalin have split the communist movement in several directions has caused considerable interest of late not only in the modern manifestations of revisionism but in its historical context as well.[2]

Revisionism is an inevitable sociological development in that circumstances change and ideas must be altered to keep pace with the passage of time. This is a particularly un-Marxist view, because in Marxist theory the historical process is subject to certain scientific interpretations that require not alteration, but simply "creative application" of the theory. The theory is infallible; it must be creatively applied to historical conditions. Only those who understand and believe in Marxism-Leninism are competent to apply the theory creatively, of course.

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[2]A fascinating survey of the revisionist phenomenon, both old and new, ideological and institutional, is provided in Leopold Labedz (ed.), Revisionism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962). Especially recommended for an analysis of contemporary revisionism is William E. Griffith, "The Decline and Fall of Revisionism in Eastern Europe," in Labedz, op. cit., Chapter XVI; and Alfred Sherman, "Tito--A Reluctant Revisionist," in Labedz, op. cit., Chapter XVIII.

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Another wholly un-Marxist thought is that revisionism is an inevitable process because individuals and groups consider their own interests as primary, and interpret the interests of the larger societal unit in terms of their own needs and desires. The orthodox Marxist would claim that there can be no conflict between the interests of a socialist state and those of socialist internationalism, but he is hard pressed to explain the progress of Yugoslavia since 1948, Communist China since 1959, Albania since 1960, and so forth.

It is a basic thought of this research study that revisionism, that is the process of diversification underway in the socialist camp since the mid-1950's, is simply the reaction--an almost inevitable reaction--to Stalinism. Stalin possessed the power to prevent revisionism to assume dangerous proportions. To recognize that Stalinism in itself is a variant of revisionism is neither profound nor profitable; Leninism, also, is a revision of Marxism, et cetera. What might be profitable in terms of understanding relations between the USSR and the East European states in the years 1956-1958 is an analysis of the nature of Yugoslav revisionism, its effect on the cohesion of the bloc, and, finally, the campaign against revisionism that commenced in the early months of 1958.

A determination of the nature of revisionism in terms of Marxist doctrine involves a value judgment, based not only upon the published works of Marxist theorists but also upon the subjective qualities of the person or persons arriving at this determination. There is no unified doctrine, or selection of formulae, which can simply be labeled "Marxism." A study or criticism of Marxism is a subjective effort or interpretation; as Alfred Meyer aptly suggested, ". . . every work on Marx should really be entitled What Marx Means to Me."[3]

Hence, there is the need, when discussing a subject such as revisionism, to establish a reference point within the historical development of what has become known as Marxism. Some basis, a school of thought within this development, must be selected as representing orthodox Marxism; otherwise, any discussion of revisionism and relative terms becomes meaningless. There are limitations inherent in any selection, even if only the works of Marx and Engels are considered, but the selection will, nevertheless, provide a necessary function. For the purpose of this discussion, "orthodox Marxism" will be considered

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embodied in the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Lenin is included not only because of his embellishments on Marxist theory but also because Lenin was a successful practitioner whose ideological concepts and motivations were not excessively warped by the requirements of the exercise of power. In addition, Lenin for several years was engaged within the international socialist movement in an almost "personal" conflict with strong forces which he considered revisionist.

The error of revisionism can be committed by either a positive or negative act. When Stalin dominated the communist bloc, revisionism (although Stalin did not often use the term) consisted of failure to display complete subservience to the interests of the USSR as the determinant of communist ideology and revolutionary strength. Khrushchev has applied very much the same test in recent years, only without the authority possessed by Stalin. Thus, in this negative sense, revisionism has amounted to failure to recognize the dominant position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the USSR in the international communist hierarchy.

These and other versions of revisionism have diluted the more traditional, authentic concept that revisionism is the positive act of altering a basic tenet of Marx or Engels. The charge of revisionism includes <u>de facto</u>

judgment by the individual or group making the charge; Marx is not alive to applaud or condemn; and there is no procedure for a neutral, third party determination of orthodoxy. Usually, the person or group with the most influence within the communist organization is able to pursue his argument to ultimate victory. The opposition--the revisionist--then either submits to self-criticism or is forced out of the party organization. Not even Marxist theory is immune to the dialectic process it has formulated for societal development.

Revisionism, in its theoretical application, centers around three closely-related Marxist tenets: the class struggle, nature of the capitalist system, and characteristics of the proletarian revolution.[4] As the communist-socialist movement has progressed since the middle of the nineteenth century, the bitter factional disputes over revisionism have mostly been concerned with these subjects. Whether the labels of revisionism were simply a cover for a more basic power struggle is not our concern here. A discussion of motives, intentions, and sincerity could prove barren.

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[4]Lenin adds a fourth principle to these: the neglect of the final goal for temporary gain, or a form of opportunism. See V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism," Sochineniia (second edition; Moscow: [n.n.], 1962), p. 256.

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The theory of the class struggle is basic not only to the problem of revisionism but Marxism in general. Marx evolved the historical development of the class struggle, from the multi-class system of ancient Rome and the feudal era through the period of commercial and colonial expansion during which there gradually evolved the two basic classes of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, or the exploiters and the exploited. To this process of the evolution of the class system, Marx added the dialectic of the fundamental antagonism between these two hostile classes. The present class struggle will not end until the proletariat achieves its inevitable victory and capitalism is destroyed. Once the proletariat has begun, there will be no more class structure in society and the class struggle will have ceased.

Until the proletariat dictatorship has been established, however, classes will exist and dominate human society. State governments are an expression of this class structure. As Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto: "Political power . . . is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another."[5] Engels made

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it clear that this was valid in a so-called democratic republic just as much as in a monarchy. The representative democracies were an illusion for the workers, who had very little political influence, according to Marxist thought. The power of the proletariat in a bourgeois democracy consisted of being able to go to the polls every few years to select various members of the ruling capitalist class to "represent" them in parliament.

It is inherent in capitalist society, according to Marxist doctrine, that the cleavage between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will widen, and that this gap cannot be overcome through the exercise of democratic processes by the proletariat. On the contrary, the capitalist system will succumb only to force, despite the inevitability of its collapse. In one of his better known observations, Marx wrote that: "Force is the mid-wife of every old society pregnant with a new one." It was a basic tenet of the orthodox school of Marxism that it is necessary to smash the bourgeois state machinery and start anew.

It is the failure of the revisionists to understand and appreciate the nature of the class struggle that causes them to adopt their revisionist views, say the orthodox Marxists. Because the revisionist neglects not only the final goal of the class struggle, the communist society, but also the role of the class struggle in achieving this

it clear that this was valid in a so-called democratic republic just as much as in a monarchy. The representative democracies were an illusion for the workers, who had very little political influence, according to Marxist thought. The power of the proletariat in a bourgeois democracy consisted of being able to go to the polls every few years to select various members of the ruling capitalist class to "represent" them in parliament.

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goal, he fails to view bourgeois democracy as a class democracy, the exercise of political authority by the ruling class. Thus, instead of directing his attention to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against the exploiting capitalist class, the revisionist shifts to a liberal view of democracy, accepting the evolutionary process of proletarian struggle.

Lenin, always a caustic, sharp-tongued revolutionary, reserved some of his most vitriolic comments for the revisionists and their supporters. Two of his favorite targets were Bernstein and Kautsky. Both, in Lenin's position, were guilty of the revisionist sin of advocating evolutionary socialism, but Bernstein was also considered an opportunist for sacrificing the communist goal in favor of the immediate tactical gain. Kautsky, whom Lenin described as an old "windbag," was merely "chewing rags in his sleep" when he succumbed to the liberal illusion of the future of the proletariat in a bourgeois democracy.

In addition to the political aspect of the class struggle (in a bourgeois democracy as well as a totalitarian state), the orthodox Marxists have strong views relative to the economic characteristics of the capitalist system and how it has evolved. The foundation for these views is the concept of the inherent contradictions of the capitalist system which provide the "seeds of its own

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In addition to the political aspect of the class struggle (in a bourgeois democracy as well as a totalitarian state), the orthodox Marxists have strong views relative to the economic characteristics of the capitalist system and how it has evolved. The foundation for these views is the concept of the inherent contradictions of the capitalist system which provide the "seeds of its own

destruction." The capitalist owners of the means of production increase their exploitation of the proletarian class through the theory of surplus value. The workers are paid minimum wages, so that they are unable to purchase the products of the economy; meanwhile, as the capitalists increase their surplus value accumulation, they are able to produce greater amounts of goods, which the workers cannot afford to buy. As a result, the goods accumulate, unemployment increases, and a crisis results. The orthodox Marxists, in their view of capitalist society, claim that the crisis cycle accelerates, increasing both the wealth of the capitalists and the impoverishment of the masses. This dooms capitalism to eventual collapse because of its inherent contradictions. This collapse, although inevitable, must be hastened by the revolutionary activity of the proletariat.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a school of thought within the Marxist movement re-evaluated the conditions of capitalist society and concluded that the crisis cycle was not necessarily accelerating and that the proletariat were not being further impoverished and exploited. This group, whose foremost exponent was Eduard Bernstein, consisted for the most part of German socialists who accepted wholeheartedly the idealism of Marx. But, in their analysis of the development of capitalist society, they did not see an intensifying crisis cycle and further impoverishment of the masses. Instead, the capitalist economic system had

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stabilized, in a relative sense. The crises were not appearing more frequently and severely, as Marxist theory had predicted. The workers' position, both politically and economically, had improved. The revisionists felt that the working class had a "stake" in its present society; that they were a part of society rather than apart from society. To the orthodox, the revisionists had accepted bourgeois status.

The third of three primary revisionist tenets concerns the nature of the proletarian revolution, or the use of revolutionary violence by the proletariat to gain power and establish their dictatorship. Again, views on the use of violence by the proletariat are closely linked to the accepted theory of the class struggle and the process of capitalist development. This is essentially a problem of revolution versus evolution, one of the theoretical issues fundamental to the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute under consideration.

Bernstein, and the other revisionist-socialists, felt that "socialism could be attained without a revolution by purely economic pressure." Their program, which has been referred to as the "Marxian minimum program,"[6] contemplated peaceful, democratic tactics of economic pressure to gain social reforms, within the existing governmental institutions. Even though their tactics may not have specifically included the use of violence, the Social Democrats of

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One kind of future primary revisionist issue concerns the nature of the proletarian revolution, or the use of revolutionary violence by the proletariat to gain power and establish communism. Again, views on the use of violence by the proletariat are closely linked to the accepted theory of the class struggle and the process of capitalist development. This is essentially a problem of revolution versus evolution, one of the unresolved issues fundamental to the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute under consideration.

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this period were not, of course, as conservative as the socialists of the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, the relative success of their trade union movement and the general growth of economic prosperity and nationalism in Western Europe stunted their revolutionary ardor, without erasing their idealistic objectives. The dilemma facing most intellectual Marxists, at the present time, as well as at the start of the century, is that:

> Marxism is divided into a set of purposes which are unscientific [the socialist ideal] on the one hand, and a scientific method [economic determinism], which is quite independent of purpose and ideals, on the other. Either one or the other has, by various people, been named as the essence of Marxism.[7]

The intellectual movement in Eastern Europe in 1956-1957, although the product of different immediate causes, reflects the conflict between idealism and pragmatism inherent in the communist system. This conflict is magnified by the problems involved in the exercise of governmental authority. What better explanatory context is there for the divergent policies of two such "devout" Marxists as Imre Nagy and Nikita Khrushchev? Nagy lost his life not only because his revisionist program threatened the entire structure of international communism but also because other Titoists-revisionists needed to be impressed with the futility of their "opportunistic efforts."

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[1] Ibid., p. 123.

As could be expected, the most significant changes and additions to Marxist theory result from the efforts of those who have been faced with the practical necessity of governing on the basis of Marxist theory. Marx was much more concerned with the conditions that surrounded the workers' struggle of his time than he was with the blissful future he predicted under communism. Consequently, Marxist theory is vague of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, transition to socialism, withering away of the state, and other such vital subjects that necessarily concern those communists in positions of governmental responsibility.

In this context, Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev can all be considered guilty of revisionism for their departures from orthodox Marxism while applying it in the USSR. Such programs as Lenin's "New Economic Policy," Stalin's "Socialism in One Country," and Khrushchev "On the Inevitability of War," conflict with or are not to be found in Marx-Engels doctrine. To carry this thought further, those communists in either the Soviet Union or foreign parties who have disagreed with the pronouncements of Stalin and Khrushchev can--and often have been--considered revisionists. In other words, <u>revisionism plus a preponderance of power equals orthodoxy</u>. This approach to the question of revisionism intellectually leads to a dead end; the explanation

of certain cases such as that of Yugoslavia must be sought in a political as well as ideological analysis.

A basis for understanding the ideological battle in 1958 between the Soviet camp and Yugoslavia must be approached through the historical perspective of Yugoslav socialist progress in the preceding decade. The charge of revisionism in its Marxist context is a serious charge. The Yugoslavs were alleged on several counts to have attempted to revise Marxism-Leninism in the ten years since the Conimform resolution. The attack on Yugoslavia on the basis of revisionist policies reached its peak in 1958 with the publication of the Draft Program for the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, known as the "Ljubljana Program." Before examining several of the principal features of this program that resulted in the campaign against Yugoslav revisionism, the primary characteristics of Yugoslav socialism as it has developed since 1949 should be briefly mentioned.

The events leading up to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948, and the reasons for this expulsion, are well known. Yugoslavia was not only motivated by the desire for independence, but as the only satellite that had played a major role in its own liberation in World War II, Yugoslavia was in a position after the war to assert its freedom. Stalin felt that his influence within the

Yugoslav Communist Party (renamed the League of Communists in 1952) would be sufficient to topple Tito in a test of strength,[8] but he not only miscalculated his own prestige, he also underestimated Tito and Yugoslav determination. Yugoslav separatism was proved to be a most costly failure for the Soviet bloc.[9]

It soon became apparent after the break with the Cominform that Yugoslavia would have to undertake extreme

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[8]The Cominform resolution expressed no doubt on this matter. "If the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove unequal to this task, then these sound forces must replace them by others and produce a new international leadership for the Party. The Information Bureau has no doubt that the Yugoslav Communist Party will be able to fulfill this honorable task." Gunther Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 236-237. Khrushchev referred to this section of the Cominform resolution in a speech on July 11, 1958: "Our criticism [in the resolution], which we have never renounced, was not incorrect; it was the appeal for a change in the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party . . . that was incorrect," Pravda, July 12, 1958, translated in CDSP, X, 28, pp. 5-8. Also found in Vaclav L. Benes, et al. (eds.), The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, [n.d.]), p. 203. Khrushchev had voiced similar criticism of the Yugoslavs in a speech to the Bulgarian Party Congress, June 3, 1958, Pravda, June 4, 1958, pp. 1-3, translated in CDSP, X, 22, pp. 8-13.

[9]It has been reported that Khrushchev was warned by Molotov against "sanctioning" Yugoslavia's independent course in 1955; see Francois Fejto, "The Communists of East Europe between Fatherland and Internationalism," The Review [Brussels], 3:19, 1961. Molotov was probably more "realistic" than Khrushchev in assessing the requirements of socialist unity; Khrushchev was probably more "realistic" than Molotov in appreciating the costs of Stalinist bloc unity. Fejto also observed that even since 1956, Khrushchev has been doing his best to "neutralize" the explosive effects of the Belgrade Declaration.

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measures, not only to maintain continued independence from the communist bloc but also to protect the position of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav government was deprived of extensive economic aid by the rupture with the Cominform. The economy was in a very unfavorable condition in 1948-1949, and the termination of bloc support further aggravated the situation. Strong repressive measures in Yugoslavia shortly after World War II, when Tito was a model of Stalinism, had seriously reduced the government's popular support enjoyed at the end of the war. In 1949-1950, it was necessary for the Tito regime to attempt to rectify the shortcomings of both foreign and domestic policies simultaneously.

In a review of their position after the break with the Cominform, the Titoists realized that the Stalinization of the Yugoslav government had stifled the economy. The rapid growth of bureaucracy and central authority had wreaked havoc with the entire system. The logical step was to decentralize, but the process of decentralization required a fundamental basis in ideology. The Titoist approach to this problem was centered upon the Marxist concept of the ownership of the means of production. Nationalization had been accomplished in Yugoslavia at the end of the war in a fashion similar to that of the young Soviet Republic at the end of World War I. In the Soviet Union,

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however, nationalization and the growth of state functions and authority had resulted in what the Yugoslavs called "State Capitalism," with the people now exploited by the state instead of the bourgeoisie, as in the capitalist countries. Tito's theorists based their decentralization efforts upon the Marxist tenet that the state should commence to "wither away" once the proletariat has gained power (according to the Yugoslavs), and that this process should not be delayed simply because of capitalist encirclement, the reasoning often used by Stalin. This Yugoslav concept of timing of the withering process is a source of extensive ideological conflict with the USSR, as will be discussed.

In other words, nationalization was considered to be only a first step and was to be superseded by common or social ownership, the fundamental ideological basis for Tito's "Socialist Democracy." The basic law providing the realization of the social ownership theory was the Workers' Council Law of 1950, to use its abbreviated title. This law serves as the source of Tito's claim to having developed a higher stage of socialism than the other states within the socialist bloc. The theory of workers' councils is employed by the Titoists also to strengthen their influence with the intellectual Marxists and socialists of the Western nations, on the basis of having democratized as well as socialized the Yugoslav government and economy.

The operation of the workers' councils soon produced several results, anticipated and otherwise. As was desired, individual incentive and initiative increased, spurred on by some freedom of action in the market place. Unfavorable results also became evident. There was gross inefficiency in workers' management in the early years, until new technical skills could be learned, and there were cases of unsound competition between some similar enterprises, in the bourgeois search for profits. But the primary fault of the early system was what the Titoists referred to as "localism," or "localistic anarchism," which was exemplified by the tendency of individuals or local groups to devote their effort toward improving their own situation rather than those activities that would best serve the needs of the area or state as a whole. To combat this drift toward localism, the government somewhat strengthened central authority in 1954 and 1955 by several steps. Some of these steps included measures to simplify and strengthen the vertical lines of communication and authority from the central government to the local enterprises.

The process of decentralization that had taken place in 1950-1953 had proceeded in similar fashion in other areas of government, in the party, and to a lesser extent in agriculture, but the formulation of workers' councils

has received the most attention in ideological debates in the subsequent years.

Within the framework of his ideological dispute with Stalin and Khrushchev, Tito often refers to Stalinism as having strayed too far from Marxism-Leninism by fostering state capitalism and the growth of bureaucracy, and the process of strengthening the party at the expense of the masses. Tito has taken what he claims are positive steps not only to avoid these excesses in Yugoslavia, but also to develop a higher form of socialist order. Tito's framework for these efforts has been the principle of the withering away of the state, designed to support his claim of ideological purity. Tito's detractors could mention that in effect the Yugoslav state and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (League of Communists) are not withering away to any significant degree, and that decentralization has been simply a necessary counter to the stifling inefficiency posed by excessive centralization in the early years of the regime.

The philosophical foundation of "socialist democracy" and decentralization was defined by Edvard Kardelj in late 1954 as recognition of the inherent limitations of central authority and the vital importance of material incentive upon individual initiative and effort. Perhaps the most appropriate comment on this so-called philosophical

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foundation is that it is based upon liberal concepts that have been considered self-evident in Western political thought for many years.[10]

There is no need in this dissertation to discuss in detail the nature of Yugoslavia's decentralization program in the early 1950's, or the strengthening of central authority in 1953-1954. The Yugoslav leaders have boasted often of their implementation of the theory of withering away of the state and party, and the fact that these measures support their claim to having the correct interpretation of Marxist theory. Of more significance is the development of new attitudes by the Titoists toward international relations, the nature of capitalism, and the transition to socialism.

Just as Tito was forced to justify his break with the Cominform in the shape of a decentralized, somewhat liberalized governmental structure, he also found it necessary to revise the ideological content of Yugoslav foreign policy. Basic economic realities, problems magnified by the 1950 drought as well as the inefficiency of his regime,

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[10]Charles P. McVicker, Titoism: Pattern for International Communism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), p. 68. For a thorough treatment of Yugoslav policies, both domestic and foreign, see Charles P. McVicker and Fred Warner Neal, Titoism in Action (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958).

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forced Tito to accept aid from the West. At the same time, the Titoists began the process of modification of some of their basic Marxist views on the nature of capitalism, socialist revolution, etc. Distasteful as some of the Yugoslav domestic policies may have been to the orthodox Marxists from Moscow, these programs most likely would have been overlooked by the Soviet leaders during the negotiations for a rapprochement in the mid-1950's, except for Yugoslavia's new views on foreign policy. Khrushchev and the others could not afford to ignore the Yugoslav positions in such foreign policy matters as the nature of relations between socialist states. These 'non-Marxist" concepts were explicitly enunciated in the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.[11] Before examining

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[11]The Draft Program (Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) was published in The Review of International Affairs [Belgrade], June 1, 1958, and can also be found in Benes, op. cit., Section II, pp. 29-91. The Program is a most revealing exposition of Yugoslav attitudes toward Marxism-Leninism; Benes noted (p. 27) that the Draft Program ". . . had become a formal declaration of political and ideological independence." The Draft Program was strongly criticized in an article in Kommunist, April 15, 1958, translated in CDSP, X, 18, pp. 3-11, and in Pravda, May 9, 1958, translated in CDSP, X, 19, pp. 6-11. For the Program as it was finally adopted by the Seventh Congress, see Yugoslavia's Way (New York: All Nations Press, 1958). A brief analysis of the Program can be found in Ernst Halperin, "Revision and Yugoslavia," in Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), Polycentrism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 53-54.

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some of the features of this Program, and the revisionist charges advanced by the Soviet theorists, Soviet-Yugoslav relations during the period 1955-1957 should be reviewed.

It had become increasingly obvious during the last years of Stalin's reign that his Yugoslav policy had been a dismal failure, and that the entire international communist structure required a re-alignment in order to prevent increased growth of such forces as revisionism and national communism. Attempts to redefine relations between communist states fell upon the willing shoulders of Nikita Khrushchev. There have been few goals more important for the socialist camp, or pursued with more vigor than Khrushchev's goal of imparting increased revolutionary impetus to the bloc nations, while at the same time strengthening socialist solidarity. These two vital factors were--and are--often contradictory in their requirements and effect; proper balance between dynamism and unity within the bloc poses perhaps the greatest challenge to Khrushchev.

One of Khrushchev's first moves in 1954 was to move in the direction of a new accord with Yugoslavia. It was imperative that Yugoslavia be brought back into the socialist camp, or effectively destroyed as a symbol of successful socialist independence. It is probable that both Tito and Khrushchev fully appreciated the objectives and negotiating limitations of the other. What seems equally

probable is that both of these veteran politicians deceived themselves regarding their power to influence the other to modify his position so that an accord could be reached. Tito felt that he could accept from Khrushchev nothing less than unequivocal agreement to Tito's principle of polycentric communism, with Belgrade as a third locus of ideological growth along with Moscow and Peking. Khrushchev, on the other hand, could not be expected to sit by as observer to the disintegration of the empire he was just beginning to bring under his own control. He could recognize in principle the theoretical basis of the "different roads to socialism" thesis, but Khrushchev considered it mandatory that the CPSU be recognized as the fountainhead of ideological wisdom, and the Soviet Union the leading power of the socialist camp. When Yugoslav nationalism conflicted with Soviet internationalism, it was clear in Khrushchev's view that the latter must predominate.

Khrushchev, often considered a hard-headed realist, probably overestimated the strength of the forces moving Tito toward renewed active participation with the bloc. It is also typical of communist leaders to have a dichotomous view of the world political situation, except when talking to or with non-aligned or "neutral" powers. For the communist, class loyalty must be either bourgeois or proletarian, nations must be either imperialist or peace-loving, wars

are either just or unjust. Khrushchev most likely had difficulty visualizing Tito and Yugoslavia in a neutral role, a position referred to by the Titoists as "active coexistence." To Khrushchev, Yugoslavia has either been a member of the peace-loving socialist camp, or a lackey of imperialism.

Most students of this subject accept as Khrushchev's goal during this period the return of Yugoslavia to the socialist camp.[12] It has been suggested that Khrushchev's target year for this accomplishment was 1957.[13] Yet, it appears less than realistic on the part of Khrushchev to have expected Tito's return, on what would have been mostly Soviet conditions. Perhaps, it is more plausible to consider that Khrushchev did not really expect this of Tito, but fully intended instead to be working--or appear to be working--in this direction in order to lure Tito away from his policy of limited cooperation with the Western powers, draw him into a degree of cooperation with the bloc, and then attempt to isolate Yugoslavia and discredit Titoism within the bloc.

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[12] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 313.

[13] Ibid., p. 309.

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[12] Colo/Lee Krawchuk, The Soviet Bloc (New York:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 112.

[13] Ibid., p. 302.

There is some support for this thesis. First of all, Khrushchev was undoubtedly a realist, and it seems unlikely that he would expect Tito to accept more than a loose confederation with the bloc nations. Secondly, an "independent" communist state might serve a very useful purpose in Soviet relations with the uncommitted states. Discreet references to the independent policies being followed by Tito might create a favorable impression with the idealistic Marxists and socialists in these areas. Thirdly, successful "neutralization" of Titoism by the Soviet leaders would give Khrushchev a potent weapon in maintaining revolutionary solidarity in the remainder of the East European states.

For these reasons, it is suggested that the policy followed by Khrushchev in 1955-1957 was to reduce the influence of Titoism, rather than seek the return of Tito to socialist internationalism as defined by the Soviets. The events of the winter 1956-1957 support this view to a certain extent. Tito apparently accepted at face value the Khrushchev pronouncements at Belgrade and Moscow in 1955 and 1956 regarding equality and independence of parties and socialist states, no interference in the internal affairs of others, etc. As a result, Tito encouraged independent action in the other East European capitals in the latter half of 1956, on the basis that the principle of polycentric

communism had become legitimate, and that the Titoist road to socialism was valid for Yugoslavia's socialist neighbors. Accordingly, it is likely that Titoism had a major influence on the activities in Poland and Hungary in 1956, even though the intellectual revolt in this area had been in progress for several months.

As the rebellious activities of the intellectuals in the East European states increased, and the extent of popular dissatisfaction became evident, Khrushchev was compelled to advise the satellite leaders in strong terms in September, 1956, not to attempt "mechanically" to follow the course of Tito, and in two more meetings with Tito he sought Tito's assistance in restraining the devisive forces.[14]

The crisis in Hungary in October-November provided the source of new tensions in Moscow-Belgrade relations. Tito was highly critical of the first Soviet intervention in the Hungarian revolution, calling this intervention a "fatal error" committed against the people of Hungary, ". . . where quite a large part of the working class and progressive people fought in the streets with arms in their hands against the Soviet armed forces."[15] Despite the

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[14] Ibid., p. 205.

[15] Speech by Tito at Pula, November 11, 1956, as

communism had become legitimate, and that the Tito-Stalin rift
in Yugoslavia was vital for Dimitrov's socialist motherland.
Accordingly, it is likely that Tito's role had a major influence on the activities in Poland and Hungary in 1971, even though the intellectual exposé in this area had been in preparation for several months.

In the subsequent activities of the intellectuals in the East European states themselves, and the upsurge of revolutionary opposition become evident, Khrushchev was compelled to devote the critical January to March period of September, 1956, not to attempt "peacefully" to follow the course of Tito, and to try once meeting with Tito on equal terms a assistance in restraining the dissident forces.[14]

The crisis in Hungary in October-November precipitated the rupture of new relations in Moscow-Belgrade relations. Tito was bitterly critical of the rigid Soviet intervention in the Hungarian revolution, calling this intervention a "fatal error" committed against the people of Hungary. ". . . where quite a large part of the working class and progressive people rebelled in the struggle with arms in hand against the brutal force."[15] Despite the

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[14] Ibid., p. 103.

[15] Speech by Tito at Pula, November 11, 1956, as

extent of Tito's involvement in the ferment of these months, and the bluntness of his language on the Soviet tactics, official Soviet reaction was relatively mild, although positive in its criticism of Yugoslav comment. Soviet discipline, intended not only for Yugoslavia but the entire satellite group, was reserved for June of the following year when the Hungarian government announced the trial and execution of Irme Nagy. Nagy had sought refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest toward the end of the revolt, and had been guaranteed safe passage by the Hungarian government out of Hungary when arrested. This Stalinist tactic must have had its desired effect on those East European communists disposed toward a "liberal" course for communism.

It has been typical of the Titoists to attempt to "shore up" their ideological framework whenever their dispute with Russia intensifies, for domestic reasons as well as relations with the bloc. After the Hungarian revolt, and Soviet criticism of Yugoslav lack of socialist internationalism, the Yugoslav leaders began to condemn the Hungarian policies that led up to the revolt, such as the development of top-heavy Stalinist bureaucracy, the police

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quoted in Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record (New York: Prospect Books, 1959), pp. 68-74.

methods of Rakosi and Gero, etc. In a December, 1956, speech,[16] Kardelj, the Yugoslav Vice President, stressed the "traditionally revolutionary role" of the workers' and revolutionary councils, or soviets, in the revolt of 1917 in Russia, and lamented the fact that similar councils had been liquidated in Hungary during the November revolt because of their opposition to the Kadar regime.

The intensity of the dispute fluctuated throughout 1957, as Khrushchev sought not only to discover a basis for renewed ties with Yugoslavia but also to emphasize the need for unity in the socialist camp along with the recognition of separate roads to socialism. An article in Kommunist in April, 1957,[17] criticized Yugoslavia's attitude toward the course of events in Hungary in the fall of 1956. Despite some correct interpretation of the nature of the Hungarian revolution, complained the author, Yugoslav views were a ". . . fundamentally incorrect stand on such important questions as . . . the class nature of the Hungarian events or the aid given the Hungarian people by the Soviet Army." The Yugoslavs had not based their interpretation either on reality or the Marxist method of "class analysis."

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[16]Referenced in Bass, op. cit., p. 87.

[17]A. Berkov, "Unity and Solidarity are the Guarantees of New Successes of the International Communist Movement," Kommunist, No. 6, April, 1957; translated in CDSP, IX, 21, pp. 20-21.

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[16] Referenced in text, see [illegible], p. 77.

[17] A. Berzin, "Unity and Duality are the Characteristics of the Organizational Communist Movement," Komsomolets, No. 5 (April, 1937); translated in CDSP, IX, pp. 20-21.

On the second anniversary of the Belgrade Declaration, the Soviets warned that they were not going to make all the concessions to Yugoslavia:

> It goes without saying that for this friendship to be consolidated it is necessary for our Yugoslav comrades to display a desire to further improve relations with the Soviet Union and with all countries of the socialist camp.[18]

Criticism of the Polish revisionist, Professor L. Kolakowski, was at the heart of the anti-revisionist campaign throughout 1957. Kolakowski not only symbolized the role of the intellectual in the events in Poland leading up to the "Polish October," he was a leading revisionist in the school of philosophers and other intellectuals attempting to devise a humanist Marxism. The Soviets responded that Kolakowski was "profoundly mistaken," that freedom of opposition to Marxism-socialism cannot be permitted, and that Kolakowski had forgotten "the role of the USSR in human progress."[19]

The Soviets again had occasion to criticize Kolakowski's views later in 1957. Kolakowski had indicated that Marxism's primary value lay in its interpretation of the social conditions of the 19th Century, and that Marxism

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[18] *Pravda*, June 2, 1957, p. 5; translated in *CDSP*, IX, 22, p. 19.

[19] *Pravda*, April 6, 1957; translated in *CDSP*, IX, 14, pp. 28-29.

on the second anniversary of the Bolshevik declaration, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was not going to make all the concessions to Lenin's dictatorship.

It does without saying that for this irreconcilable opponents of the Soviet Union it is necessary for our Congress to be convinced of the necessity for our Congress to denounce decisively a treaty to Tsarism imposing enslaving terms with the Soviet Union and with all countries of the Socialist camp.[12]

Creation of the United Left-Socialist Party

Lenin's view of the role of the Left-Socialist Party became one of the "military" in the events in Petrograd and Moscow, and it the leader of the Left-Socialist Party Congress [illegible] not only eliminated the Socialist-Revolutionary Party as a legal opposition to the Bolshevik dictatorship, but also to create a communist monopoly. The Soviets responded that Volkenshtein was "politically mistaken," that Trotsky had [illegible] and declared "the cost of the USSR to human people."[13]

The Soviets again had occasion to criticize Lenin's view later in 1921. Volkenshtein was invited to [illegible] Congress, but refused to go. [illegible] Congress, but refused to go. [illegible] Congress, but refused to go.

became institutionalized and lost its revolutionary-interpretive content.[20]

Any hopes for a lasting settlement of the dispute in 1957 vanished, however, at the Moscow gathering of communist leaders in November, 1957. Khrushchev had been working diligently during 1957 to repair the damage done in late 1956 to the unity and coherence of the bloc. He had met with some success in this endeavor, and as a result the Yugoslav delegation found itself rather isolated during the ideological maneuvering in Moscow. At this conference, the Yugoslav delegation accepted the principles and proposals of the "Peace Manifesto," which was simply a statement of agreement among sixty-four Communist Parties to serve the aspirations of the socialist group of states. Another declaration, commonly referred to as the Twelve Party Declaration (the twelve parties actually in power), attacked revisionism as an attempt to "exorcise the revolutionary spirit of Marxism, to undermine faith in socialism among the working class . . . ," etc. This blast at revisionism was included in a list of "basic laws" applicable to all countries making the transition to socialism. Also unacceptable to the Yugoslavs was the statement that the ". . . cause of peace is upheld by the powerful forces of

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[20] CDSP, IX, 38, pp. 3-6.

". . . Cause of peace is opposed by the powerful forces of

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[10] Ibid., xx, 10, pp. 1-2.

our era: the invincible camp of socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union . . . ."[21]

The refusal of the Yugoslavs to endorse these basic laws, and thus recognize their own sins of the past, led to yet another storm in the already-turbulent relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. This storm, in the nature of an ideological dispute, was not to erupt in full force until the following spring.

The basis of the second Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, as the first, was primarily political. Tito desired a loose arrangement with the Soviet bloc that would allow him freedom to pursue his policy of "active co-existence." Khrushchev wanted either to pressure Tito back into the camp, or isolate Yugoslavia between the Soviet and Western blocs, and effectively destroy the influence of Titoism in the satellites. It has been suggested that the latter was Khrushchev's policy, as it was based on a more realistic interpretation of the situation in the communist world.

Despite the fundamental role of power politics in the dispute between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, ideology has provided the framework for this second controversy

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[21] Pravda, November 22, 1957, translated in CDSP, IX, 47, pp. 3-7; for the text of this declaration officially entitled the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries, also see Benes, et al., op. cit., pp. 12-25.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

to a much greater extent than the first. The role of ideology is not limited merely to providing terms of reference for the dispute; if this were so, the ideological battle within the socialist world over revisionism and opportunism could have been carried on in a much simpler fashion. Considering the extent to which Yugoslavia has pursued its own road to socialism in domestic policy, and even more important its independent foreign policy based upon radical interpretations of Marx, it seems clear that the ideological basis of the dispute is quite real.

Of course, it is difficult to separate the ideological from the purely political factors in such a controversy between two communist states. Any form of revisionism that tends to fragment the socialist camp, undoubtedly, threatens the future viability of the movement and thereby threatens the position of the CPSU as its leader. The ideological charges of revisionism, non-Marxism, opportunism, etc., even if valid in the sense of interpretation of Marxist theory, become tools for maintaining not only ideological purity but also the political hegemony of the leading power.

Although there are several documents pertinent to the ideological bases of this dispute, two of these can be singled out as providing the most important source of the Yugoslav and Soviet positions. These are the first three chapters of the Program adopted by the Seventh Congress of

the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,[22] and an article in Pravda, April 15, 1958, criticizing several aspects of the Draft Program which had been prepared for the consideration of the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists. It is of interest to note the changes made in the Draft Program, illustrated by the Program as finally adopted by the Seventh Congress.

Other available documents provide additional insight. For example, Khrushchev's speech in East Berlin three months after the Pravda article contrasts sharply with that article in Khrushchev's vitriolic attack on the Yugoslav Program. Although the cause of Khrushchev's temper display may be the failure of the Yugoslavs to effect more substantial revisions in their Draft Program as a result of Soviet criticism, it is also probable that Khrushchev was looking beyond Yugoslavia with the intent to influence satellite policies. He noted[23] that the Yugoslav leadership was trying to "impose" its incorrect views on the Yugoslav people,

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[22] Sherman, op. cit., p. 264, considers the program ". . . an attempt to provide a coherent ideology for independent Communism, reconciling absolute power of the Communist Party within the boundaries of the national--or multinational--state with undiminished state sovereignty vis-à-vis other states, Communist and non-Communist alike." The result is a program full of contradictions.

[23] Pravda, July 12, 1958, translated in CDSP, X, 28, pp. 5-8; also found in Benes, op. cit., pp. 202-216.

the leaders of Communists of Yugoslavia,[22] and an article in Pravda, April 15, 1936, criticizing several members of the draft program which had been prepared for the consideration of the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists. It is of interest to note the changes made in the draft program illustrated by the program as finally adopted by the Seventh Congress.

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[22]Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 264, considers the program ". . . an attempt to provide a coherent ideology for Communist Communism, reconciling absolute power of the Communist Party within the Dictatorship of the Proletariat—or multinational—state with undiminished state sovereignty via-à-vis other states, Communist and non-Communist alike." The result is a program full of contradictions.

[23]Pravda, July 11, 1956, translated in CDSP, 8, 28, pp. 3-6; also Time Journ in Depth, op. cit., pp. 202-218.

that the Yugoslavs had failed to subject themselves to criticism, and that Yugoslavia's poor relations with the other communist parties was Yugoslavia's fault, and not a continuation of the 1948 dispute which had been superseded. Khrushchev also made it clear that revisionism not only damages the socialist camp unity directly, but it also aids the cause of the imperialists.

The main force of the Soviet attack in Pravda was directed at the Yugoslav view of the present course of capitalist development, and the class struggle.[24] This, of course, is fundamental to other Marxist tenets. If it is correct, as the Yugoslavs contend (according to Pravda), that the state in a bourgeois democracy is detached from the interests of either the bourgeois or proletariat class, and serves as a "regulator" of the struggle between these classes; and if the increased role of the state in the economic sector of present capitalist states is a step toward socialism; and if there is a possibility of an evolutionary

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[24] See supra, p. 209, fn. 11 for Pravda article; it is interesting to note that the Soviet criticism of the Draft Program of the Yugoslavs was based both on Yugoslav departure "from the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and the theory and practice of the world Communist movement." Benes, op. cit., pp. 95-96 [italics added]. The Soviet ideologues were not going to do battle with the Yugoslavs strictly on the basis of "pure" Marxism-Leninism, but on the creative (Soviet) development of theory in recent years, i.e., relations among socialist countries as structured by the Soviet Union.

that the Yugoslavs had failed to subject themselves to criticism, and that Yugoslavia's poor relations with the other communist parties were Yugoslavia's fault, and not a consequence of the 1948 dispute which had been suppressed. Khrushchev also made it clear that revisionism not only damaged the socialist camp unity directly, but it also aids the cause of the imperialists.

The main focus of the Soviet attack in Pravda was directed at the Tuesday view of the present course of capitalist development, and its class struggle.[24] This, of course, is fundamental to other Marxist tenets. It is in contrast, as the Yugoslavs contend (according to Kardelj), that any place in a bourgeois democracy is detached from the interests of either the bourgeois or proletariat class, and serves as a "regulator" of the struggle between these classes; and if the increased role of the state in the economic sector of present capitalist states is a step toward socialism, and it there is a possibility of an evolutionary

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[24]See Borba, p. 109, fn. 11 for Pravda articles it is interpreting to mean the Soviet criticism of the Dusek group of the Yugoslavs was based both de Yugoslav departure "from the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and the theory and practice of the world Communist movement." Ibid., p. 97. (Italics added). The Soviet ideologues were not going to do battle with the Yugoslavs strictly on the basis of "pure" Marxism-Leninism, but on the creative (Soviet) development of theory in recent years, i.e., relations among socialist countries as structured by the Soviet Union.

transition from present bourgeois democracy to socialism, what is the raison d'être for the international communist movement, with Moscow at its head?

Assuming that the above interpretations represent in simplified form some of the Yugoslav views, general acceptance of these theories in the socialist camp would be fatal to the movement as it has been structured. For this reason, it becomes imperative that the Soviets, Chinese, and others attack and discredit what they consider to be Yugoslav revisionism.

Both the extent and the tone of the Soviet rebuttal to the Yugoslav views on the class struggle indicate the seriousness with which the Soviets view this vital principle of Marx's theory.[25] Pravda criticized the Yugoslavs for concentrating their attention on the political rather than the economic aspects of modern capitalism. The authors of the Pravda article reminded the Yugoslavs that the essence of the class struggle includes the basic truth that the state is a means of oppression controlled by the ruling

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[25]One reason the Soviets objected so strongly to the Yugoslav attitude toward the class struggle is that Lenin, in his theory of imperialism, had projected the concept of class struggle as an internal phenomenon to the struggle between imperialist countries and socialist countries, i.e., an international problem. To reject the class struggle in effect means rejecting the struggle between imperialism and socialism.

transition from present bureaucratic democracy to socialism, what is the raison d'être for the international communist movement, with Moscow at its head?

Assuming that the above interpretations separately or combined from some of the Yugoslav views, several modifications of these theories in the socialist camp would be required to the extent to which they could be fitted to the revisionist as it has been structured. For this reason, it became imperative that the Soviets, Chinese, and others attack and discredit what they considered to be Yugoslav revisionism.

Both the method and the tone of the Soviet rebuttal to the Yugoslav views on the class struggle indicate the determination with which the Soviet bureaucracy, the guardian of Marx's theory,[1] fought contrasting the theoretical foundations that militated on the political extent than the economic aspects of social development. The answer of the Soviet critics featured the hypothesis that the sense of the class struggle underwent the basic change that is a cause of opportunism contrasted by the ruling

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[1] The issue the Soviets objected to strongly in the Yugoslav criticism toward the class struggle is that theory in its theory of imperialism, had projected the concept of class struggle as an internal phenomenon to the extent to which the dependent capitalist countries had developed, i.e., an international process. To reject the class struggle in effect means rejecting the struggle between imperialism and socialism.

class, and that the state cannot act in a neutral fashion with respect to both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The Yugoslavs correctly assessed the growth of monopolistic capital in the present capitalist system, stated Pravda but then failed to assign the proper role of the state, which is controlled by monopolistic capital. Rather than curb monopolistic activities through increased participation in the economy of the bourgeois democracies, the monopolies use the power of the state, which they control, to increase their economic stranglehold of the proletariat, the Soviets claimed. In reality, continued Pravda, the monopolies have "unloaded" certain unproductive industries such as coal, electricity, etc., in those bourgeois states that have attempted nationalization measures, so that they can devote their attention to more profitable industries and further exploit the workers. Thus, instead of the state assuming more control over the national economy through nationalization in such countries as Great Britain and France, the monopolistic capitalists have foisted their losses in these industries upon the workers through taxation to support the nationalized industries, and have, therefore, realized still greater profits from other industries. The bourgeois capitalists can do this only through control of the state institutions and increased oppression of the workers.

of the workers.

The Soviet authors also took the Yugoslavs to task for incorrect interpretation of two other present features of the capitalist system: (1) restrictive measures by the state against small and middle capitalists; and (2) social and political concessions granted by bourgeois capitalism. The Pravda article noted that the capitalist states occasionally acted contrary to the interests of some small and "middle" capitalists, but the state ". . . always and invariably acts in the general interests of the bourgeoisie and in the interests of monopolistic capital."[26] In other words, state action against the weaker capitalist enterprises is merely symptomatic of the increasing concentration of capital in the hands of the monopolists and is certainly no evidence of the impartiality of the state relative to the two classes.

The second incorrect Yugoslav interpretation of modern capitalistic systems concerned concessions granted by the bourgeois state. The Soviet authors emphasized that these concessions were forced upon the bourgeois governments by the successes of the socialist system, and in no way reflected a position of the state as an "unbiased" regulator between the two classes.

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[26] Pravda, May 9, 1958, translated in CDSP, X, 19, pp. 6-11; also see Benes, op. cit., p. 98.

[illegible] The Soviet writers also took the opportunity to take the inconsistent interpretation of two other peculiar features of the capitalist system: (1) restrictive measures by the state against small and middle capitalistry and (2) social and political concessions granted by bourgeois capitalism. The Kievan article makes both the capitalist opinion concerning these functions, namely "capitalists" but the state "a single and universally acting in the general interests of the bourgeoisie and in the interests of monopolistic capital."[35] In other words, state action against the weaker capitalistic enterprises is merely symptomatic of the intervening competition as implied in the theory of the monopolists and is certainly no evidence of the superiority of the state relatives to the two classes.

The second incorrect literary interpretation of modern capitalistic systems concerned the relation of the bourgeois trades. The Soviet authors emphasized that these commodities were flocked upon the bourgeois domestic by the successes of the socialist system, and in no way reflected a position of the state as an "unbiased" negotiator between the two classes.

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[35] Kievan, May 9, 1928, translated in CDSP, V, No. 19, pp. 9-11; also see Sokol, op. cit., p. 56.

The Yugoslavs did not contend, however, that there had been, in fact, a metamorphosis of the capitalist system, but rather that some conditions had changed. When discussing the acts of the state in restricting the role of private capital, the Yugoslavs added that this condition had occurred "without affecting the foundations of the capitalist system itself."[27] This phrase had been omitted in the Pravda version.

Soviet fear of the results of such views of capitalism as those expressed by the Yugoslavs is illustrated by the comment that:

> The thesis of the "independence" of the state in the conditions of contemporary capitalism obliterates the class essence of the bourgeois state and distracts the attention of the proletariat from the historic task of the revolutionary conquest of power.[28]

For present Soviet leaders, the principle of socialist internationalism, or solidarity of the proletarian revolution, as a Marxist basis for successful strategy, is secondary only to the Marxist-Leninist principle of the nature of capitalism in terms of the class struggle. Khrushchev dwells on the need for (and existence of!) socialist unity, almost to the extent of a personal

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[27] Benes, op. cit., p. 36.

[28] Pravda, May 9, 1958, translated in CDSP, X, 19, pp. 6-11; also see Benes, op. cit., p. 99.

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Doubts exist as the results of such views as capitalism as those represented by the Yugoslavs is illustrated by the comment that

> The thesis of the "independence" of the state in the conditions of contemporary capitalism obliterates the class essence of the bourgeois state and distracts the attention of the proletariat from the hitherto case of the revolutionary conquest of power.[38]

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[37] Ibid., op. cit., p. 39.

[38] Programa, May 3, 1958, translated in CDSP, X, 17, pp. 6-11; also see Gomez, op. cit., p. 39.

obsession. The Soviet critics expressed keen disappointment that the principle of socialist unity in the Draft Program was "buried in oblivion," and that the Yugoslavs thought primarily in terms of "principles of equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs" in relations between socialist states. The Soviets considered such nonsense as "petty bourgeois nationalism," and emphasized that socialist cooperation and mutual support cannot result in a violation of equality because of the very nature of socialism.

This self-evident "law" of socialist goodness serves as a proper introduction by the Soviets of the subject of the locus of authority for the socialist system. They had been stung by the Yugoslav charge of Soviet "hegemonism," and responded that "Marxism-Leninism does not deny the possibility of one or another Communist party or socialist country playing the leading role during a certain historic period."[29] They noted that it so happens that during this period the center of the world revolutionary movement happens to be in Russia, where the transformation of society has been practically completed. The present center of the

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[29] Kommunist, April 15, 1958, translated in CDSP, X, 18, pp. 3-11; also see Benes, op. cit., p. 124. The Soviets also criticized the Yugoslav Draft Program for not stressing sufficiently the "rich experience" of the U.S.S.R. in building socialism.

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[29] *Kommunist*, April 15, 1956, translated in *CDSP*, 8, 15, pp. 3-11; also see Deming, *op. cit.*, p. 124. The Soviets also criticized the Yugoslav Party Program for not stressing sufficiently the "class character" of the U.S.A. in omitting capitalism.

socialist revolution is in the Soviet Union because that is the first socialist state, and the socialist state that has been warding off the blows of imperialist reaction to socialist success. This position of the USSR requires it to "render fraternal aid" to the other socialist states, such as its suppression of imperialist counter-revolutionary intervention in Hungary in 1956.

The Soviets also had been wounded by Yugoslav attacks on Soviet failure to implement the process of withering away of the state. The authors of the Pravda article were perhaps on their firmest ideological footing in attacking the Yugoslav concept of the state withering away. The Soviets defended their position not only in Marxism-Leninism, but also in logic. They made it clear that the socialist state could not wither away immediately after the victory of the proletariat because:

1. It needs to defend itself against the inevitable imperialist reaction (such as in Hungary);

2. Society needs to be educated for the transition from socialism to communism, a process that requires many state functions; and

3. National sovereignty must by necessity wither prior to the state itself, but as the people need to adjust to socialism so do states. "The merging of nations does not begin with the withering away of the state but culminates in it."[30]

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[30] Ibid., p. 114.

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> 1. It needs to defend itself against the imperialist reaction (much as in Hungary);
>
> 2. Society needs to be educated for the transition from socialism to communism, a process that requires many state functions; and
>
> 3. National sovereignty must by necessity still reign in the state (small), but as the people need to adjust to socialism so to state.
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> "The decaying of nations does not begin with the withering away of the state but culminates in it."[30]

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[30] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

A Yugoslav position that drew particular Soviet wrath was the Yugoslav treatment of the two world bloc systems as equally responsible for international tension. Tito had made this charge on several previous occasions in his capacity as a neutral "observer," but, nevertheless, the Yugoslavs modified their position on the two blocs in the program adopted by the Seventh Congress.

The Soviet critics concluded their attack on the Draft Program with a lengthy dissertation on the nature of proletarian internationalism and the failure of the Yugoslavs to appreciate the historic and vital role of the Soviet Union in building socialism. The Soviets claimed that the Yugoslavs equated proletarian internationalism with national equality and non-interference in each other's affairs, which is "characteristic of petty bourgeois nationalism."[31]

The authors of the Draft Program were reminded that the November, 1957, Declaration (which the Yugoslavs had not signed) noted ". . . that the invincible camp of socialist states is headed by the Soviet Union;" it was also stated that this leading role is not determined by "subjective desires" but by "objective conditions," i.e., the location of the "center of the world revolutionary

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[31] Ibid., p. 120.

[illegible], p. 120.

movement."[32] The Soviet Union occupies the center because of its vast experience, its sacrifices for world socialism, its rescue of other socialist states after World War II, and, of course, because of its "fraternal aid" to the Hungarian people in the fall of 1956.[33]

It should be obvious, continued the criticism, that the nature of relations among socialist states precludes the possibility of one socialist state exploiting another: exploitation is a characteristic of imperialism.[34]

Throughout the rest of the spring and summer of 1958, the Soviets continued their attacks on Yugoslav revisionism, and the attacks became stronger as time elapsed. In early June, Khrushchev felt confident enough that he could either force Yugoslavia into some sort of reunion with the socialist camp, or completely discredit Yugoslav policy, that he reindorsed the 1948 Cominform resolution as ". . . correct and . . . in accordance with the revolutionary movement." A month previous to this an editorial in Pravda noted that

> . . . the Communist and Workers' parties regard themselves as a component part of the great international Communist movement and display a lively interest in the work and experience of each of the fraternal parties.[35]

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[32] Ibid., pp. 122-124.

[33] Nollau, op. cit., p. 300, refers to this as Soviet ex post facto justification for their intervention in Hungary.

[34] Ibid., p. 126. [35] Benes, op. cit., p. 136.

conquest."[32] The Soviet Union occupies the center position of its vast expressions, its sympathies for world socialism, its rescue of other socialist states (April Day 17), and, of course, because of its "fraternal aid" to the Hungarian people in the fall of 1956."[33]

It should be obvious, continued the criticism, that the question of relevance among socialists always precludes the possibility of the socialist state exploiting another: exploitation is a characteristic of imperialism."[34]

Throughout the rest of the spring and summer of 1958, the Soviets continued their attacks on Togliatti revisionism, and the schism became almost as open as that of early June, when Khrushchev felt confident enough that he could either force Togliatti into some sort of revision with the socialist camp, or completely discredit Togliatti, that he retained--the Iron Curtain revisionism as ". . . a control and . . . in accordance with the revolutionary movement."

A month previous to this an editorial in Pravda noted that

> . . . the Communist and Workers' Parties rupted theoretically in a communist part of the great internationalist movement and display a lively, interest in the work and experiences of each of the fraternal parties."[35]

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[32] Togliatti, p. 122-123.

[33] Mollins, op. cit., p. 309, refers to this as Soviet ex post facto justification for their intervention in Hungary.

[34] Togliatti, p. 124. [35] Pravda, op. cit., p. 126.

The Soviets had renewed their attack on the Yugoslavs with great vigor. Not only had the Soviet and other Communist comradely criticism been rebuffed by the Yugoslavs, the Yugoslavs had engaged in "sharp hysterical attacks" on fraternal parties and had ". . . defended stubbornly their erroneous, essentially anti-Leninist positions on a number of issues."[36]

Despite the lengthy polemics over Marxist theory and the construction of socialism, the essence of the dispute was in the determination of bloc leadership. The Soviets insisted that the "most important question" is the relation of the individual parties to the international Communist movement; ". . . the slightest deviation from the principles of Marxist-Leninism, any manifestation of disassociation or sectarianism, inevitably leads to the quagmire of revisionism . . . ."[37]

Whether the Yugoslav approach is called "socialist democracy," liberal communism, or revisionism depends on one's point of view. It is probably not nearly as liberal as some Western observers feel--nor as revisionist as the Soviet critics claim. Although the Yugoslav concept of socialism has experienced some domestic success, and Titoism was a significant factor in the East European

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[36] Ibid., p. 138. [37] Ibid., p. 155.

The Soviets had opened their attack on the Yugoslav with great vigor. Not only had the Soviet and other Communist countries publicly criticized Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslavs had engaged in "sharp rhetorical attacks" on fraternal parties and had "... defended stubbornly their erroneous, essentially anti-Leninist positions on a number of issues."[26]

Despite the lengthy polemics over Marxist theory and the construction of socialism, the essence of the dispute was in the determination of their leadership. The Soviets insisted that the "most important question" is the relation of the individual parties to the International Communist movement; "... the slightest deviation from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, any weakening of discipline or insubordination, inevitably leads to the opposite of revisionism ..."[27]

Whether the Yugoslav approach is called "socialist democracy," "liberal communism," or revisionism depends on one's point of view. It is probably not merely an liberal as some Western observers feel--nor do certainly the Soviet critics claim. Although the Yugoslav concept of socialism has emphasized some democratic success, and Titoism was a significant factor in the case with

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[26]Ibid., p. 138. [27]Ibid., p. 155.

developments of 1956, the example of Yugoslavia for the other socialist states has not proved to be a major threat to socialist unity as it has evolved since 1956. It is true that the CPSU does not enjoy today whatever "monolithic" control it may have possessed under Stalin's leadership, but as far as the East European satellites are concerned the bloc is not disintegrating, either. Since the failure of the separatist movement in Hungary, the organic differences between Yugoslavia and other East European socialist states has become much more obvious.

If one assumes that during the 1956-1957 period of Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations that Tito wanted to return to the bloc with an autonomous status, and that Khrushchev was intent upon full Yugoslav participation, it appears that both Tito and Khrushchev failed to reach their objectives. We have attempted to demonstrate, however, that whereas Tito actually hoped for some sort of informal tie with the bloc, Khrushchev sought not necessarily the return of Tito to pre-1948 conditions but rather the neutralization of Titoism as a threat to socialist unity. In this light, Khrushchev has achieved a degree of success and Tito has failed.

Khrushchev has been able to neutralize Titoism through an astute combination of practical politics and ideology. Once having drawn Tito back to a form of

socialist cooperation in 1956,[38] Khrushchev soon discarded his references to "separate paths" and concentrated instead in both word and deed upon the theme of socialist unity. He placed renewed emphasis upon personal contacts, especially with the satellite leaders, and stressed not only the advantages of mutual socialist cooperation, but also the dangers to the entire bloc system through nationalistic approaches. Khrushchev continually emphasized that polycentric communism, of fragmentation, would blunt the revolutionary momentum of the bloc and lead to eventual disintegration; on the other hand, positive, centralized leadership was required to continue the building of the socialist revolution. The leadership of the CPSU was implicit in this argument.

It can also be demonstrated that Khrushchev has been the tentative victor in the ideological struggle with Tito, for what little this victory might be worth. Although it can also be shown in different ways how most of the communist leaders are guilty of "revisionism," it seems obvious that the extent of Yugoslav revisionism is tantamount to the movement of the social-democrats at the turn of the

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[38] By means of agreement in principle to the "different paths" concept, and also through economic assistance. Tito consented to give public support to Gomulka and Kadar as his part of the bargain, as well as recognize the German Democratic Republic.

socialist cooperation in 1935,[76] Khrushchev soon discarded his reference to "peaceful path" and concentrated instead in both word and deed upon the theme of socialist unity. He placed renewed emphasis upon personal contacts, especially with the socialist leaders, and stressed not only the advantages of mutual socialist cooperation, but also the dangers to the entire bloc system through nationalistic approaches. Khrushchev continually emphasized that polycentric communism, or fragmentation, would blunt the revolutionary momentum of the bloc and lead to eventual disintegration; on the other hand, reinforced leadership was required to continue the building of the socialist revolution. The inevitable of the CPSU was implicit in this argument.

It can also be demonstrated that Khrushchev has taken the wantonly violent to the ideological struggle with Mao, for what little this victory might be worth. Although it can also be shown in different ways how most of the communist leaders are guilty of "revisionism," it seems obvious that the subject of Yugoslav revisionism is tantamount to the acceptance of the social-democrats at the core of the

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[76] By means of agreement in principle to the "different paths" concept, and also through economic assistance. Tito consented to give public support to Gomulka and basic aspects of the Gierek, as well as recognize the German Democratic Republic.

century, a movement that still espouses the ideals of Marx and Engels but has forsaken the revolutionary tactics of Lenin. Although the "socialist democracy" of the Yugoslavs is not the course advocated by Djilas, a path that would have most likely led to Western style democracy, it is a program of national communism with the emphasis on "national." Khrushchev is convinced, as was Lenin, that socialist solidarity is essential to his cause; Yugoslavia's revised position on modern capitalism removes the requirement for this militant solidarity, and, therefore, the reason for Khrushchev's leadership.

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Here the manuscript comes to an abrupt end, due to the candidate's untimely death in the service of his country.

country.

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